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APPROACHING COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW 
David C. Donald∗ 
ABSTRACT 
This Article identifies several common errors that occur in 
comparative law analyses, offers guidelines to help avoid such errors, 
and provides a framework for studying the company laws of three major 
jurisdictions.  Part I discusses some of the problems that can arise in 
comparative law and offers a few points of caution that can be useful for 
practical, theoretical and legislative comparative law.  Part II examines 
well-known examples of comparative analysis gone astray in order to 
demonstrate the utility of heeding the outlined points of caution.  Part III 
provides an example of using functional definitions to demarcate the 
topic “company law,” offering an “effects” test to determine whether a 
given provision of law should be considered as functionally part of the 
rules that govern the core characteristics of companies.  The relevant 
company law statutes and related topical laws of Germany, the United 
Kingdom and the United States are at the center of this analysis. On the 
basis of this definition, Part IV analyzes the system of legal functions 
that comprise “company law” in the United States and the European 
Union.  Part IV selects as the predominant factor for consideration the 
jurisdictions, sub-jurisdictions and rule-making entities that have legis-
lative or rule-making competence in the relevant territorial unit, analyzes 
the extent of their power, presents the type of law (rules) they enact 
(issue) and discusses the concrete manner in which the laws and rules of 
the jurisdictions and sub-jurisdictions can legally interact.  Part V 
examines the way in which these jurisdictions interact on the temporal 
axis of history and assesses their actual influence on each other which, 
in the relevant jurisdictions, currently takes the form of regulatory com-
petition and legislative harmonization.  The approach outlined in this 
Article borrows much from system theory and the analysis is detailed 
without losing track of the overall jurisdictional framework in the 
countries studied. 
∗ Professor, Chinese University of Hong Kong faculty of law.  I would like to thank 
Theodor Baums and Andreas Cahn for their comments on an earlier draft of this Article. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The disciplines of “comparative law” in general and “comparative 
company law” in particular are natural companions to the globalization 
of social, political and economic activity.  The course of economic and 
political developments in recent decades has thus increased the amount 
of comparative law taking place at every level, whether it be that of fact-
oriented practitioners, result-seeking legislators and development agen-
cies, or theory-focused academics.  Each of these factions has its own 
interests, priorities and goals.  Nevertheless, there are certain approach 
coordinates that mark the path for all their comparative studies.  This 
Article outlines these approach coordinates for the comparison of the 
laws that govern public companies in the United States, the United 
Kingdom and Germany. 
Just as the merchants who engaged in the earliest forms of 
international trade developed a commercial law that was trans-
jurisdictional,1 today’s merchants and their counsel are often at the 
forefront of comparative legal activity.  When a transaction spans inter-
national borders, the persons responsible for structuring it must, by 
necessity, become comparatists.  As Professor Klaus J. Hopt has ob-
served, lawyers and legal counsel “are the real experts in both conflict of 
company laws and of foreign company laws. . . .  Working out the best 
company and tax law structures for international mergers, and forming 
and doing legal work for groups and tax haven operations, is a high, 
creative art.”2  Legal counsel’s consistent choice of a particular structure 
or law can gradually crystallize into a “best practice” which, indepen-
dently or under the auspices of professional associations3, can lead to 
many jurisdictions adopting that practice and converging toward a 
 1. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW 13 
(3d ed. 2007). 
 2. Klaus J. Hopt, Comparative Company Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW 1161, 1169 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 
2006) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]. 
 3. Such “associations” can range from the International Chamber of Commerce 
and its international commercial terms for international sales transactions, to the 
International Bar Association and its numerous practice guides, to the voluntarily 
adopted master framework agreements created by organizations like the International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc.  See International Chamber of Commerce 
Homepage, http://www.iccwbo.org (last visited Sept. 19, 2008); International Bar 
Association Homepage, http://www.ibanet.org (last visited Sept. 19, 2008). 
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perceived optimal rule.  In this way, the practical choices of lawyers 
eventually become recognized legal norms.  Comparative scholars like 
Professor Philip R. Wood, whose numerous books focus on the practical 
details of the financial laws and instruments in many countries,4 give 
internationally active lawyers the information they need to approach 
transnational problems. Professor Wood specifically focuses on 
providing detailed and accurate information about disparate legal sys-
tems, rather than reflecting on the policy goals of legislation or seeking 
an overall coherence of a given system’s solution to a specific problem.5 
Comparative activity with great practical impact also occurs in 
venues quite removed from commercial transactions.  The unpreceden-
ted level of international cooperation transpiring on the regulatory side 
of globalization creates systematic comparative studies that have drama-
tically accelerated legal understanding and convergence.  Any project to 
harmonize national laws or to draft a convention to govern an area of 
law among nations will likely compare laws to find the best (or at least 
the most mutually acceptable) solution.  Institutions such as the 
European Union,6 the United Nations,7 the International Institute for the 
 4. See, e.g., PHILIP R. WOOD, COMPARATIVE FINANCIAL LAW (1995) [hereinafter 
WOOD, FINANCIAL LAW]; PHILIP R. WOOD, COMPARATIVE LAW OF SECURITY INTERESTS 
AND TITLE FINANCE (2d ed. 2007) [hereinafter WOOD, COMPARATIVE SECURITY 
INTERESTS]. 
 5. The method used, as is appropriate for the goal of the comparative study, 
centers around the practitioner’s desire to use the law: “[t]here are three broad steps in 
this type of measurement: (1) the legal rules; (2) the weighting of the importance of the 
legal rules in practice; and (3) actual implementation or compliance by the jurisdiction 
concerned.”  WOOD, COMPARATIVE SECURITY INTERESTS, supra note 4, at 16. 
 6. See PAUL CRAIG & GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND 
MATERIALS 1189-95 (3d ed. 2008).  As it developed from an initial six to its current 27 
member states over a 50 year period, the European Economic Community (then 
European Union) harmonized a core of minimum standards in many areas, followed this 
up with mutual recognition of member state law while restricting harmonization to 
health and safety, and introduced a parallel movement of European standardization. 
This combination of legislative strategies allowed mandatory harmonization to pave an 
initial uniformity, making home rule and voluntary convergence acceptable, which in 
turn led to unproblematic harmonization so that the laws of the separate member states, 
particularly the late entries, which became ever more tightly matched to each other.  
This was particularly relevant for late entries, who were forced to adopt packages of 
introductory laws.  See id. 
 7. In particular, the Commission on International Trade Law (UNICTRAL) and 
the Office of Legal Affairs, Codification Division’s Codification of International Law.  
See generally United Nations International Law, http://www.un.org/law (last visited 
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Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT)8 and the Hague Conference on 
Private International Law9 engage in comparative law on a grand scale 
in order to produce their directives, regulations and conventions.  This 
activity falls under the rubric of “legislative comparative law” in the 
descriptive schema offered by Professor Konrad Zweigert and Professor 
Hein Kötz, and has historically been one of comparative law’s most 
solid domains.10  If legislative efforts seek to achieve a specific result – 
such as economic prosperity, stable government or investor protection11 
– then a second level problem arises: the legislator must correctly 
ascertain a causal connection between the chosen law or legal system on 
the one hand, and the desired social or economic effect on the other.  
The latter, second-level type of project falls squarely within the mission 
of institutions such as the World Bank, which seeks to “help developing 
countries and their people . . . [by] building the climate for investment, 
jobs and sustainable growth . . . .”12  In addition to the studies prepared 
by their experts, much of the academic comparative law produced in 
universities also supports the activities of legislators and development 
agencies. 
The increasingly high stakes of correctly understanding foreign law 
– both for the success of commercial transactions and for the comparing, 
choosing and implementing of laws carried out by international 
organizations – have naturally drawn an increasing amount of academic 
Sept. 19, 2008). 
 8. UNIDROIT “is an independent intergovernmental Organisation . . . [whose] 
purpose is to study needs and methods for modernising, harmonising and co-ordinating 
private and in particular commercial law as between States and groups of States.” 
UNIDROIT: An Overview, http://www.unidroit.org/dynasite.cfm?dsmid=84219 (last 
visited Sept. 19, 2008). 
 9. “Since 1893, the Hague Conference on Private International Law, a melting pot 
of different legal traditions, develops and services Conventions which respond to global 
needs . . . .” HCCH Homepage, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php (last visited Sept. 19, 
2008). 
 10. See KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 
51 (Tony Weir trans., Oxford Univ. Press 3d rev. ed. 1998) (1977).  See also Charles 
Donahue, Comparative Law Before the Code Napoléon, in HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 
3 (“Modern comparative lawyers . . . tend to date the foundation of their discipline to 
the nineteenth century and to the promulgation of the great European codes.”). 
 11. See ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 10, at 11 (explaining how “applied” 
comparative law can be used to solve specific legal policy problems). 
 12. The World Bank:  About Us, http://go.worldbank.org/DM4A38OWJ0 (last 
visited Sept. 19, 2008). 
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attention to comparative law.  Although steady growth of this field 
actually began in the 19th century with the major codifications in 
Continental Europe,13 a dramatic upsurge ensued as efforts to develop 
the economies of the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China 
took off in the 1990’s.14  More recently, activity has been particularly 
intense in the area of comparative company law, specifically addressing 
questions of “comparative corporate governance,” comparative “investor 
protection”15 and, within the European Union itself, comparative 
methods of “creditor protection.”16  Major events in this “academic com-
parative law” include the 2006 publication of the Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Law,17 a collection of theoretical essays on the activity of 
comparative law, and the collaboration of seven leading corporate law 
scholars from different jurisdictions in 2004 to produce a high-level 
comparison of the company law of the United States, Europe and 
Japan.18 
Comparative company law is thus expanding quickly at various 
levels of abstraction and practice.  Each level has its own focus and its 
own tasks.  First, the practical comparatist might concern herself with 
the type of document filed or lodged in order to perfect a security 
interest.  Second, the legislative comparatist might focus on whether a 
specific regime for collateral will stimulate desired commercial activity.  
Lastly, the theoretically-oriented academic comparatist might well be 
occupied with whether the practical comparatist’s understanding of both 
“filings” and “creditor possession,” as two forms of “publicity,”19 is a 
tenable functional analysis, or whether it displays unacceptable levels of 
an Aristotelian teleological essentialism.20  All three levels of activity 
 13. See ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 10, at 51. 
 14. See generally Mathias Reimann, The Progress and Failure of Comparative 
Law in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 671, 691-92 
(2002). 
 15. See infra Part II.B-C. 
 16. See 7 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. (2006) (discussing efficient creditor protection in 
European company law); see also Ellis Ferran, The Place for Creditor Protection On 
the Agenda for Modernisation of Company Law in the European Union, 3 EUR. CO. & 
FIN. L. REV. 178 (2006). 
 17. See HANDBOOK, supra note 2. 
 18. See REINIER R. KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A 
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (2004). 
 19. See WOOD, COMPARATIVE SECURITY INTERESTS, supra note 4, at 140-41. 
 20. See Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in 
HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 339, 345-47. 
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occur separately but are closely related; many works, like that of Wood, 
tend to cross the line from practice to theory and back again.21  Like any 
other theoretical pursuit, academic comparative law examines the steps 
taken in the practical activity of comparison in an attempt to make its 
methods more transparent and conscious, and its results more objective 
and accurate.22  This includes, at a minimum, scrutiny of: the 
perspective from which foreign legal systems are investigated and 
understood; the scope and content of such investigation; the conceptual 
tools that are used to compare and evaluate laws; and the basis on which 
causal links between law and a desired social or economic resu
ted.23 
One of the best methodological analyses of comparative law, that of 
Zweigert and Kötz, proposes a flexible, inductive process of preliminary 
hypotheses, investigation of functional values, checking of preliminary 
results and reformulation of hypotheses.24  Although Professor Ralf 
Michaels, in his excellent analysis of the functional method in 
comparative law, finds that this approach “has an irrational ring to it” 
that would distance comparison from “scientific aspirations,”25 the 
approach is essentially the same as what he praises in the work of Ernst 
Cassirer.  Regarding the work of Cassirer, Michaels states, “it is not 
necessary to recognize some essence of a particular element; it is suffi-
cient to understand the element as a variable result of a functional 
connection with another variable element.”26  Seen against this back-
ground, the method proposed by Zweigert and Kötz – which moves back 
and forth between functional parts understood in a hypothetical whole 
and adjustments to the initial understanding of that whole based on new 
information gained from an analysis of the parts – is not irrational at all, 
but rather phenomenological; it roughly resembles a key method of one 
of Cassirer’s more famous contemporaries, Martin Heidegger.  In the 
“hermeneutic circle” that is central to Heidegger’s ontology, a higher-
level, presupposed concept necessarily encompasses the relational 
values of the individually existing, lower-level items.  An understanding 
of the latter then helps better to understand the true nature of the pre-
 21. See WOOD, COMPARATIVE SECURITY INTERESTS, supra note 4, at 140-46. 
 22. See ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 10, at 33-34, 43-44. 
 23. See id. at 32-47. 
 24. See id. at 33-34. 
 25. See Michaels, supra note 20, at 360. 
 26. See id. at 355. 
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ue, they are only one solution to a given problem for the 
com
work.29  The functions of a given right, duty or organizational form 
supposed, higher-level concept, and so on.  This circle is not “irrational” 
or tautological; it is a methodological tool used to grasp relational 
values.27  While these values for Heidegger are to be understood as 
essential and tr
paratist.28 
The dangers of using this circular method – which utilizes an 
assumed whole to determine the function of the parts and a deeper 
understanding of various parts’ complementary functions to reformulate 
the model of the whole – cannot be reduced to a simple checklist.  It is 
important that accurate information about the respective legal systems 
be procured and that only comparable items be compared to avoid 
creating useless or misleading comparisons.  Additionally, one must re-
member that unlike discrete objects (e.g., apples and oranges), legal 
rights, duties, and forms cannot be accurately compared in isolation.  
Rights and duties exist within legal systems and tend to serve relative 
(i.e., not transcendently essential) functions within their overall frame-
 
 27. See MARTIN HEIDEGGER, SEIN UND ZEIT 7, 148 (1928).  In another context, 
Michaels accepts the hermeneutic circle as comparable to the “way in which 
cial response to a universal problem is ill placed in comparative 
inds “equivalence functionalism” to bear promise for comparative 
law
on of its elements, rather than set up by elements that are independent of 
mathematicians recognize functions . . . .”  Michaels, supra note 20, at 369. 
 28. Michaels’ critique on the ends of this method, on the other hand, appears to be 
both a correct and significant contribution to comparative law.  He observes that for 
Zweigert: “[i]nstitutions are contingent while problems are universal, the function can 
serve as tertium comparationis, different legal systems find similar solutions by 
different means, so universal principles of law can be found and formulated . . . .” 
Michaels, supra note 20, at 346.  By contrast, a more sophisticated functionalism would 
recognize the irregularities in systems: laws have both “manifest” and “latent” 
functions, societies are sometimes dysfunctional rather than functionally symmetric, 
and elements of a society can even be non- or anti-functional.  All this suggests that the 
search for the perfect so
law.  See id. at 352-53. 
 29. Michaels f
.  He explains: 
Functional equivalence means that similar problems may lead to different solutions; 
the solutions are similar only in their relation to the specific function under which they 
are regarded. . . .  Equivalence functionalism by contrast explains an institution as a 
possible but not necessary response to a problem, as one contingent solution amongst 
several possibilities.  As a consequence, the specificity of a system in the presence of 
(certain) universal problem lies in its decision for one against all other (functionally 
equivalent) solutions.  Legal developments are thus no longer necessary but only 
possible, not predetermined but contingent.  This method in turn requires an 
understanding of society (and its subsystems, including law) as a system constituted 
by the relati
each other. 
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might also complement other functions within the same system, creating 
an almost organic network of interdependence within the legal system.  
In order to better understand what is strictly considered “law,” compara-
tists must also remain conscious of the fact that legal systems exist 
within societies and both receive and exercise influence vis-à-vis such 
societies.  Since societies further exist in the context of history, and 
develop and change in relation to historical events, the comparatist must 
often be aware of the historical position of the legal system being 
studied.  Finally, since at least one leg of a legal comparison will include 
a law or legal system of a foreign state or country, or from a distant 
time, accurate comparison will require an acute awareness of the 
distorting tendencies of one’s own perspective in time, nation, and 
culture.  The foregoing indicates that comparatists should exercise 
caution with regard to (at least) the following points of approach: 
• Obtain accurate information and compare only comparable 
items; 
• Examine the functional values of system components within 
the context of the society as a whole; 
• Duly consider history’s impact on the legal system; and 
• Be aware of the natural distorting tendencies of one’s own 
perspective.30 
It might seem that the utility of such a list would be limited to an 
introductory text on comparative law and need not be addressed to pro-
fessionals actually engaging in comparative or applied comparative law.  
As Part II of this Article will make clear, however, examples of highly 
skilled professionals ignoring these approach coordinates are not diffi-
cult to find. 
The purpose of this Article is to outline a feasible approach to 
comparative company law that takes into account at least these 
methodological cautions, which are straightforward enough for practi-
tioners, yet contain much of the theoretical insight offered by academic 
comparative law.  Each of the four points will be fleshed out with a 
well-known case from comparative law literature. Thereafter, the Article 
will sketch out a basis for comparison of three major systems of 
company law: the German, as found primarily in the Stock Corporation 
Id. at 358-59 (citation omitted). 
 30. See ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 10, at 32-47. 
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Act (Aktiengesetz or “AktG”),31 the British, as found primarily in the 
Companies Act 2006 (“CA 2006”)32 and the U.S., as found primarily in 
state corporate law, represented here by the Delaware General 
Corporation Law (“DGCL”).33  This analysis will attempt to clarify 
what is comparable, demarcate the systemic boundaries within which 
respective functions can be sought and compared and illuminate certain 
prejudices that the differences between these three jurisdictions can 
evoke at this point in history.  The Article will thus be organized as 
follows:  Part II will look at examples of comparisons that failed to heed 
the points of caution summarized above.  Part III will define the term 
“company law” by examining the topical laws that could reasonably be 
included in a study of company law, thus addressing the warning 
conveyed in the first cautionary point above.  Part IV will examine the 
law and rulemaking bodies responsible for creating such topical laws in 
Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States.  Part V will then 
analyze how the various levels of legislation interact in these three 
jurisdictions, thus creating the framework necessary to heed cautionary 
points two and three.  Finally, Part VI will offer conclusions. 
II. FIVE POINTS OF CAUTION WHEN APPROACHING  
COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW 
A. Obtain accurate information about the legal system  
and compare only comparables 
Perhaps the most immediate danger faced by comparative lawyers 
is the risk of basing an analysis on incomplete or incorrect information 
about the legal systems being studied,34 especially since reliable 
information may be far away and written in a foreign language.  This ex-
plains the utility of the numerous texts that present translations or 
summary analyses of the laws of various countries in English.  These 
texts, however, are usually organized by dedicating a chapter to each 
country; little or no effort is made to draw comparative conclusions 
 
 31. Aktiengesetz  [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBI.1 (F.R.G.) 
[hereinafter AktG]. 
 32. Companies Act 2006, ch. 46, available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/acts 
2006/pdf/ukpga_20060046_en.pdf. 
 33. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 (2008). 
 34. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
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about the laws of the separate jurisdictions.35 
The problem of incomplete or incorrect information can arise in 
even the best comparative legal scholarship and even regarding law that 
is very close to home.  Take, for example, one of today’s most influ-
ential schools of comparative company law, led by finance theorists 
Professors Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, 
and Robert Vishny (hereinafter the “Origin Theorists”).  These scholars 
are best known for their argument that legal systems originating from 
common law lead to effective investor protection and, consequently, to 
the development of stock markets and prosperity.  They also believe 
that, on the contrary, legal systems originating from the civil law do not 
offer such benefits.36  The Origin Theorists summarize one of their key 
findings as follows: “Common law countries have the strongest pro-
tection of outside investors – both shareholders and creditors – whereas 
French civil law countries have the weakest protection.  German civil 
law and Scandinavian countries fall in between, although comparatively 
speaking they have stronger protection of creditors, especially secured 
creditors.”37  This conclusion is based on a list created by the Origin 
Theorists, wherein each country listed was assigned a governance index 
score based on the existence of certain predetermined shareholder 
rights.38  From the perspective of corporate law, however, this method is 
problematic because it: (1) presumes that certain rights are universal 
keys to investor protection while others are not,39 (2) presumes that the 
 35. See, e.g., SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS IN EUROPE (Sweet & Maxwell, 2004) 
(containing separate, detailed chapters on the major European jurisdictions for securities 
transactions written by leading corporate and financial law firms in the respective 
jurisdiction). 
 36. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Gover-
nance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 8, 15-16 (2000). 
 37. Id. at 8. 
 38. See id. at 8-11. 
 39. Sanjai Bhagat et al., The Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance Indices 
67-68 (Eur. Corporate Governance Inst., Working Paper, No. 89, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1019921. 
[I]ndices are constructed so as to treat all component governance mechanisms as 
complements, when the data suggest that several such mechanisms are actually 
substitutes for, and not complements to, each other and the relation appears to vary 
across firm characteristics and industry sectors. In short, one size does not fit all. 
Good governance is therefore best understood as highly context-specific, something 
that even the best-constructed index simply cannot capture and convey. 
Id. 
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rights on the books can in fact be effectively exercised in the juris-
dictions the Origin Theorists favor,40 and, most importantly (3) fails to 
use accurate information on the nature of the law in the jurisdictions it 
discusses. 
The Origin Theorists view civil law countries as “interventionist” 
and “bureaucratic,”41 while they understand common law countries to 
use flexible standards like “fiduciary duty” and “fairness” to protect 
private property.42  But as Professor Mark Roe has rightly pointed out: 
State presence in common law systems today exceeds its historical 
presence in civil law nations. . . .  The United States began moving 
away from judge-made law, and even away from legislatively made 
but judicially enforced law, well over a century ago when Congress 
set up the Interstate Commerce Commission and chose to have 
regulators, not judges, make law.43 
At least until 2003, the rules of the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) created a web of regulations more pervasive than 
those found in any European country, whether of civil or common law 
origin.44  As discussed in Parts IV.A.2-4 of this Article, the European 
 40. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 864 (2005). Professor Lucian Bebchuk has explained repeated-
ly in many contexts how the guarantees bestowed on shareholders by corporate statutes 
are not as effective in practice as they might seem on paper.  For example, 
“shareholders’ veto power over charter amendments and reincorporations cannot effec-
tively ensure the passage of value-increasing changes” because it is a mere right to 
react, not to act, and “management’s agenda-setting power under existing arrangements 
also enables it to obtain shareholder approval for changes that, by themselves, reduce 
shareholder value” by bundling the proposal to an attractive transaction up for 
shareholder vote.  Id. 
 41. See, e.g., La Porta et al., supra note 36, at 12. 
 42. See, e.g., id. at 9. 
 43. Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets, 120 HARV. L. 
REV. 460, 484 (2006).  See also Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public Enforcement 
of Securities Laws: Preliminary Evidence (Harvard Public Law Working Paper, No. 08-
28, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1000086) (discussing the levels of regu-
latory enforcement in common and civil law countries and their correlation to market 
volume, which shows a higher staffing of regulatory agencies in common as compared 
to civil law countries). 
 44. As discussed in Section IV.B.3, infra, the European Union studied the 
possibility of a pan-European securities market and began enacting directives and 
regulations in this regard in 2001.  See Report of Committee on the Regulation of 
European Securities Markets, infra note 295 and accompanying text. 
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Commission has all but eliminated this imbalance with a cluster of 
directives on securities regulation, some of which track recommen-
dations from the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO),45 in which the United States plays a leading role.46 
Perhaps it is a point of American pride to think of the U.S. markets 
as lean and unbureaucratic.  However, this is belied by the fact that 
foreign issuers have historically found the cost of filing under the SEC’s 
extensive regulatory regime to outweigh the costs of excluding Ameri-
can investors from their offerings47 and excluding American journalists 
from their road shows.48  Further, the SEC has issued safe harbor rules 
like Regulation S49 and Rule 134e50 promising that, when the safe 
harbor conditions are met, the Commission will not reach out 
extraterritorially to cast its heavy regulatory net over such foreign 
 45. For example, IOSCO released its report “International Disclosure Standards for 
Cross-Border Offerings and Initial Listings by Foreign Issuers” in 1998, which the SEC 
carried almost without change into an amended Form 20-F in 2000.  See Int’l 
Disclosure Standards, Securities Act Release Nos. 33–7745; 34–41936, 64 Fed. Reg. 
53900 (Oct. 5, 1999). The European Union simultaneously incorporated many elements 
of the IOSCO Report in its Prospective Directive in 2003. The result is substantially 
identical annual disclosure requirements for listed issuers in the United States and the 
European Union.  See Directive 2001/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, 2003, O.J. (L 345) 64, 66 (EU) (describing the prospectus to be published 
when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and amending Directive 
2001/34/EC). 
 46. See infra Part IV.A.2-4. 
 47. See Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release Nos. 33-6863; 34-27942, 
55 Fed. Reg. 18306 (May 2, 1990). 
[T]he significant increase in offshore offerings of securities, as well as the significant 
participation by U.S. investors in foreign markets, present numerous questions. . . . 
The Regulation adopted today is based on a territorial approach . . . . The registration 
of securities is intended to protect the U.S. capital markets and investors purchasing in 
the U.S. market . . . . Principles of comity and the reasonable expectations of 
participants in the global markets justify reliance on laws applicable in jurisdictions 
outside the United States . . . . 
Id. 
 48. See Offshore Press Confs., Meetings with Co. Reps. Conducted Offshore and 
Press-Related Materials Released Offshore, Securities Act Release Nos. 33–7470; 34–
39227, 62 Fed. Reg. 53948 (Oct. 17, 1997) (“U.S. journalists are being excluded on a 
regular basis from the offshore press activities of foreign issuers. . . . The purpose of 
this rulemaking is to eliminate this unintended and undesirable consequence of the 
Commission’s rules governing offering publicity.”). 
 49. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.901. 
 50. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.135e. 
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activities.  As discussed in Part II.C, countries in Continental Europe 
may indeed have legislatively disfavored capital markets, but this was 
part of a political choice to favor labor over capital and did not result 
from their law being less judicial or more pervasive.51  A comparison of 
national political and economic policies would be the most appropriate 
tool to prove this point, as opposed to a common law/civil law 
comparison.  It is simply inaccurate to describe U.S. securities 
regulation as slim, flexible and judicially-oriented while simultaneously 
characterizing the capital markets regulation of civil law countries as 
pervasive, ri
The Origin Theorists also depend on the rather aged argument that 
judges in civil law jurisdictions, rather than adjusting law by analogy to 
the case at hand, mechanically compare facts to rigid rules: “The vague 
fiduciary duty principles of the common law are more protective of 
investors than the bright line rules of the civil law, which can often be 
circumvented by sufficiently imaginative insiders.”52  In 1982, however, 
nearly twenty years before the Origin Theorists’ article on investor pro-
tection was published, the German High Federal Court issued the 
Holzmüller decision.53 This landmark decision judicially created a right 
for shareholders to vote on the management decision to spin off a 
substantial portion of the company’s assets into a subsidiary.54  In its 
opinion, the Court explained: 
The express provisions of the Stock Corporation Act offer the 
shareholders of the parent company insufficient protection against 
such encroachments. . . . At least in this case, it is certainly necessary 
to protect these shareholders from the danger that, by making 
fundamental decisions in the subsidiary, the management board will 
exploit the structure it has created through its power of 
representation to further diminish those shareholder rights that have 
already been weakened by the spin-off. . . . This is a real gap in the 
Stock Corporation Act that should be closed in accordance with the 
Act’s systematic design and policy aims.  It would unduly restrict a 
necessary extension of the law through judicial precedent 
(Rechtsfortbildung) to ask the damaged shareholders to wait for a 
 51. See infra Part II.C. 
 52. La Porta et al., supra note 36, at 9. 
 53. Bundesgerichshof [BGH] [Federal High Court] Feb. 25, 1982, 174 
Entscheidungen des Budesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 80 (F.R.G.). 
 54. Id. at 341. 
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future legislative amendment or further clarification in the legal 
scholarship . . . .55 
Such judicial flexibility is widely practiced in civil law countries.  
For example, because much of the Code Napoleon56 still remains in its 
original form from 1804, French judges have, through a large and 
growing body of judicial decisions over the last 200 years, adapted the 
statutory rules to the changing nature and problems of society.57 
In the presence of a well-known socio-political difference – like the 
post-war Continental European political tendency to prefer the protec-
tion of labor over the promotion of capital investment – a comparatist 
might be tempted not only to argue that the difference is caused by 
diverging legal origins, as do the Origin Theorists, but also to seek 
support for the difference in flawed comparisons, such as comparing 
diverging laws that also have diverging functions. Such errors can easily 
occur, primarily because use of the functional method means one must 
detach laws from their “literal” meaning and derive a “functional” 
purpose based on one’s understanding of the legal system in question.58  
The “functional” method used in comparative law, like the functional 
analysis in sociology,59 and the “structural” method employed in 
 55. Id.  This decision is merely one of the better known cases of judicially crafted 
doctrine, but is by no means an isolated occurrence.  Another landmark decision is the 
German High Federal Court’s adoption of the “entity theory” over the “aggregate 
theory” for general (civil law) partnerships in 2000.  See 146 Entscheidungen Des 
Bundesgerichtshofes In Zivilsachen (BGHZ) 341 (2001).  In the United States, this was 
achieved by the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (1997), as courts were unable to 
judicially adopt such a theory.  This clear reversal of the antiquated characterization of 
flexible, judicially made common law and rigid, statutory civil law further calls the 
position of the Origin Theorists into question. 
 56.  THE CODE NAPOLÉON (Bryant Barrett trans., Reed, 1811, reprinted by Gryphon 
1983). 
 57. See ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 10, at 80-84 (discussing the judicial 
development of the Code Napoléon). 
 58. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Legal Approaches to Restricting Distributions to 
Shareholders: The Role of Fraudulent Transfer Law, 7 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 199, 
201 (2006) (showing that U.S. rules on “fraudulent conveyance,” the literal purpose of 
which is to protect bankruptcy creditors, actually function like European capital 
maintenance rules). 
 59. With respect to functional analysis in sociology, Ralf Michaels has succinctly 
explained Émile Durkheim’s contribution: 
[f]irst, he separated functions from origins and established functions as relations 
between, not qualities of, elements. Second, he emphasized that the goals of 
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anthropology60 and literary criticism,61 splits the studied object into the 
two levels of “name” or “essence” on the one hand, and relative 
“function” on the other.  The use of function instead of name or essence, 
however, dislodges the object of comparison from its linguistic or 
conceptual moorings and introduces the risk that the comparatist will 
abuse the elasticity of the “function” concept.  A well-informed legal 
scholar’s interpretation of function will usually be accurate, even if no 
particular comparative methodology is self-consciously applied.  For 
example, the cases of “functional convergence” in corporate governance 
that Professor John C. Coffee argued to exist even in the face of clear 
“formal divergence”62 have generally been seen as valid interpretations 
of comparable functions despite different formal provisions of law.63 
individuals were contingent and therefore not the valid material of scientific 
endeavours. . . . As long as the ends or goals of an institution had been its inherent 
elements, any explanation had to be teleological, and an analysis would have to focus 
either on the will of a transcendent creator or on the inherent nature of things. If 
institutions were defined by the purpose defined by their creators, a systematic 
analysis had to be impossible. . . . The emphasis on objective functions . . . distinct 
from both origin and purpose, allowed the search for general laws, the goal of all 
sciences. 
Michaels, supra note 20, at 349-50. 
 60. A memorable functional analysis in anthropology is Claude Levi-Strauss’ 
comparison of mythical thought, characterized as “bricolage”, to scientific thought.  
Levi-Strauss stated that both are merely constructive activities and the primary 
difference between the two is that the bricoleur improvises on the basis of an existing 
repertoire while the engineer subordinates each task performed to the availability of 
certain materials. See CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, THE SAVAGE MIND 17-18 (George 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson Ltd. trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1966) (1962). 
 61. The functional method in literary criticism can be traced back to VLADIMIR 
PROPP, MORPHOLOGY OF THE FOLK TALE (Laurence Scott trans., 2d ed. 1968).  The 
school of thought that developed out of Propp’s work became known as “Structural-
ism.”  See, e.g., WINFRIED NÖTH, HANDBOOK OF SEMIOTICS 298 (1990). 
 62. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global 
Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641 
(1999).  “Although this Article agrees with the path dependency perspective that formal 
convergence faces too many obstacles to be predicted, it argues that functional 
convergence can be facilitated . . . .” Coffee focuses on how the participants in inter-
national mergers and listings can find ways functionally to bridge formally different 
legal rules.  Id. at 650. 
 63. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence 
of Form or Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329, 349 (2001).  Although Coffee and Gilson 
are to a certain extent relying on each other’s work in these articles, the validity of 
functional analysis in comparative company law is firmly established.  See, e.g., 
KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 4. 
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However, when comparisons are performed deductively on the 
basis of well-known differences – rather than inductively on the actual 
basis of laws or their functions – there is a risk of the comparison be-
coming merely “anecdotal” and thus incapable of actually yielding 
knowledge.  For example, consider the debate on executive compen-
sation that followed the disclosure of the exorbitant sums granted to 
former General Electric CEO Jack Welch and former New York Stock 
Exchange CEO Richard Grasso, as described in the celebrated book on 
the subject by authors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried.64  Foremost, as 
is well known from studies such as those written by Roe,65 Germany is 
(or at least was66) a “social democracy” in which the profit principle is 
to a certain extent subordinate to the general good, and particularly to 
the good of employees, pursuant to a generally recognized national 
policy.  In addition, German corporations are managed by a board of 
managing directors that are legally required to act as a “collegial” body, 
deemphasizing leadership by any one man or woman.67  In 2006, the 
average compensation of an executive filling a role most comparable to 
a CEO was just under €5 million in 29 major German corporations.68  
This average was further elevated by Deutsche Bank’s Chief Managing 
Director, Josef Ackermann, who earned over €13 million,69 a figure still 
considerably lower than the $25 million taken home by Charles Prince 
of Citicorp in the same year.70  Nevertheless, this state of affairs promp-
 64. LUCIEN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004). 
 65. See, e.g., MARK ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
29-33 (2003). 
 66. See Peer Zumbansen, The Parallel Worlds of Corporate Governance and 
Labor Law, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 261 (2006) (detailing a more recent and a 
rather more “German” opinion on the German economic structure). 
 67. See AktG § 77(1) (“If the management board is composed of more than one 
person, all members are authorized only collectively for executive management. The 
articles or the by-laws may provide otherwise; they may not provide, however, that one 
or more members make disputed decisions against the position held by the majority of 
the board.”). 
 68. Catherine Hoffmann, Warum verdienen Manager so viel Geld?, FRANKFURTER 
ALLGEMEINE SONNTAGSZEITUNG, July 22, 2007, at 44. 
 69. See id. 
 70. Barnaby J. Feder, For Citigroup’s C.E.O., It Was a Very Good Year, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 14, 2007, at C9,  available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/14/busi 
ness/businessspecial/14citipay.html?fta=y. 
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ted German politicians across the political spectrum to react.  Oskar 
Lafontaine, leader of the Leftist Party, advocated restricting CEO 
compensation to a multiple of 20 times that of the company’s lowest 
paid employee. 71  Going a step further, Renate Künast, a Green Party 
cabinet member, flatly stated that salaries running into the millions are 
“immoral,” and Wolfgang Schäuble, a Christian Democratic Union 
cabinet member, was reported as saying that leading citizens must set 
good moral example; if they fail to restrict their own excessive salary, 
the state should then step in to do so.72  The foregoing indicates a sig-
nificant divergence in how executive compensation is viewed in 
Germany and the United States, given each country’s unique social and 
legal contexts. 
In an article73 presenting an anecdotal analysis of decisions re-
garding executive compensation in German and U.S. courts, Franklin 
Gevurtz, a leading U.S. corporate law scholar, compared the German 
judiciary’s decision regarding the “golden handshake”74 paid out to the 
former CEO of Mannesmann AG, Dr. Klaus Esser, following the 
company’s takeover by Vodafone Plc, with the Delaware judiciary’s 
decision on the very large severance payment to Walt Disney’s short-
lived, former President, Michael Ovitz.75  As the article explains: 
Delaware courts exonerated directors of The Walt Disney Company 
from liability for damages – despite the directors having paid 
Michael Ovitz around $130 million in exchange for a year 
accomplishing little as the number two executive at Disney. At about 
the same time, the German Federal Supreme Court held that 
directors of the German company, Mannesmann AG, breached their 
duty to the company when they awarded a bonus of approximately 
$17 million to the outgoing CEO – whose actions apparently played 
 71. Manfred Schäfers, Was darf ein Manager verdienen?, FRANKFURTER 
ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Nov. 27, 2007, at 15. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Franklin A. Gevurtz, Disney in a Comparative Light, 55 Am. J. Comp. L. 453 
(2007). 
 74. “Golden handshake” refers to a term used to describe generous compensation 
packages offered to employees to encourage them to retire.  Mark R. Kravitz and Daniel 
J. Klau, Developments in the Second Circuit: 2000-2001, 34 CONN. L. REV. 833, 970 
(2002). 
 75. See Gervurtz, supra note 73, at 453. 
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an important role in gaining over $50 billion for the Mannesmann 
shareholders.76 
Initially, this comparison seems to illustrate that German courts, in 
line with the social and political differences discussed above, are more 
critical when scrutinizing executive compensation than their counter-
parts in Delaware.  The comparison fails to point out, however, a sig-
nificant and fundamental difference in contexts in which the decisions 
were rendered.  That is, the Delaware decision was made on the basis of 
corporate law whilst the German decision was made on the basis of 
criminal law; these two bodies of law serve distinct functions and 
receive very different treatment from the courts.77  The Delaware court 
that issued the decision in the Disney litigation was the Court of 
Chancery, a court of equity and perhaps the nation’s most famously 
business savvy court.78  In contrast, the German High Federal Court that 
heard the Mannesmann appeal was in the Criminal Division, which is 
not accustomed to balancing business interests in the corporate area.  
Moreover, the payment to Ovitz in Disney was made in accordance with 
a negotiated contract; a large part of the Delaware chancery court’s 
opinion offered a lengthy analysis of the adequacy of the negotiation and 
approval process for this agreement.79  The payment to Klaus Esser, on 
 76. Id. 
 77. Whereas civil remedies like those found in corporate law are primarily 
remedial or coercive, criminal penalties have the primary purpose of punishing and 
deterring wrongful conduct.  See, e.g., In re Am. Biomaterials Corp., 954 F.2d 919, 925 
(3d Cir. 1992); U.S. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 882 F.2d 656, 661 (2d Cir. 
1989); Allied Capital Corp. v. GC-Sun Holdings, L.P., 910 A.2d 1020, 1045 (Del. Ch. 
2006).  As one would expect, this is a position also held in Germany.  With regard to 
the German position on the distinction between criminal and civil laws, see CLAUS 
ROXIN, 1 STRAFRECHT 3 (2006) (“A provision does not belong to the criminal law 
because it regulates against violations of prescriptions or prohibitions – many pro-
visions of civil and administrative law also do that – but because such violations are 
sanctioned by rules on punishment or deterrence.” (author’s translation)). 
 78. See, e.g., R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, DELAWARE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS & BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 20.11 (Aspen Law & Business 2008) 
(1998) (“[T]he Delaware Court of Chancery . . . has a long tradition of resolving 
complex business disputes in a timely, efficient and fair manner . . . .”); Franklin A. 
Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule:  Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided Notion?, 
67 S. CAL. L. REV. 287, 323 (1994) (“[J]udges (at least in Delaware) have some 
expertise in providing legal advice to corporate boards.”). 
 79. See generally In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 
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the other hand, was wholly independent of his negotiated bonus 
package; the German court stressed that the payment was awarded on a 
gratuitous basis for past performance after Esser’s exit had already been 
decided.80  In similar cases, the Delaware court has found this scenario 
to constitute a waste of corporate assets. 81 
In the author’s opinion, these substantial differences render the 
Mannesmann and Disney decisions unsuitable for any useful compari-
son.  A specialized business court’s decision evaluating whether the 
negotiation and approval of a compensation contract was grossly 
negligent under corporate law standards simply has too little in common 
with a criminal court’s decision evaluating whether a gratuitous payment 
made to an exiting director was an abuse of trust under criminal law 
principles.  For some, however, the above comparison nevertheless ef-
fectively reveals the possibility that these cases each function as the 
procedural remedy of choice in their respective jurisdiction for the 
discipline of such management actions.  Indeed, Gevurtz asks “whether 
the difference is coincidental or symptomatic of the way in which the 
two jurisdictions are likely to react to cases of this nature.”82  The 
answer he provides is that because shareholder suits are more difficult to 
bring in Germany, the public prosecutor chose to file a criminal 
complaint against the Mannesmann directors instead,83 which indicates 
shareholder remedies in Germany are taking a different route from 
analogous cases in Delaware.  While this is an interesting idea, the facts 
ultimately do not provide any substantive basis for Gevurtz’s claim. 
First, and perhaps most importantly, Delaware courts regularly hear 
shareholder challenges to director compensation packages,84 whereas on 
the other side of the Atlantic, the Mannesmann decision created major 
headlines in Germany precisely because this type of case was novel.85  
2005). 
 80. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Dec. 21, 2005, 3 Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 522 (F.R.G.). 
 81. See, e.g., Fidanque v. Am. Maracaibo Co., 92 A.2d 311, 321 (Del. Ch. 1952); 
Lewis v. Hett, C.A. No. 6752 1984 WL 8258 (Del. Ch. Sept. 4, 1984). 
 82. See Gevurtz, supra note 73, at 485-86. 
 83. See id. at 490 (“[T]he criminal prosecution in Mannesmann illustrates what can 
happen in a high profile transaction, perceived by the public as outrageous, in the 
absence of a viable opportunity for civil adjudication.”). 
 84. See, e.g., BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 78, at § 4.19. 
 85. German legal scholarship is led by highly respected, multivolume commen-
taries on individual laws and codes.  An examination of the lengthy comments on § 266 
of the German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) reveals no case comparable to 
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In addition, unlike the Delaware court’s approach to applying the 
demand requirement,86 German courts have flatly rejected the applica-
tion of the business judgement rule to protect supervisory board 
decisions that refuse to pursue an action against a board member.  The 
German courts have explained that evaluating the merits of a legal claim 
is not a business judgment, but rather is one of the basic functions of a 
court, subject to de novo review.87  Thus, a board of directors would be 
far less likely to stop an action regarding compensation in Germany than 
in Delaware. 
Indeed, the demand requirement in Delaware resulted in the 
decade-long shareholders’ action against Disney’s board of directors, 
which was commenced in 1996 and did not end until the court finally 
reached its decision in 2006.88  Moreover, unlike the Delaware law, the 
AktG expressly provides a mandatory standard when measuring the 
Mannesmann. See THOMAS FISCHER, BECK’SCHE KURZKOMMENTAR ZUM 
STRAFGESETZBUCH, § 266 margin no. 54 (55th ed. 2008). 
 86. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. Ch. 1984). 
 87. See ARAG/Garmenbeck, Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] 
Apr. 21, 1997, 175 Entscheiungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 135 
(244) (F.R.G.). 
[T]he supervisory board may not invoke a “decision-making prerogative” to restrict 
the scope of the court’s review with regard to this part of its decision-making. In 
examining whether a claim for damages exists and the merits thereof, the supervisory 
board does nothing other than anyone else who evaluates – for himself or for another 
– whether a claim exists and whether it may be successfully prosecuted in court.  The 
substance and correctness of such an evaluation of the merits of judicial prosecution 
of a claim may, in cases of a dispute, generally be fully tested in a court, given that 
such an evaluation does not regard business dealings but rather solely regards an area 
of knowledge for which we may always consider positing a limited freedom for 
discretion. 
Id. (author’s translation). 
 88. The Disney proceedings began in 1996 with the shareholders filing a complaint 
directly with the court rather than requesting that the directors pursue the action.  In the 
first round of action, the Disney directors sought dismissal of the case, which the Court 
of Chancery initially held in favor of the defendants.  Then the Supreme Court reversed 
this judgment in part and remanded the suit to the Court of Chancery for further 
determinations.  As a sampling of the ten decisions in this long procedural history, see 
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 25 (Del. Ch. 1997) 
(rejecting plaintiff shareholder’s request to dismiss defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1998) 
(denying plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss the suit); In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 825 
A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003) (denying defendants’ motion to dismiss the suit). 
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adequacy of executive compensation.89  This is another reason why 
compensation cases could take a corporate rather than a criminal route in 
Germany.  Although it is well known that the United States is far friend-
lier to shareholder litigation than is Germany, one could argue that this 
attitude is not readily apparent when comparing the two court decisions.  
In this way, the broader topic Gevurtz seeks to highlight – i.e., that 
socially democratic Germany is much less sanguine on high executive 
compensation than the economically utilitarian United States – is cer-
tainly true.  The author disagrees with Gevurtz, however, to the extent 
that he provides very little meaningful support for his conclusion 
through the comparison of Disney and Mannesmann; the two decisions 
feature very different fact patterns that are evaluated in the context of 
laws with divergent functions and by courts with very different purposes 
and tenors. 
The comparison of “incomparables” to draw systematic conclu-
sions, therefore, has the potential to divert attention from comparative 
work that focuses on the actual causes of the diverging treatment of 
compensation.90 As Zweigert & Kötz note, “[i]ncomparables cannot use-
fully be compared, and in law the only things which are comparable are 
those which fulfil the same function.”91 
B. Recognize Functions and Relationships within Systems 
Concededly, it is the rare case that seeks to compare two elements 
of a legal system that are both formally and functionally different.  But it 
is quite common to find that the comparatist does not cast her analytical 
net wide enough, and thus fails to appreciate all the functional elements 
that interact with a law or right in a foreign legal system.  This is one 
problem that has plagued development law and has led to the rejection 
by developing countries of incompatible “transplants” from foreign legal 
systems.  As Professors Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor and Jean-
Francois Richard explain: “Extensive comparative research prior to the 
adoption of a foreign legal system is indicative for an informed 
choice.”92 
 
 89. AktG § 87(1). The overall compensation of a managing director must be “in an 
appropriate relationship to the duties of the director and the state of the company.” 
 90. See ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 10, at 34. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Daniel Berkowitz et al., The Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163, 180 
(2003). 
104 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE &  Vol. XIV 
 FINANCIAL LAW 
 
Such extensive comparative research would reveal “a system of 
functional constellations; its concepts [would] denote the tasks that a 
given life situation assigns law – indeed, assigns all laws resting on the 
same social and economic conditions.”93  The research from the outset 
would renounce the belief that certain legal institutions are essentially 
necessary; instead, it would employ an “anti-metaphysical focus . . . 
[that] understand[s] institutions through their relation to problems.”94  
The relationship between the problems posed by similar underlying 
conditions – as well as the solutions devised to address them – is central 
to the analysis.  In The Anatomy of Corporate Law, Kraakman and his 
colleagues observe that, 
[i]t would perhaps be more accurate to call our approach ‘economic’ 
rather than ‘functional’ . . . the exigencies of commercial activity and 
organization present practical problems that have a rough similarity 
in developed market economies throughout the world, that corporate 
law everywhere must necessarily address these problems, and that 
forces of logic, competition, interest group pressure, imitation, and 
compatibility tend to lead different jurisdictions to choose roughly 
similar solutions to these problems.95 
Such comparative research, however, should include not only the 
legal provisions themselves, but also the means of enforcing them.  In 
analyzing governance under the company law of a given jurisdiction, 
Bebchuk and Roe argue that “[w]hat counts are all elements of a cor-
porate legal system that bear on corporate decisions and the distribution 
of value: not just general principles, but also all the particular rules 
implementing them; not just substantive rules, but also procedural rules, 
judicial practices, institutional and procedural infrastructure, and en-
forcement capabilities.”96 
The foregoing statements of leading corporate law comparatists 
evince a general consensus that in comparative law, the relative func-
tions of a given rule or structure must be understood in the complete 
 93. ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 10, at 46 (defining the method of comparative 
law). 
 94. Michaels, supra note 20, at 360. 
 95. KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 4 (discussing their approach to the 
“anatomy of corporate law”). 
 96. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in 
Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 155 (1999). 
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context of the legal system and broader societal framework as solutions 
to problems that may arise in other jurisdictions.  Therefore, although 
the functional approach of comparative law is not without its dangers,97 
it is generally accepted. 
In their explanation of how law development projects on the whole 
have had little success since the 19th century, Berkowitz, Pistor and 
Richard attribute the trend to a failure to perform extensive comparative 
research on the constellation of values and functions within the recipient 
society before transplanting a foreign legal tool.  Using the term 
“demand” as shorthand for the desire of a recipient society to actually 
enforce a transplanted rule, they explain: 
[C]ountries that receive their formal legal order from another country 
have to come to grips with what was often a substantial mismatch 
between the preexisting and the imported legal order.  They may be 
unfamiliar with dispute settlement through adversarial litigation 
rather than mediation and negotiation, or with the rigidity of legal 
rights independent of kinship relations or norms of social 
obligations.  Moreover, the social, economic and institutional context 
often differs remarkably between origin and transplant country, 
creating fundamentally different conditions for effectuating the 
imported legal order in the latter.98 
Our basic argument is that for law to be effective, a demand for law 
must exist so that the law on the books will actually be used in 
practice and legal intermediaries responsible for developing the law 
are responsive to this demand.  If the transplant adapted the law to 
local conditions . . . then we would expect that the law would be 
used.  Because the law would be used, a strong public demand for 
institutions to enforce this law would follow. . . .  However, if the 
law was not adapted to local conditions . . . then we would expect 
that initial demand for using these laws to be weak. . . .  Countries 
that receive the law in this fashion are thus subject to the “transplant 
effect”: their legal order would function less effectively than origins 
 97. See Michaels, supra note 20, at 345.  With reference to the use, critique and 
eventual rejection of functionalism in Sociology, Michaels explains that functions 
should not be understood to express an essential telos, whether understood as the 
intention of a transcendent creator (Aristotle) or a necessary evolution (Compte).  Not 
every function within a social system should be understood as indispensible, given that 
living societies contain contingent, antiquated and unnecessary elements (Robert 
Merton).  Id. at 352.  The functional method is thus strongest when used to understand, 
compare and critique laws and legal systems.  “[It] is not only a bad tool for legal unifi-
cation, but even provides powerful arguments for maintaining differences.”  Id. at 377. 
 98. Berkowitz et al., supra note 92, at 170-71. 
106 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE &  Vol. XIV 
 FINANCIAL LAW 
 
or transplants that either adapted the law to local conditions and/or 
had a population that was familiar with the transplanted law.99 
Understanding the law in context is a prerequisite to the transplan-
tation of laws.  When the “donor” countries do not perform sufficient 
comparative analyses on either their own legal systems or on those of 
the recipient countries, the transplant fails.  Efforts to transplant legal 
systems, from the colonization period of the 19th century to contem-
porary development law projects, have consistently yielded very poor 
results. The comparative analyses performed were not sufficiently ex-
haustive.  As indicated above, the analysis preceding a transplantation of 
laws must examine a great number of components of the legal system in 
conjunction with the society; it should attempt to undertake a thorough 
examination of (at least) the primary ways in which the functions of 
these components interact with and complement each other. 
The complex and changing nature of this web of functional 
relationships tends to invoke organic metaphors like “transplant.”100  
Employing another organic metaphor – but blaming the recipient 
(inappropriate earth for a healthy crop) rather than the foreign element 
being introduced (inappropriate organ for a healthy body) – Professors 
Bernard Black, Reinier Kraakman, and Anna Tarassova reflect on the 
lack of sufficient background study that went into recommending mass 
privatizations for Russia in the 1990’s: 
We have learned that Western-style capitalism is more fragile than 
we thought.  It will not emerge – certainly not quickly, perhaps not at 
all – if seeds are simply scattered widely through mass privatization, 
to grow in the thin soil of an institutionally impoverished country.  
Instead, the institutions that control theft in its myriad forms, 
especially self-dealing by managers and controlling shareholders, are 
an essential fertilizer.  The task of creating fertile soil in which 
privatized companies can take root is not a simple one. 
. . . . 
Russia needs a serious, top-down effort to control corruption, 
organized crime, and self-dealing; adopt a rational tax system; 
reduce the broad administrative discretion that invites corruption; 
shrink the bloated bureaucracy; enforce existing rules that limit self-
dealing; remove the principal loopholes in those rules; and improve 
 99. Id. at 167-68. 
 100. See, e.g., id. 
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financial reporting by major firms . . . .  No one of these steps is 
sufficient by itself, but each will help and progress on any one can 
reinforce progress on others.101 
A comparative analysis must therefore grasp the manner in which 
the legal system interacts with the society, its habits and mores, in addi-
tion to the immediate function of rights, laws, and organizational forms 
within the specific legal system.  The affinity between comparative law 
and sociology thus goes not only to the use of the functional method of 
analysis, but also to the interdependence of the two objects of study. 
C. Understand the Historical Setting of the Legal System 
To this breadth of systematic and social analysis must be added a 
temporal axis of comparative study.  Accurate knowledge of historical 
facts and trends influencing a legal system and its operation are very 
often crucial to a comparison.  Major events such as wars, revolutions 
and economic booms or collapses are not “legal” in nature, but 
nonetheless have an impact on the development of economies and legal 
systems.102  The number of historical and political elements that influ-
ence a major change in the law is often so great that even a detailed 
historical analysis of the events can only summarize the overall 
process.103  The Origin Theorists have been criticized by a number of 
scholars for failing to factor history into their analytical equations.  For 
example, Roe has subjected the argument of the Origin Theorists – that 
civil law stunted the development of stock markets in Continental 
Europe while common law stimulated such development in the United 
States and the United Kingdom – to a criticism that approaches a 
complete refutation.104  Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard also demonstrate 
how historical events have had a more meaningful impact on the success 
of legal systems than has the origin of a given system in the common 
 
 101. Bernard Black et al., Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What 
Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1731, 1797-98 (2000). 
 102. See, e.g., JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET:  A 
HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE 
FINANCE, xvii-xxiii (3d ed. 2003); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the 
Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L. J. 1521 (2005) (detailing the 
relationship between historical events and the creation of law). 
 103. See, e.g., SELIGMAN, supra note 102; see also Romano, supra note 102. 
 104. See Roe, supra note 43. 
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law.105  Both of these critiques illustrate why history must be factored 
into any comparative analysis of a legal system or the latter’s effects on 
social development. 
Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard challenge the link between legal 
origin and successful legal systems by showing that legal institutions 
forced on countries through colonial conquest or uninformed develop-
ment assistance have a high probability of failure, regardless of their 
origin.106  In contrast, systems that a country itself develops – and the 
complementary elements of which the culture reflects and supplements – 
have a high probability of success regardless of their origin.107  The 
suitability of the transplanted law thus has a greater impact on its future 
development than does a fragile and diluted link to Justinian’s Corpus 
Juris Civilis.108  Among developing countries, any difference in the rate 
of success between those with common law and those with civil law 
colonial backgrounds could be traced to the differing policies of colonial 
management.  For example, the British, influenced perhaps by their less 
rationalist approach to culture or the unpleasant experience in North 
America, attempted to leave space for local customs and institutions.109 
Meanwhile, the French sought to remake conquered societies by 
introducing their own customs and institutions, including French law, 
perhaps following their more rationalist cultural heritage or riding the 
wave of enthusiasm for social engineering that carried them during the 
Revolution.110  This difference was unlikely to be a common law/civil 
 105. See Berkowitz et al., supra note 92. 
 106. Id. at 168-69. “We provide statistical evidence showing that the ‘transplant 
effect’ is a more important predictor of effective legal institutions than the supply of a 
particular legal family.” 
 107. Id. at 170-71. 
Internal development can take advantage of new solutions economic agents develop in 
response to new challenges and existing constraints. Lawmakers can build on 
domestic knowledge and expertise and can take full advantage of complementarities 
between new and old institutional arrangements. This is most explicit for case law, 
where new legal rules are generated from litigated cases. But legislatures can also take 
advantage of social knowledge about perceived problems and possible solutions 
through survey instruments or law commissions staffed with experts. 
Id. 
 108. For a discussion of Justinian’s Corpus Juris Civilis, see Wolfgang Kunkel, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 157, n.2 (J.M. Kelly, 
trans., Oxford 1966). 
 109. See ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 10, at 220. 
 110. See id. at 113. 
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law divergence:  Holland, a civil law country, applied its own law only 
to its own citizens in its colonies and left the natives to their own 
customs.111 
Roe focuses on the assertion that common law countries have 
developed more active capital markets than civil law countries due to the 
superior investor protection that derived from common law courts.112  
The Origin Theorists attribute this argument to a statement by Professor 
John C. Coffee, Jr., that courts can flexibly apply rules to situations that 
are difficult to foresee in advance.113  Yet, in another context, Coffee ex-
plains how investment bankers began to sit as “independent” directors 
on the boards of U.S. companies to provide more effective monitoring 
because judges in American courts were easily bribed and European 
investors needed assurances against the extraction of rents by 
management.114  Thus a dogmatic application of common law as the 
source of effective investor protection can in no way be attributed to 
Coffee.  Roe’s critique of the Origin Theorists focuses on the highly 
industrialized countries that currently have active capital markets, and 
looks at the development of their markets during the 20th century against 
the backdrop of the political events they experienced.115  Roe shows that 
 111. Berkowitz et al., supra note 92, at 176. 
 112. Roe, supra note 43, at 462. 
 113. La Porta et al., supra note 36, at 9. 
In the area of investor expropriation, also known as self-dealing, the judges apply 
what Coffee calls a ‘smell test’, and try to sniff out whether even unprecedented 
conduct by the insiders is unfair to outside investors.  The expansion of legal 
precedents to additional violations of fiduciary duty, and the fear of such expansion, 
limit the expropriation by the insiders in common law countries. 
Id. 
 114. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and 
the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 28-29 (2001). 
[T]he derivative suit had been recognized by the Supreme Court as a legal mechanism 
to protect minority shareholders, and the law of fiduciary duties generally required 
any corporate official who engaged in a self-dealing transaction with his firm to prove 
its “intrinsic fairness.” But once the investor had committed his capital, he might 
discover that the corporation had migrated to another, more permissive jurisdiction . . 
. .  Or, a judge would simply be bribed to accept some pretext for clearly predatory 
misbehavior. . . .  Litigation was simply not the answer for the foreign investor. . . .  
One means to this end was pioneered by J.P. Morgan & Co., namely, placing a partner 
of the firm on the client’s board. 
Id.  This is a technique that has historically been used in Germany.  See JEREMY 
EDWARDS & KLAUS FISCHER, BANKS, FINANCE AND INVESTMENTS IN GERMANY 199-
210 (1994). 
 115. Roe, supra note 43, at 464. 
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the percentage of GDP represented by stock markets was high in 
Continental Europe in 1913 (Belgium = 99%, France = 78% and 
Germany = 44%, compared to the United States = 39%), plummeted 
through World War I, World War II and their aftermath (Belgium = 
32%, France = 28% and Germany = 35%, compared to the United States 
= 61% in 1960), and gradually returned to or exceeded its pre-1914 level 
by 1999, one decade after the end of the Cold War (Belgium = 82%, 
France = 117% and Germany = 67%, compared to the United States = 
152%).116  As Roe explains, the political events of the 20th century – 
most intensely experienced in Continental Europe – disproportionately 
effected countries in that area, which were primarily countries of “civil 
law origin”: 
The first political economy channel has military occupation 
weakening institutions overall.  When it came time to rebuild, the 
polity rebuilt human institutions in early decades, waiting until later 
to rebuild stock markets.  The second channel ties destruction to 
postwar domestic politics.  Stunned voters were averse to risk, labor 
was powerful, and savings were meager.  Those background political 
conditions were not market-friendly.  The third channel is postwar 
international politics.  The program in many nations was fighting 
communism, inducing most Western European and East Asian 
governments to befriend international communism’s most likely 
domestic allies.  A fourth channel is that destroyed nations do not 
immediately need large pools of capital from financial markets.  
Banks are adept at allocating capital to known technologies, while 
securities markets are more adept at allocating capital to new and 
untried technologies.  After World War II, reconstruction was largely 
a known task for which banks were well suited, perhaps better suited 
than volatile equity markets, and which fit with a polity that 
preferred steady and low-risk reconstruction.117 
Countries in Continental Europe were occupied and partially 
destroyed by invading armies during the two World Wars.  Their 
surviving populations lost some or all of their property and as a result, 
became risk averse.  The aftermath demanded investment in conserva-
tive activity of reconstruction rather than speculative investments.  
Moreover, the main political aim was to keep Communism at bay, which 
meant appeasing labor and not ostensibly favouring capital.  As Roe 
 116. Id. at 488 tbl.3. 
 117. Id. at 502. 
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observes, banks were well equipped for allocating capital to the kind of 
projects that arose out of these historical events.  The law permitted 
“universal banking,”118 and these institutions were able not only to 
accompany their customers into more normal times with financing, but 
also to take equity stakes in them and elect outside “financial directors” 
on their supervisory boards, exercising significant influence119 that could 
have guided them towards further bank financing.  Although the absence 
of a Glass-Steagall Act120 did mean that law facilitated this arrangement, 
it was not the “origin” that counted but rather the content.  Beyond these 
historical arguments, when one adds Switzerland and Luxembourg – 
both civil law countries that host two of the world’s most active stock 
markets121 – the legal origin argument appears quite weak.  In addition, 
capital flight from a troubled Europe in the 1930’s not only weakened 
Continental markets, but strengthened those in the United States.122 
Roe, Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard make it very clear that 
comparative law must understand and factor in the historical events and 
developments that affect the legal systems being studied.123  Moreover, a 
recent response by the Origin Theorists shows just how deep an 
understanding of culture and history is necessary.  In a 2007 paper, the 
Origin Theorists adjusted their argument to assert that “common law” 
and “civil law” work in a culture to promote planning or laissez-faire: 
In this paper, we adopt a broad conception of legal origin as a style 
of social control of economic life (and maybe of other aspects of life 
as well).  In strong form (later to be supplemented by a variety of 
 118. See EDWARDS & FISCHER, supra note 114, at 97-98. 
 119. See id. at 213. 
 120. 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 377, 378 (1994). The Glass Steagall Act prevented finan-
cial institutions from holding equity positions in industrial companies.  See e.g., 
Gustavo Visentini, Compatibility and Competition Between European and American 
Corporate Governance: Which Model of Capitalism?, 230 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 833, 838 
(1998). 
 121. See Roe, supra note 43, at 488 tbl.3.  Luxembourg’s domestic market capitali-
zation of about €60 billion is substantially more than double its GDP, making its capital 
market a much more active segment of the economy than in the United States. Bourse 
de Luxembourg Fact Book 2007, http://www.bourse.lu/application;JSESSIONID_BDL 
=qyhrLyHjhTGb2pLd1rydmcnBGLy9fWL4Xb2Bj6PdR2mYhvVdgybg!1484001113!-
134474789?flowid=PageStatiqueFlow&content=services/statistques/Statistiques.jsp 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2008). 
 122. ERIC HELLEINE, STATES AND THE REEMERGENCE OF GLOBAL FINANCE: FROM 
BRETTON WOODS TO THE 1990’s 39 (1996). 
 123. See Berkowitz et al., supra note 92. 
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caveats), we argue that common law stands for the strategy of social 
control that seeks to support private market outcomes, whereas civil 
law seeks to replace such outcomes with state-desired allocations.  In 
words of one legal scholar, civil law is “policy implementing”, while 
common law is “dispute resolving”. . . .  These broad ideas and 
strategies were incorporated into specific legal rules, but also into the 
organization of the legal system, as well as the human capital and 
beliefs of its participants.  When common and civil law were 
transplanted into much of the world through conquest and 
colonization, the rules, but also human capital and legal ideologies, 
were transplanted as well.124 
This attempt to co-opt the socio-political criticism offered by Roe 
and others would go to the extent of compressing the significant 
differences in historical development between French and British 
thought into the type of legal system used by each.  Along these lines, 
the difference between, say, the rationalism of René Descartes and the 
empiricism of Thomas Hobbes would have been the result of their 
respective legal systems,125 or at least would have been transmitted to 
French and British colonies only through the transplant of such legal 
systems.  While law is important – indeed, some cultures have been 
better known for their law than for their philosophy, art, scientific or 
military accomplishments – it would be a rare thing for a civilization to 
be summed up in the origin of its law.  Here, again, the hands-off 
domestic policies of (civil law) Switzerland’s local democracy and the 
minimalist colonial management of (civil law) Holland, as well as the 
economic micro-management of (common law) Britain’s post war 
economy,126 do not fit well into the Origin Theorists’ mold.  The gaps in 
 124. Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins 3-4 (J. of 
Econ. Literature, Working Paper, 2007), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=1028081. 
 125. The peculiarity of reversing the causal relationship in such manner is displayed 
in the solid method of the eminent intellectual historian, Professor Peter Gay, who 
analyzes the legal writings of Montesquieu for the tension between influences from the 
philosophical positions of rationalism and empiricism rather than taking the reverse 
path proposed by the Origin Theorists.  See PETER GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT:  THE 
SCIENCE OF FREEDOM 326 (1996). 
 126. See TONY JUDT, POSTWAR: A HISTORY OF EUROPE SINCE 1945 367 (2005) 
(“[T]he British Labour movement, whose core doctrine and program ever since 1918 
rested on an ineradicable faith in the virtues of state ownership . . . .  The example of the 
UK’s British Motor Corporation, a helpless guinea pig for government experiments in 
centralized resource allocation . . . .”). 
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the original and adjusted arguments of the Origin Theorists emphasize 
the need to investigate a jurisdiction’s history and social composition 
before formulating theories of causality. 
D. Be Aware of and Counter Prejudicial Perspectives 
Zweigert & Kötz argue that the negative side of the functional 
method is flawed because it requires that the comparitist radically free 
herself from her own legal and doctrinal prejudices127 – a task that per-
haps one can never completely achieve, as writings evidencing harsh 
judgements on foreign law are not hard to find in comparative law 
literature.  One of America’s classic texts on comparative law by 
Professors John Henry Merryman and Rogelio Pérez-Perdomo sneers so 
obviously at the “civil law tradition” that it can make even the U.S. 
reader uncomfortable.  For example, consider the following passage ana-
lyzing the work of legal scholars in civil law countries: 
The assumption of legal science that it scientifically derives concepts 
and classes from the study of natural legal data on the one hand, and 
the generally authoritarian and uncritical nature of the process of 
legal education on the other, tends to produce the attitude that 
definitions of concepts and classes express scientific truth.  A 
definition is not seen as something conventional . . . it becomes a 
truth, the embodiment of reality. . . .  Legal scientists are more 
interested in developing and elaborating a theoretical scientific 
structure than they are in solving concrete problems. . . .  Nor is the 
legal scientist interested in the ends of law, in such ultimate values as 
justice . . . they built ideologically loaded concepts into a systematic 
conceptual legal structure that is still taught in the faculties of law . . 
. .  In this way European systematic jurisprudence embodies and 
perpetuates nineteenth-century liberalism, locking in a selected set of 
assumptions and values and locking out all others.128 
This depiction of the bookish civil law professor building sky 
castles while ignoring justice seems to refer just to the 19th century 
pandectics, whom many Germans of the period also found to be overly 
abstract and socially conservative.129  In addition to the statement that 
the system of legal science is “still taught in the faculties of law,” 
however, the analysis moves on in the next chapter to deconstruct the 
 
 127. ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 10, at 35. 
 128. MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 1, at 63. 
 129. See ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 10, at 142. 
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introduction of a current elementary textbook in Civil Law.  The analy-
sis teases out inexactness in the introductory simplifications130 and 
points to statements that contain an ideological perspective,131 as if to 
show that the ideological tunnel vision of civil law scholars is still 
closing young minds off from the truth.132  In fact, the explicatory criti-
cism is so harsh that Merryman and Pérez-Perdomo seek to spare the 
author of the civil law book the embarrassment of having her name 
mentioned, referring to the text only as “a respected elementary work 
(which shall remain anonymous) on private law.”133 
Merryman and Pérez-Perdomo’s exposé of civil law scholarship 
shows strong cultural prejudice and displays the kinds of contradictions 
that such prejudice tends to bring with it.  For example, the text explains 
that civil law scholars are not interested “in solving concrete problems,” 
but 35 pages later states that because they “are not paid enough for [their 
academic work] to live well, . . . aspirants to academic positions 
customarily embark on an additional legal career.”134  A positive spin on 
this state of affairs would be that the legal scholar, who may also be a 
partner in a law firm, an arbitrator, or a director of a corporation, can 
bring his practical skills to bear in the classroom.  For Merryman and 
Pérez-Perdomo, however, the civil law scholar is both divorced from 
reality and lives a second life as an odd-jobber moonlighting from his 
poorly paid post.  The assertion that civil legal scholars are not 
interested in “such ultimate values as justice” is also troublesome; it 
would seem to be refuted by the civil law origins of the concept of 
unconscionability in contracts,135 as well as by the sociological projects 
 130. MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 1, at 70.  For example, in the 
introduction to the nature of law under discussion, a first year law student would read:  
“The legal norm [is] . . . a command addressed to the individual by which a determined 
conduct . . . is imposed on him.”  However, the comparatists beg to differ, explaining: 
“Actually, not all norms command; the text is inaccurate.”  Id. 
 131. Id.  The first year law student of civil law would read “subjective right is the 
power of the individual that is derived from the norm.”  Id.  The comparatists find this 
is an “ideologically loaded fundamental notion,” as “[i]n private law, this is the 
foundation of a legal system in which private, individual rights . . . exist.  Id. 
 132. See id. at 69. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See id. at 108. 
 135. See ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 10, at 320.  In times when a common law 
court would refuse to inquire into the adequacy of consideration (Sturlyn v. Albany, 78 
Eng. Rep. 327 (K.B. 1587)), the Austrian Civil Code of 1811 allowed dissolution of a 
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of legal scholars like Niklaus Luhmann.136  Indeed, the very existence of 
“equity” – from which notions resembling unconscionability first 
developed in the common law – evince the overly formalistic nature of 
early common law that was more interested in formal perfection of the 
writs than in achieving equitable justice.137  Coming from a legal tradi-
tion (in which decisions like Lochner v. New York138 prohibited most 
“paternalistic” interference with unequal bargaining power, right up 
until the Executive Branch declared its preparations for war on the Judi-
ciary in 1937139), the description of civil law as perpetuating 19th 
Century liberalism also seems more than a little one-sided.  A compara-
tive analysis of such liberalism stressing its uniform grip on both the 
common and the civil law, with an analysis of the diverging ideological 
approaches used to adapt law to an evolving understanding of the con-
tracting subject would seem more appropriate in a sophisticated, 
comparative study. 
Interestingly enough, the Origin Theorists also address 19th century 
civil law development with the diametrically opposed assertion that civil 
law sought to manage and control economic activity, rather than 
perpetuate a conservative laissez-faire liberalism.  They argue that in 
England, 
common law evolved to protect private property against the crown. . 
. .  In France and Germany, by contrast, parliamentary power was 
weaker.  Commercial Codes were adopted only in the nineteenth 
century by the two great state builders, Napoleon and Bismarck, to 
enable the state to better regulate economic activity.140 
The historical assertions made in this statement are problematic; 
they also seem to display a particular Anglo-American prejudice that 
was common in the 1990’s following the victory in the Cold War.  First, 
historical research by Professors Daniel Klerman and Paul Mahoney 
tends to refute the asserted role of common law courts as comparatively 
strong guardians of property.141  Second, the argument that the French 
contract if the consideration promised by the two parties was substantially 
disproportional. 
 136. See, e.g., NIKLAS LUHMANN, DAS RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT (1995). 
 137. See JILL E. MARTIN, HANBURY & MARTIN MODERN EQUITY 5 (17th ed. 2005). 
 138. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 139. See DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR 325 (1999). 
 140. La Porta et al., supra note 36, at 19. 
 141. “By the early modern era, French judges probably enjoyed greater indepen-
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and German commercial codes were 19th century tools of state control is 
weak.  France’s 1807 Commercial Code was only a partial amendment 
of royal decrees on commerce dating back to the late 17th century,142 
which were essentially codifications of many of the same common mer-
cantile customs that were used in Britain.  Both the French royal decrees 
on commerce and the British mercantile customs derived from law 
developed by European merchants during the Middle Ages.143  The 
Origin Theorists may have intended to refer to the French civil code, but 
as discussed above, far from being a tool of state socialism, this Code 
Napoleon enacted a 19th century laissez-faire liberalism with individu-
alistic notions of property and contract.144  The German Commercial 
Code, while also promoting the same freedom of individual property and 
contract, was primarily designed to harmonize the local laws and codes 
pre-existing in various German states, principalities and dukedoms, in 
order to facilitate trade in the newly unified Germany.145  If harmoni-
zation of commercial law is seen as state control, then the Uniform 
Commercial Code and UNITRAL are both projects seeking such 
control. 
What, then, is the prejudicial perspective of La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny?  To begin, they wrote their comparison in 
the United States in 2000, at the close of the decade following the fall of 
Communism in Eastern Europe.  As expressed in the policies of leaders 
like Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, the fall of Communism was 
dence than their English counterparts because a French judgeship was considered a 
form of heritable property.  Normally, French kings neither chose their judges nor had 
the power to remove them.  In contrast, English judges served at the pleasure of the 
crown, although the power to remove was seldom used.”  Daniel M. Klerman & Paul 
Mahoney, Legal Origin? 4 (USC CLEO Research Paper No. C07-5, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=968706.  See also MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 
1, at 16 (“Before the French Revolution, judicial offices were regarded as property . . . .  
[J]udges were an aristocratic group who supported the landed aristocracy.”). 
 142. CH. LYON-CAEN & L. RENAULT, DROIT COMMERCIAL 7 (3d ed. 1922). 
 143. See id. at 5; see also Paul Mahoney, Contract or Concession? An Essay on the 
History of Corporate Law, 34 Ga. L. Rev. 873, 880-82 (2000) (discussing how the 
medieval law merchant was used by British merchants). 
 144. See MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 1, at 93; see also ZWEIGERT & 
KÖTZ, supra note 10, at 92. 
 145. As in the United States, this process started with a uniform law on negotiable 
instruments and gradually spread to a uniform commercial code.  See NORBERT HORN, 
HANDELSGESETZBUCH, Intro. VI, margin nos. § 22 (2d ed. 1995). 
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seen as a victory of free enterprise and a renewal of faith in markets over 
state planning and domination of the economy.  The market was seen to 
create a much more efficient allocation of resources than the Continental 
European dirigisme,146 championed most strongly by France.147  Pro-
fessor Tony Judt has epigraphically captured the difference between the 
free market English style and the French statist style during this period: 
“In contrast to Mrs. Thatcher and her heirs . . . the French were cautious 
about selling off public utilities . . . .  In markets as in gardens, the 
French were suspicious of unplanned growth.  They preferred to retain a 
certain capacity to intervene.”148 
At the time the Origin Theorists authored their comparison, the 
dichotomy between the private, flexible Anglo-American world and the 
statist, rigid Continental Europe had a significant ring of truth to it.  In 
the view of this author, however, their references to the timing, nature 
and purposes of the French and German commercial codes are inaccu-
rate and these distortions seem to display a projection of positions held 
at the close of the 20th century backward into the 19th century. 
In the following parts, this Article will offer an analytical frame-
work of company law in Germany, the United Kingdom and the United 
States that will help avoid the pitfalls discussed above. 
III. COMPARE ONLY COMPARABLES: WHAT IS “COMPANY LAW”? 
A. Defining Company Law Functionally 
“Company law” or “corporate law”149 is generally understood as a 
 
 146. See THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 484 (2d ed. 2001). 
 147. See JUDT, supra note 126, at 552-54. 
 148. Id. at 554. 
 149. This Article uses the terms “company” law and “corporate” law indistinguish-
ably.  On the one hand, “corporate law” is a U.S. term and “company” law is the 
preferred term in the United Kingdom, as well as in the English language versions of 
EU legislation.  From a German perspective, the term “corporate” law might be more 
accurate for this Article, as the object of study is corporations that may well be large 
enough to be listed on a stock exchange, an area of study that German scholars might 
call “law of capital collecting companies” (Kapitalgesellschaftsrecht), as opposed to 
“company law” (Gesellschaftsrecht), which would likely include various forms of 
partnerships and limited liability companies (Gesellschaften mit beschrankter Haftung), 
as well as stock corporations (Aktiengesellschaften).  The German understanding of the 
term “company law” might be rendered as “corporations and other business 
organizations.”  Here, both “company law” and “corporate law” will refer to the law 
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body of law enabling the creation of an entity with “five core structural 
characteristics”: “(1) legal personality, (2) limited liability, (3) trans-
ferable shares, (4) centralized management under a board structure, and 
(5) shared ownership by contributors of capital.”150  If a law other than a 
company law were to regulate one of these “core characteristics” of the 
corporate entity, it would require treatment in a study of company law.  
This is unproblematic when another law is expressly linked to the 
company law.  Labor co-determination in Germany provides a good 
example.  The sections of the AktG that refer to the number, qualifi-
cations and appointment of members of the supervisory board expressly 
refer to the provisions of various laws providing for co-determination in 
Germany.151  The inclusion of co-determination laws in any study of 
German company law is, thus, beyond question. 
Difficulties arise when a law’s function closely complements the 
governing entities with the five listed characteristics. 
 150. KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 5.  These characteristics are not a recent 
invention.  For similar lists of core characteristics with respect to U.S. law, see ROBERT 
C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 2 (1986); HENRY WINTHROP BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON 
CORPORATIONS 1 (1946).  For a historical discussion of the development of these 
characteristics, see Mahoney, supra note 143; Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical and 
Political Origins of the Corporate Board of Directors, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 89 (2004) 
(focusing on central management under a board).  Although limited liability is con-
sidered to be one of the most valuable characteristics of a corporation, it should be 
noted that both Germany and the UK offer companies unlimited liability.  The German 
limited partnership by shares (Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien – KgaA) and the 
English “unlimited company” both offer the possibility of an entity that issues shares to 
investors, but leaves at least one of their owners with unlimited liability. 
 151. See AktG §§ 95–104.  Co-determination in German companies is regulated by 
three major laws, one of which – the Law on Co-Determination of Employees in the 
Supervisory Boards and Management Boards of Enterprises Engaged in the Mining Iron 
and Steel Industries of 21 May 1951 (Montan-Mitbestimmungsgesetz) – is no longer 
relevant.  The most important law today is the Co-Determination Act of 1976 
(Mitbestimmungsgesetz, or “MitbestG”), which applies to all GmbHs and AGs with 
more than 2,000 employees (see § 1 MitbestG), and requires that one-half of the 
supervisory board comprise representatives of the employees and their unions (see § 7 
MitbestG). See Johannes Semler, in MÜNCHNER KOMMENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESETZ § 96 
(Bruno Kropff & Johannes Semler eds., 2d ed. 2000). Another important piece of 
legislation, the Works Constitution Act of 1952 (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz), requires 
that a company have a supervisory board and that one-third of the board members be 
appointed by employees if the corporation employs more than 500 persons. 
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz [Works Constitution Act], Oct. 11, 1952, BGBl. I at 681 
(F.R.G.). 
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corporation law in the jurisdiction in question, but the law is not 
expressly linked to the company law.  If such laws are excluded from 
treatment, any picture of the system of regulation will be incomplete.  If 
different mixes of topical laws govern the same area in different 
jurisdictions, a comparison that does not take this difference into 
account would be distorted.  For example, if we compared the German 
company law rule that requires disclosure of an interest in a corporation 
that exceeds 25% of its capital – as expressed in § 20(1) of the AktG152 – 
exclusively with the DGCL and the case law related to that statute which 
states no such requirement, we are led to conclude that German com-
pany law creates greater transparency.  Yet, if we add to the mix a U.S. 
federal law, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange 
Act”),153 particularly § 13(d) thereof and the rules issued under it 
requiring disclosure of any holding exceeding five percent of the capital 
of a registered company,154 we tend to reach the opposite conclusion, 
and German law appears less extensive.   Further, when the require-
ments of § 21 of the German Securities Trading Act155 
(Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, or “WpHG”), which applies to listed 
companies, are also added to the comparison, we see that the obligations 
of Delaware and German public companies are quite similar in this 
respect.  Because the rules governing companies may be differently 
 152. See AktG § 20(1). 
 153. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (2000). 
 154. Rule 13d-1 under the Exchange Act requires that any person who acquires 
directly or indirectly more than 5% of either the “voting power” or the “investment 
power” of any class of equity security registered under § 12 Exchange Act must file 
details on such acquisition (on a form called a “Schedule 13D”) with the SEC within 10 
days after the acquisition.  17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(a).  Securities must be registered 
under § 12 of the Exchange Act if either a) they are listed on a national securities 
exchange or b) the issuer of the securities has more than 500 shareholders and total 
assets exceeding $ 10 million. Id. at § 240.12(a) & (g).  In addition to securities regis-
tered under § 12 Exchange Act, Rule 13d-1 also applies to “any equity security of any 
insurance company which would have been required to be so registered except for the 
exemption contained in section 12(g)(2)(G) of the Act, or any equity security issued by 
a closed-end investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 
1940.”  Id. § 240.13d-1(i). 
 155. Wertpapierhandelsgesetz [Securities Trading Act], Sept. 9, 1998, BGBl. I at 
2708 (F.R.G.), last amended by Gesetz, July 16, 2007, BGBl. I at 1330, § 21(1) (re-
quiring that any person who through acquisition, disposal or in any another manner 
reaches, exceeds or falls below any of the 5%, 10%, 25%,  50% or 75% thresholds of 
voting rights of a listed company, must provide written notice to the issuer and to the 
Federal Supervisory Office within seven calendar days). 
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distributed among various topical laws in each country, knowledge of 
the applicable topical laws, including their nature and the range of their 
application, is critical. 
Each of the five core characteristics listed above may be closely 
tied to other areas of law.  One purpose of legal personality and limited 
liability is to demarcate those assets which creditors may reach in 
collecting debts of the corporation.156  This position is integrally tied to 
creditors’ rights in insolvency proceedings over the company’s assets.  
The inclusion of bankruptcy law in the study of company law is still 
debated.  Professors Henry Hansmann and Reinier R. Kraakman have 
argued that “bodies of law designed to serve objectives that are largely 
unrelated to the core characteristics of the corporate form . . . do not fall 
within the scope of corporate law.”157  Following this view, lawmakers’ 
legislative purpose should determine whether a given law should be 
included within a study of corporate law.  As discussed above, however, 
the functional method of comparative law should not limit itself to 
intention, but rather should encompass the systemic role played by the 
given law within the legal system and society.158  The intentional design 
of topical law considered for inclusion then would not be the best 
criterion for decision.  For example, German labor laws express a 
legislative intent to have employees treated fairly by corporations.  But 
as a means to this end the law serves the function of assigning employee 
representatives to the supervisory board.159  U.S. securities laws express 
a legislative intent to protect investors regardless of who is selling the 
relevant securities; as a means to this end, such laws have the function of 
regulating an issuer’s required disclosure information.160  Similarly, the 
principles of agency law, central to any discussion of corporate 
governance, were not devised with the intention of regulating the 
centralized management of a corporation. 
In a different context, Professor John Armour has asked whether 
EU member states could successfully use their bankruptcy laws to 
control the flow of regulatory competition opened by the decisions of 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) following Centros.161  He argues 
 156. See KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 9. 
 157. See id. at 17 (emphasis added). 
 158. See infra Part IV. 
 159. See supra note 155 and the laws discussed therein. 
 160. See, e.g., supra note 154. 
 161. John Armour, Who Should Make Corporate Law? EU Legislation Versus 
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convincingly that “[c]orporate insolvency law supplies rules which 
govern companies experiencing financial distress, and so it is appro-
priate to consider it as being within the scope of a functional account of 
‘company law’.  In particular, there may be complementarities between 
insolvency law and other aspects of a country’s corporate governance 
regime.”162  Viewed from the perspective that Armour is considering – 
that of a corporate promoter or incorporator – complementarities would 
exist between a corporate law statute and an insolvency law if the latter 
would have a material impact on the choice of jurisdiction in which to 
incorporate.  Such an “effects” test is essentially a functionality test seen 
from a practical rather than a theoretical vantage point. It would demand 
that provisions of other laws be considered together with a jurisdiction’s 
company law – regardless of whether the legislative purpose of such law 
focuses on corporations – if the law affects or functionally complements 
the corporate law statute.  Therefore, slightly reformulating Hansmann’s 
and Kraakman’s criterion, all rules, laws and organizational forms that 
have the function of regulating the corporation, its activities, and the 
rights of persons vis-à-vis the corporation with a close relation to the 
core characteristics of the corporate form, would be potential candidates 
for inclusion in a company law analysis. 
Under this analysis, tax law (one of the most important considera-
tions when planning the incorporation of a company or subsidiary) 
would not come within the study of company law because it does not 
have a close relation to a core characteristic of a company.  On the other 
hand, rules on fraudulent conveyances would be part of company law, as 
they serve a capital maintenance function (closely related to the limited 
liability and investor ownership characteristics of corporations) in the 
U.S., the same function that is served by the legal capital rules of 
German and UK company law.  As this example makes clear, it can 
reasonably be assumed that the topical laws seen as having corporate 
law functions, and thus included in a functional definition of company 
law, will not be identical in each jurisdiction. 
B. Germany 
In Germany, the AktG provides a comprehensive set of mandatory 
 
Regulatory Competition  (ESRC Ctr. for Bus. Research, Univ. of Cambridge, Working 
Paper No. 307, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=860444. Centros Ltd. v. 
Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, Case C-212/97, 1999 E.C.R. I-1459. 
 162. Armour, supra note 161, at 39. 
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regulations for corporations.  Tracking the core characteristics of a cor-
poration listed above, the AktG provides for the creation of an entity 
with legal personality, limited liability and transferable shares163 that has 
centralized management under a two-tier board structure164 and that is 
subject in certain respects to the shareholders.165  By reference,  the 
AktG also incorporates provisions of the Commercial Code 
(Handelsgesetzbuch – “HGB”) on the preparation of the annual financial 
statements, including the specification of reserves and distributable 
profits.166  It also provides a right to demand special audits,167 and re-
quires that financial statements be made available to shareholders for 
their approval.168 Additionally (and going well beyond the range of cov-
erage that would be expected by an American lawyer), the AktG 
contains provisions on the disclosure of equity holdings169 and the soli-
citation of proxies by banks holding shares in custody;170 incorporates 
the Co-Determination Act to place labor representatives on the 
supervisory board;171 specifies the rights, duties and required financial 
statements of companies operating in corporate groups;172 and requires 
listed companies to adopt a governance code on a “comply or explain” 
basis.173  As will be discussed in Part IV, many of these special provi-
sions come from EU directives that were incorporated into the AktG 
 163. See AktG §§ 1-53a. 
 164. See id. §§ 76-116. Under the AktG, a corporation has a two-tier board. The two 
levels are the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat), provided for in AktG §§ 95-116, and the 
management board (Vorstand), provided for in AktG §§ 76-94.  The shareholders elect 
all or some (if co-determination applies) of the supervisory directors and the super-
visory board appoints the managing directors, who have direct responsibility for 
managing the company.  See id. §§ 101(1), 84(1) and 76(1) respectively.  See also 
Theodore Baums, Company Law Reform in Germany (Johann Wolfgang Goethe-
Universität, Inst. for Banking Law, Working Paper No. 100, 2002), available at 
http://www.jura.uni-frankfurt.de/baums/; Klaus Hopt, The German Two-Tier Board 
(Aufsichtsrat): A German View on Corporate Governance, in COMPARATIVE 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 227 (Klaus Hopt et al. eds., 1998). 
 165. AktG §§ 118-147. 
 166. Id. § 150. 
 167. Id. §§ 142-146. 
 168. Id. § 175. 
 169. Id. § 20. 
 170. Id. § 128. 
 171. Id. § 101. 
 172. Id. §§ 291-328. 
 173. Id. § 161. 
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over the years.  Regardless of its jurisdictional origin, however, the 
resulting law is broad, comprehensive and mandatory. 
German courts have also created doctrine beyond the statutory law 
through a significant body of decisions on topics such as pre-
incorporation liability, equitable subordination of loans made by share-
holders to the company and fiduciary duties of management.174  Some of 
these decisions were actually handed down with reference to the Limited 
Liability Companies Act (Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit 
beschränkter Haftung – GmbHG), rather than the AktG, and are analo-
gously applied to corporations.175 One exception to the inclusive 
tendency of the AktG is the exclusion of rules on mergers between 
corporations in the “Transformation (or Reorganization) Act” 
(Umwandlungsgesetz – UmwG).176  Also, like Delaware law but unlike 
the UK Companies Act, the AktG does not contain extensive provisions 
on accounting; these were moved to the Commercial Code in 1985.177 
Although the AktG includes provisions that other jurisdictions 
might attribute to areas outside of corporate law proper – such as on the 
disclosure of holdings and the behavior of custodian banks in the proxy 
solicitation process – most studies of German company law would also 
include, in addition to the MitbestG and the UmwG, a number of rules 
from the Securities Trading Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz – WpHG)178 
and the Takeover Act (Wertpapiererwerbs- und Übernahmegesetz – 
WpÜG)179 in any comprehensive treatment of company law, especially 
 174. See, e.g., ARAG/Garmenbeck, Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of 
Justice] Apr. 21, 1997, 175 Entscheiungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen 
[BGHZ] 135 (244) (F.R.G.) (where the German High Federal Court judicially crafted 
the business judgment rule). 
 175. For example, the entire doctrine of equitably subordinating loans made to 
financially troubled companies to the existing loans of external creditors was first de-
veloped in connection with §§ 30 and 31 of the GmbHG and only later applied to stock 
corporations.  See Andreas Cahn, Equitable Subordination of Shareholder Loans?, 7 
EUROPEAN BUS. ORG. L. REV. 287, 291 et seq. (2006). 
 176. Umwandlungsgesetz [UmwG] [Reorganization Act], Oct. 28, 1994, BGBl. I at 
3210, last amended by Gesetz, Apr. 19, 2007, BGBl. I at 542 (F.R.G.). 
 177. See Handelsgesetzbuch [HGB] [Commercial Code], May, 1897, RGBl. I at 
219, last amended by Gesetz, Dec. 19, 1985, BGBl. I at 2355 (F.R.G).  This was done 
in the context of implementing three EC directives on individual and group accounts. 
 178. See, e.g., Semler, supra note 151, at Intro. margin no. 3; KARSTEN SCHMIDT, 
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 32 (4th ed. 2002). 
 179. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH KÜBLER & HEINZ-DIETER ASSMANN, 
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 506 (6th ed. 2006). 
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when discussing listed companies.  As the converse of the principle lex 
specialis derogat legi generali180, a German court will also look to the 
more general rules on company forms contained in the Limited Liability 
Companies Act,181 the Commercial Code182 and the Civil Code 
(Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch – BGB)183 if a given situation is not expressly 
governed in the specifically applicable section of AktG.184  Since com-
panies listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange would be governed by the 
exchange rules, such rules might also be taken into account, although 
they tend to be less detailed and extensive than their counterparts in 
London or New York.  One reason the Frankfurt listing rules tend to be 
light is the applicability of the German Corporate Governance Code.185  
The AktG does not require listed companies to adopt the German 
Corporate Governance Code, but a company is required to explain their 
decision if they choose not to adopt it.186 
The complete picture of what is considered “company law” in 
Germany is rather broad, but easily defined.  It includes one main com-
prehensive statute and various other laws and rules specifically incor-
porated by reference to cover accounting, mergers, co-determination, 
takeovers and securities regulation, as well as applicable exchange rules 
and the German Corporate Governance Code. 
 180. Lex specialis – Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki 
/Lex_specialis (last visited Oct. 24, 2008) (“[A] law governing a specific subject matter 
(lex specialis) is not overridden by a law which only governs general matters (lex 
generalis).”). 
 181. Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung [GmbHG] 
[Limited Liability Companies Act], Apr. 20, 1892, RGBl. I at 477, as amended by 
Gesetz, Mar. 22, 2005, BGBl. I at 837 (F.R.G.). 
 182. HGB, supra note 177. 
 183. Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code], Aug. 18, 1896, RGBl. I. at 195 
(F.R.G.). 
 184. For example, most of the rules on pre-incorporation liability for an AG are 
derived from cases regarding GmbH’s, which in turn may depend on general principles 
of company membership found in the BGB’s provisions on civil law companies 
(partnerships).  See KÜBLER & ASSMANN, supra note 179, at 376. 
 185. GOV’T COMM’N, GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, available at http:// 
www.corporate-governance-code.de/index-e.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2008). 
 186. See AktG § 161. 
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C. The United States 
In the United States, a company and its “internal affairs”187 are 
governed by the laws of the state in which the company is incorporated.  
Corporations incorporated in one state are generally allowed to conduct 
business in other states, subject to minimal state-specific requirements, 
such as designating an agent for service of process.188 Today, most 
major U.S. corporations, including more than half of publicly listed 
companies, are incorporated under the law of the State of Delaware.189  
Therefore, this Article will use the DCGL as a proxy for corporate law 
in the U.S. 
The DGCL provides for each of the five core characteristics of a 
business corporation.  It provides for the creation of an entity with legal 
personality,190 limited liability,191 management by a centralized board192 
and transferable shares193.  The aspect of shared ownership by investors 
is implicit in the company’s existence as an entity that must issue 
stock,194 which must be paid for195 and which represents a property in-
terest in the corporation in the form of a “chose in action.”196  Although 
shareholders rarely use this power, the DGCL also gives shareholders 
the right to eliminate centralized management by vesting executive 
control in a body other than the board of directors, such as a council 
including all shareholders.197  The greatest difference between the 
DGCL and the AktG is that the DGCL is composed almost entirely of 
optional, default terms that shareholders may modify, supplement or 
 
 187. See EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 23.2 (3d ed. 2000).  For a 
II.C.1. 
d half of all U.S. firms traded on the New York Stock Exchange and 
, § 108 (2008). 
)(6). 
)(4). 
ept as may be otherwise provided 
detailed definition of “internal affairs” see id. at Part. I
 188. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 317 (2008). 
 189. According to the 2006 Annual Report of the State of Delaware’s Division of 
Corporations, “Delaware is the corporate home to 61 percent of the Fortune 500 
companies an
NASDAQ.” 
 190. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8
 191. Id. § 102(b
 192. Id. § 141. 
 193. Id. §§ 201-02. 
 194. Id. § 102(a
 195. Id. § 152. 
 196. See Equitable Trust Co. v. Gallagher, 67 A.2d 50, 54 (Del. Ch. 1949). 
 197. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2008) (“The . . . corporation . . . shall be 
managed by or under the direction of a board . . . exc
in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.”). 
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 be governed by 
fiduc
eliminate in the company’s certificate of incorporation.198  In this way, it 
resembles the UK’s Companies Act.199  Delaware corporate law also en-
velopes a large body of decisions by the Delaware Supreme Court and 
Court of Chancery on such matters as fiduciary duties, which are not 
specified in the statute.200  The regulation of corporate groups, for ex-
ample, which the AktG expressly regulates, would
iary duties imposed on majority shareholders.201 
The DCGL contains no provisions on disclosure, accounting or 
audits, but it does have rules to govern mergers202 and takeovers.203  
Given the thin and relatively optional character of the DGCL, it is not 
surprising that corporate law is generally considered to include sub-
stantial elements of securities regulation.204  As will be discussed in 
greater detail in Part IV of this Article, including “securities regulation” 
requires looking to the requirements of federal laws grouped under Title 
15 of the U.S. Code, which includes the Securities Act of 1933 (the 
“Securities Act”),205 the Exchange Act and the Trust Indenture Act of 
1939 (the “Trust Indenture Act”)206, among others.  Beyond these 
securities laws and the extensive body of rules that the SEC has issued 
under the authority they delegate, a listed company would also have to 
comply with the rules of the relevant exchange, which can be quite 
extensive.  It is also common to include basic principles of revocable or 
fraudulent transfers from bankruptcy law in the study of U.S. corporate 
 
 198. See Katharina Pistor, Legal Ground Rules in Coordinated and Liberal Market 
 Look of Shareholder 
ancery Court cases addressed fiduciary duty issues). 
0 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971); Ronald J. 
. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 
. tit. 8, §§ 251-266 (2008). 
ote 150, at 
ture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (2000). 
Economies 9 (European Corporate Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 30, 
2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=695763. 
 199. See infra Part III.D. 
 200. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New
Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 165-66 (2004) 
(finding that during the two-year period from 1999 and 2000, approximately 78% of 
Delaware Ch
 201. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 28
Gilson & Jeffrey N
785 (2003). 
 202. DEL. CODE ANN
 203. Id. § 203. 
 204. See, e.g., BALLANTINE, supra note 150, at 858-86; CLARK, supra n
293-340 and 719-49. 
 205. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a-77aa (2000). 
 206. Trust Inden
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ules found in the DGCL and all other U.S. corporate law 
statu
cally 
depending on the proximity of a corporation to the capital markets. 
D. The United Kingdom
law.207  The latter serve to supplement very permissive capital main-
tenance r
tes. 
The enabling nature of the DGCL, which is composed of non-
mandatory “default” rules, would allow a company, in its certificate of 
incorporation, to comprehensively govern seemingly every imaginable 
right, duty and circumstance, making the range of “company law” rather 
limited.  Once the company is large enough to trigger application of the 
securities laws, however, such laws become more restrictive, regulating 
annual meetings and accounting practices, among other things.  When 
the company is publicly traded on an exchange, both the securities laws 
and the relevant set of exchange rules would impose yet another layer of 
mandatory regulation, governing, for example, the composition of the 
board of directors and the type of securities that may be issued.208  Thus, 
the concept of “company law” in the United States changes dramati
 
 
As a jurisdiction with a common law system that has significantly 
influenced U.S. law, and as a member state of the European Union that, 
like Germany, must implement EU directives and obey EU regulations 
and ECJ decisions, the company law of the United Kingdom takes a 
middle position between Delaware and Germany.  The United Kingdom, 
which formally had some of the oldest rules on corporations, dating all 
the way back to the 17th Century, now has the newest company law of 
the three jurisdictions examined.  Both the core statute and many of the 
outlying rules serving a corporate law function were substantially 
amended in 2006.  The Companies Act 2006 substantially amended the 
1985 version of that law and restated a significant body of case law on 
the duties of directors into the statute itself,  thus providing norms that 209
 207. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS 
act Approval and Investment 
nd equitable 
ORGANIZATIONS:  CASES AND MATERIALS 858 (Concise 9th ed. 2005); CLARK, supra 
note 150, at 40-52. 
 208. See, e.g., Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Changes to Short 
Sale Rules, Disclosures Regarding Advisory Contr
Company Governance Provisions (June 23, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004 
-87.htm, for a sampling of SEC rules and amendments. 
 209. See generally Companies Act, 2006, ch. 46 (Eng.). Sec. 170(3) Companies Act 
provides that: “The general duties are based on certain common law rules a
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under a board,216 and 
(4) s
Delaware and German law primarily express through judicial deci-
sions.   It provides for the creation of all types of companies (public or 
private, limited by shares or by guarantee, as well as unlimited)  and 
offers rules for a corporate entity with the five, core characteristics 
discussed in our functional definition of “company law.”   A company 
limited by shares is a “body corporate”  with (1) limited liability,  (2) 
transferable shares,  (3) centralized management 
210
211
212
213 214
215
hared ownership by contributors of capital.217 
The 2006 Act removed a number of rules, such as those regarding 
the mandatory disclosure of significant shareholdings218 and share deal-
ings by directors219 from the Companies Act, and placed them in newly 
issued rules of the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA).  This re-
sembles earlier decisions to hive out rules from the Act, such as when 
insolvency rules were removed from a pre-1985 version of the Act and 
placed in the Insolvency Act 1986.220  As mentioned, other matters, such 
as detailed rules on director’s duties, were added to the Act, and it 
remains the largest and most detailed of the three laws being examined 
here.  Like the Aktiengesetz, the Companies Act provides detailed rules 
on the constitution and maintenance of capital221 and mandatory dis-
closure222 (both from EU law), but at the same time, it is flexible like the 
 
principles as they apply in relation to directors and have effect in place of those rules 
and principles as regards the duties owed to a company by a director.”  Id. 
 210. As discussed above, the Aktiengesetz provides a standard of care for managing 
and supervising directors (AktG §§ 93, 116), prohibits managing directors from com-
oses a duty of confidentiality on all 
ameters of the duty of loyalty 
ts. 
s Act 2006, ch. 46, §§ 3-4. 
II.A and accompanying text. 
ct 2006, ch. 46 §, 16(2). 
)(c). 
1985, §§ 198-99. 
DAVIES’ PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY 
peting with the company (AktG § 88), and imp
directors (AktG §§ 93, 116), but the detailed par
(Treupflicht) have been worked out by the cour
 211. See Companie
 212. See supra Part I
 213. Companies A
 214. Id. § 9(2
 215. Id. §§ 10, 544. 
 216. Id. § 154(2). 
 217. Id. § 8. 
 218. Companies Act 
 219. Id. at §§ 323-24. 
 220. See PAUL L. DAVIES, GOWER AND 
LAW 47 (7th ed. 2003). 
 221. See, e.g., Companies Act 2006, ch. 46, pts. 17-18. 
 222. See, e.g., id. §§ 414-15. 
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 Reform (previously the Department 
of T
DGCL and allows such matters as the method of appointing directors223 
and the operation of the board224 to be freely structured in the company’s 
articles.  In contrast to the other laws, the Companies Act provides 
extensive and detailed rules on accounting,225 sets forth systematic rules 
for the creation of security interests on a company’s assets (“charges”)226 
and contains annexed Model Articles that govern a significant portion of 
a company’s internal management affairs.227 The Model Articles are pre-
scribed by the Secretary of State,228 and drafted by the Department for 
Business, Enterprise & Regulatory
rade and Industry) (BERR).229 
Beyond the Companies Act and its related statutory instruments, 
company law in the United Kingdom contains basically the same capital 
market elements as in Germany, both being derived from EU directives, 
plus the insider dealing provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1993.230  
The fact that rules on company insolvency, directors’ dealings, and 
shareholder disclosures were originally located in the Companies Act 
argues for including such laws and rules under the rubric of “company 
law”.  The FSA’s Disclosure and Transparency Rules thus constitute a 
central element of UK company law.231 The FSA’s Listing Rules also 
contain substantial elements of company law for listed companies, such 
as requirements that shareholders approve significant transactions and 
mandatory restrictions on directors’ dealings in their company’s 
securities.232  Insider trading is disciplined by certain provisions of the 
Criminal Justice Act of 1993,233 which should thus also be considered a 
functional component of company law.  Unlike in either the United 
 
 223. Id. §§ 154-69; see also DEP’T OF TRADE & INDUS., DRAFT MODEL ARTICLES 
FOR PUBLIC COMPANIES, 2007, § 19, available at http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file299 
[
06, ch. 46, §§ 170-379; see also DRAFT MODEL ARTICLES, 
te 223, at sched. 3. 
r.gov.uk/index.html. 
ARENCY RULES (2008), 
, R. 3, 4, 9, 10 (2008), 
35.pdf hereinafter DRAFT MODEL ARTICLES]. 
 224. Companies Act 20
supra note 223, at §§ 6-7. 
 225. See, e.g., Companies Act 2006, ch. 46, pt. 15. 
 226. See, e.g., Companies Act 2006, ch. 46, pt. 25. 
 227. See DRAFT MODEL ARTICLES, supra no
 228. Companies Act 2006, ch. 46, § 19(1). 
 229. Business, Enterprise & Regulatory Reform, http://www.ber
 230. See Criminal Justice Act of 1993, ch. 36, §§ 52-64 (U.K). 
 231. See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., DISCLOSURE AND TRANSP
available at http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/handbook/DTR.pdf. 
 232. See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., CONTINUING OBLIGATIONS
available at http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook. 
 233. See Criminal Justice Act of 1993, Ch. 36, §§ 52-64. 
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ove, UK company law 
shou
erence into 
the Aktiengesetz), consider the laws falling under the rubric of “company 
law” in G ited States 
(represented by D  be th g tabl
 
States or Germany, takeovers involving listed companies in the United 
Kingdom are regulated by a code adopted by a private panel endowed 
with regulatory authority.234  As mentioned ab
ld be understood to contain certain elements of the Insolvency Act 
1986, particularly the doctrine of “wrongful trading”235, which can serve 
as an additional tool for capital maintenance.236 
Leaving aside the very significant area of accounting rules (which 
are within the Companies Act 2006 and incorporated by ref
ermany, the United Kingdom and the Un
elaware) to ose in the followin e: 
 234. See Companies Act 2006, ch. 46, §§ 942-43; see generally The Panel on 
o ents of Company LFunctional Comp n aw 
Takeovers and Mergers, The Takeover Code (8th ed. 2008). 
 235. See Insolvency Act 1986, ch. 45, § 214 (U.K.). 
 Germany United Kingdom Delaware 
Main statute Aktiengesetz mpanies Act 2006 ral 
orporation Law 
Co Gene
C
Linked statute on  Co-Determinati
Act 
 
Linked statute ion  Transformat  
Act 
Upper-level U  Exchange Act and Applicable E Applicable EU
regulations regulations regulations Rules (federal) 
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(linked rules) 
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IV.  KNOW SYSTEMIC FUNCTIONS AND RELATIONSHIPS: THE 
JURISDICT ANY LAW IONAL INTERACTION OF COMP
A.  The Whole and Its Parts 
Functions are by nature relational,  and a correct understanding of 
legal functions thus requires that the entire system of relationships from 
which their relational value derives be taken into account.  This Part will 
examine the most salient systemic relationships for legal functions: the 
jurisdictions that issue legal rules, the areas they address, and their 
respective powers.  Part V will build on this analysis by examining how 
the systemic unity of these jurisdictions acts as an environment of causal 
interaction to shape law’s development over time.   Phrased in a 
different way, this Part looks at the system components and th
237
238
e legal 
rules of their interaction, while Part V will examine the actual force that 
these components have exercised on each other in recent history. 
Each of the three jurisdictions examined in this Article is a sub-unit 
of a larger jurisdiction.  Germany and the United Kingdom belong to the 
European Union; Delaware belongs to the United States.239  Because 
both the upper- and the lower-tier jurisdictions enact legislation that is or 
functions as company law, it is necessary to understand the nature of the 
rules coming from each jurisdiction and their respective standing vis-à-
vis each other.  The rule-giving bodies240 affecting the governance of 
public companies in each of our jurisdictions are found at the primary, 
nation or state level (i.e., Germany or Delaware), at an upper, 
supranational or national level (i.e., the European Union or the United 
 
 236. See KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 17; Armour, supra note 161, at 44. 
 237. See NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM (translated by Klaus A. 
Ziegert) (2004), at 142 et seq. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Although Germany itself is a federation of states and the United Kingdom is 
comprised of England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, this aspect is much less 
important because, with very few exceptions, company law is uniform at the national 
level. 
 240. The word “jurisdiction” would be used here very loosely, as it would also 
include securities exchanges.  The agreement between an issuer and the securities 
exchange on which its shares are listed is a contract, and the exchange has “regulatory” 
power only over a very narrow group of persons, particularly its members and 
participants and its listed companies. 
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, such as on the 
reco
 and legal literature of the effects of an 
economy having corporate ownership rights dispersed among many 
small shareholders or concentrated in the hands of blockholders,244 this 
States), and at the level of a private or quasi-public organization (e.g., 
the New York Stock Exchange or the UK Takeover Panel).  There is 
also a growing number of cooperative plans between the securities regu-
lators of the European Union and the United States
gnition of accounting principles241 and the regulation of deriva-
tives242, which could eventually lead to treaty or treaty-like obligations 
creating yet another layer of jurisdictional interaction. 
This Part will restrict itself to defining the legal relationships of the 
relevant jurisdictions to each other and analyzing the specific content of 
the rules issued by each.  As discussed in Part II, socio-political and 
cultural factors are also important elements of the functional system 
comprising German, UK and U.S. company law.  Although this Article 
will make occasional reference to existing histories and socio-economic 
analyses of these factors, it offers an approach to comparing these 
company laws, not a full comparison.  Because each of the jurisdictions 
here discussed is a highly developed Western culture with comparable 
social values and structures,243 the real differences that may exist at the 
present time – other than cultural attitudes towards executives and labor 
– currently have less of an impact on the shape of the law than do 
constitutional and treaty relationships between jurisdictions and the 
arrangement of rules in mandatory norms or default options.  Given the 
ample discussion in the economic
 
 241. See Press Release, SEC and CESR Launch Work Plan Focused on Financial 
Reporting: Developing Cross Atlantic Financial Markets (Aug. 2, 2006), available at 
ailable at http://www.cftc.gov/newsroom/generalpressreleases/2006/pr5182-
EGULATION: CULTURAL AND POLITICAL 
T, THE CONTROL OF CORPORATE 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-130.htm. 
 242. See Press Release, Facilitating Transatlantic Derivatives Business (May 15, 
2006), av
06.html. 
 243. On this point, greatly differing social and moral structures could make a 
significant difference with regard to the nature of securities regulation.  For example, 
see supra note 99 and the accompanying text for lamentations of dishonesty in Russia 
following the collapse of the Soviet police state.  On the other extreme, a contemporary 
society with certain types of religious principles might well condemn securities trading, 
as did British and American society in the 17th and 18th Centuries.  See STUART 
BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES R
ROOTS, 1690-1860, at 14-15, 122-23 (1998). 
 244. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. 
FIN. 471 (1999); FABRIZIO BARCA & MARCO BECH
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Article will not revisit that issue. 
B.  The European Union and Its Member States 
1. Pursuant to the Treaty Establishing the European  
Community (EC Treaty) 
Germany was a founding member of the European Economic 
Community (ECC) in 1957,245 and the United Kingdom joined the EEC 
in 1973.246  Through the Treaty on European Union (EU Treaty)247 
signed in Maastricht, Denmark in 1992, the EEC and the other 
connected European communities were transformed into the European 
Union.248  Even though this Article will use the term “EU law” 
following convention,249 it is perhaps useful to note that because the 
European Community is the lawmaking portion of the European 
Union,250 it is the Community’s relationship to the member states that is 
most relevant for an exact understanding of jurisdictional interaction.  
This latter relationship varies depending on the area being discussed.  
Within areas where the Community has been delegated competence that 
 
EUROPE (2001); Coffee, supra note 114, at 34-35. 
.J. (C 191), available at http://eur-
tives.  The common practice to refer to these directives as “EU” law 
 Commission to 
hereinafter EC Treaty]; see also Manfred 
,
 245. JUDT, supra note 126, at 303. 
 246. Id. at 308. 
 247. Treaty on the European Union, 1992, O
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:321E:0001:0331:EN:pdf. 
 248. CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 6, at 15. 
 249. It is common to use the term “EU Law” even when “EC Law” is more legally 
accurate.  As Prof. Eilís Ferran explains when making this observation with reference to 
the directives adopted in the area of securities regulation, “[t]he strict technical position 
is that securities laws are made within the legal framework of the European Community 
(EC, formerly European Economic Community or EEC), which is a Community within 
the common structure of the European Union.  The EU, as such, has a limited role.”  
EILÍS FERRAN, BUILDING AN EU SECURITIES MARKET 7 (2004).  The same applies to the 
company law direc
comes from the fact that the European Community is an integral part (“Pillar I”) of the 
European Union. 
 250. See Treaty on European Union, 2002, O.J. (C 325) 5 (specifying the institutions 
of the European Community as exercising powers under the EC Treaty and the EU 
Treaty); Treaty Establishing the European Community, 2002, O.J. (C 325) 249 (2002), 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:321E: 
0001:0331:EN:pdf (directing the European Parliament, Council and
make regulations and issue directives) [
Zuleeg  in KOMMENTAR ZUM EU VERTRAG, vol. 1, at 141-97, 262-89. 
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companies . . . with a view to making such safeguards equivalent 
is not concurrent, the ECJ has interpreted the EC Treaty251 to mean that 
EU law is supreme over that of the member states.252  The German 
Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), however, has 
expressly reserved national, sovereign power which it has nevertheless 
pledged not to exercise, so long as the Community remains within its 
delegated powers and does not violate basic rights guaranteed in the 
German Constitution.253  Within those areas where the European 
Community has not been given exclusive competence, the relationship 
between the Community and the member states is governed by the 
relationship of “subsidiarity” provided for in Article 5 of the EC Treaty, 
which includes the imperative that “the Community shall take action . . . 
only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason 
of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the 
Community.”254  In Articles 43 through 48 of the EC Treaty, the 
Community is given the express duty to guarantee the freedom of a 
citizen or company from one member state to establish him, her, or itself 
in any other member state, but the promulgation of company law beyond 
a certain level of safeguarding harmonization is not an express 
Community function.255  The company law area should therefore be 
thought of as one of “concurrent jurisdiction,”256 to which the principle 
of subsidiarity could apply.  Article 44(2)(g) of the EC Treaty expressly 
instructs the European Council to adopt directives to coordinate only “to 
the necessary extent the safeguards . . . required by Member States of 
 
 251. EC Treaty, supra note 250, at 33. 
 252. Case 26/62, Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos 
v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 ECR 1, 12 (Neth.) (stating “the 
[European] Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit 
al Court] June 7, 2000, 2 
ee 
.L.R. 57. 
 calls the difficult concept of 
 Zuleeg, supra note 250, at 141-97, 262-89. 
of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and 
the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals”); see 
Zuleeg, supra note 250, at 141-97, 262-89. 
 253. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Constitution
BvL 1/97 (F.R.G), available at http://www.bverfg.de/cgi-bin/link.pl?entscheidungen.  
For an older decision expressing a similar line of reasoning and reprinted in English, s
Brunner v. The European Union Treaty, 1994 1 C.M
 254. EC Treaty, supra note 250, art. 5.  Judt wryly
“subsidiarity” “a sort of Occam’s razor for eurocrats.”  JUDT, supra note 126, at 715. 
 255. See EC Treaty, supra note 250, arts. 43-48. 
 256. See
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 by application of 
the p
 
throughout the Community.”257  This express, yet limited delegation of 
authority means that the Community’s exercise of power is evaluated 
primarily for any abuse of such delegation rather than
rinciple of subsidiarity, which would add little to the analysis.258 
A “directive” as referred to in Article 44(2)(g) and defined in 
Article 5 of the EC Treaty is binding as to the result to be achieved; 
member states must carry its substance into their national law, but it 
leaves them free to choose the form and method of implementation.259  
Once a directive has been adopted, however, it works to pre-empt 
conflicting national legislation.  The ECJ made this point clear in Inspire 
Art260, holding that the Eleventh Company Law Directive’s list of 
required and optional disclosures for branches established in other mem-
ber states is “exhaustive,” and that any disclosure requirements imposed 
by a member state (in that case, The Netherlands) are pre-empted.261  
Harmonization of company law was originally seen as a quid pro quo for 
allowing companies from other member states to operate in the host 
country.  ECJ Justice Timmerman observed that the harmonization pro-
gram conducted on the basis of Article 44 was thus seen as “an entrance 
 257. EC Treaty, supra note 250, art. 44(2)(g); VANESSA EDWARDS, EC COMPANY 
LAW 3-14 (1999); STEFAN GRUNDMANN, EUROPÄISCHES GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 48, 69-
72 (2004). 
 258. See GRUNDMANN, supra note 257, at 45; see also Troberg & Tiedge, in KOMM. 
ZUM EU VERTRAG, vol. 1, p. 1535, for further citation and discussion of article 44 of the 
EC Treaty. 
 259. See EC Treaty, supra note 250, art. 5.  A “directive” is an instrument proposed 
by the European Commission and issued by the European Council with the consultation 
or approval or notification of the European Parliament, and is defined as an instrument 
that is “binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is 
addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods.”  
Id. art. 249; see CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 6, at 85.  EU company law has been 
harmonized almost exclusively through directives enacted under Article 44(2)(g) of the 
EC Treaty, which provides that, “[i]n order to attain freedom of establishment . . . the 
Council . . . shall act by means of directives . . .  coordinating to the necessary extent the 
safeguards . . . required by Member States of companies . . . with a view to making such 
safeguards equivalent throughout the Community.”  See EDWARDS, supra note 257, at 
3; GRUNDMANN, supra note 257, at 69.  Articles 43-48 of the EC Treaty guarantee 
e of business in a 
 BÚRCA, supra note 6, at 791. 
freedom of establishment, and thus “require the removal of restrictions on the right of 
individuals and companies to maintain a permanent or settled plac
Member State.”  CRAIG & DE
 260. Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. 
Inspire Art Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. I-10155 [hereinafter Inspire Art]. 
 261. See id. at ¶¶ 65-71. 
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oes hand in hand with the 
regulatory competition discussed in Part V. 
2.  The Company Law Directives 
ghts of shareholders with respect to changes in the 
com
fee Member States accepted to pay for market integration.”262  The 
harmonization program under Article 44 g
Ten company law directives promulgated from 1968 harmonized 
company law on many key aspects of forming and operating public 
corporations,263 with only minor attention given to private companies.  
The First Company Law Directive, adopted in 1968, imposed a 
harmonized system of register disclosure for companies to publish facts 
regarding their incorporation, legal capital and financial results, as well 
as to specify those persons authorized to represent the company in 
dealings with third parties.264  The Second Company Law Directive, 
implemented in 1976, provided harmonized rules for the incorporation 
of public companies and the maintenance of their capital, including: (i) a 
procedure for auditing the value of in-kind contributions to capital, 
restrictions on dividend distributions and share repurchases; (ii) a prohi-
bition of “financial assistance”, (iii) mandatory preemptive rights, and 
(iv) a required shareholder vote for certain changes in the company’s 
capital.265  Even considered alone (and taking into account that the 
Second Directive was somewhat pared down through 2006 
amendments), it is obvious that these two Directives regulate core cor-
porate characteristics.  They provide rules that govern the creation and 
actual representation of the corporation as a legal person, the capital 
maintenance requirements (which are by many considered a quid pro 
quo for its limited liability), the nature of certain rights attaching to its 
shares, and the ri
pany capital. 
The remaining company law directives adopted before the mid-
 
 262. Christiaan Timmermans, Harmonization in the Future Company Law in 
cture of European Company Law: 
Europe, in CAPITAL MARKETS AND COMPANY LAW 623, 628 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy 
Wymeersch eds., 2003); Stefan Grundmann, The Stru
From Crisis to Boom, 5 EBOR 601, 605 (2004). 
 263. See GRUNDMANN, supra note 257, at 48; EDWARDS, supra note 257, at 1. 
 264. See First Council Directive 68/151, 1968 O.J. (L 65) 8 (EC), available at 
www.eurlex.eu [hereinafter First Council Directive]. 
 265. See Second Council Directive 77/91, 1976 O.J. (L 26) 1 (EC). 
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1980’s harmonize accounting266 or address specific company actions or 
topics, such as mergers and divisions,267 the establishment of branches 
in other member states.268  One directive even guarantees that the 
existence of a single-shareholder company will be respected throughout 
the Union.269  Following long and difficult negotiations among the 
member states, the European Union finally adopted longstanding 
proposals for a directive regulating takeovers270 and a 
regulation/directive package en abling the creation of a “European 
company” (“Societas Europaea” – “SE”), which is a porous framework 
of EU law filled in by the national company law of its member state of 
incorporation and seat.271  The company law directives and regulations 
outlined above prescribe mandatory minimum rules, but the SE 
Regulation introduces a certain amount of flexibility into national law.  
The Regulation allows shareholders to choose either a single-tier or a 
two-tier management board structure in setting up a Societas Europae,272 
and to specify a percentage of less than 10% of the shareholders to call a 
shareholder meeting.273  Germany and the United Kingdom have 
implemented all of these EU directives into their respective company 
laws; the SE Regulation is both directly binding as law and tied into 
national law with special, national legislation prescribing how the gaps 
in the loose, supranational framework are to be filled.274  More recent 
 
 266. Fourth Council Directive 78/660, 1978 O.J. (L 222) 11 (EC); Seventh Council 
Directive 83/349, 1983 O.J. (L 193) 1 (EC); Eighth Council Directive 84/253, 1984 O.J. 
ng 
DWARDS, supra note 257, chs. V-VII. 
9/666, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 36 (EC) [hereinafter 
 is discussed at 
ive 2001/86, 2001 O.J. (L 294) 22 (EC) (supplementing the 
o the involvement of employees) 
ve]. 
hough national law 
mber that many of the gaps 
(L 126) 20 (EC); Council Directive 1606/2002, 2002 O.J. (L 243) 1 (EC) (applyi
international accounting standards).  For a thorough discussion of these measures, see 
GRUNDMANN, supra note 257, §§ 14-16, and E
 267. See Third Council Directive 78/855, 1978 O.J. (L 295) 36 (EC); Sixth Council 
Directive 82/891, 1982 O.J. (L 378) 47 (EC). 
 268. Eleventh Council Directive 8
Eleventh Council Directive].  The Eleventh Company Law Directive
length in Inspire Art, supra note 260. 
 269. Twelfth Council Directive 89/667, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 40 (EC). 
 270. Council Directive 2004/25, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12 (EC). 
 271. See Council Regulation 2157/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 294) 1 (EC) [hereinafter SE 
Regulation]; Council Direct
Statute for a European company with regard t
[hereinafter SE Directi
 272. SE Regulation, supra note 271, art. 38(b). 
 273. Id. art. 55(1). 
 274. See Gesetz zur Einführung der Europäischen Gesellschaft [European Company 
Implementation Act], Dec. 22, 2004, BGBl. I at 3675 (F.R.G.).  Alt
will fill in gaps in the Regulation, it is important to reme
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laware and EU member states.  A 
grow
 
company law directives facilitate cross-border mergers275 and harmonize 
a number of shareholder rights with respect to receiving notice of an 
annual meeting, casting votes at the meeting, and granting a proxy for 
such votes.276  Although no directive has set out to harmonize directors’ 
duties of care and loyalty, the many ex ante rules in the directives 
referred to above – such as those restricting distributions to 
shareholders, prescribing procedural conduct for mergers, and limiting 
defenses against takeovers, as well as delineating how accounts should 
be prepared and signed – have a significant effect on management 
behavior.  Such rules should be factored in when comparing the 
development of fiduciary duties in De
ing body of ECJ decisions, which will be discussed at length in Part 
V, also has had an extremely important impact on company law. 
EU law regulates every aspect of the capital markets through a 
general framework of directives, directly applicable regulations, and 
detailed “interpretive” directives.  The areas covered include public 
offerings of securities,277 the disclosures that listed companies must 
make to the market,278 insider trading and market manipulation,279 the 
activities of brokers and trading facilities,280 and the operation of invest-
ment funds.281  As mentioned above,282 the shape of these capital market 
rules is often influenced by IOSCO, and thus also often resembles that 
of similar rules adopted in the United States.  Additionally, EU-U.S. 
have been left in areas already harmonized by earlier EU directives. 
 275. See Directive 2005/56, 2005 O.J. (L 310) 1 (EC). 
 276. See Directive 2007/36, 2007 O.J. (L 184) 17 (EC). 
 277. See Directive 2003/71, 2003 O.J. (L 345) 64 (EC) (amending Directive 2001/34 
concerning disclosure prior to a public offering or trading of an issuer’s securities). 
 278. See Directive 2004/109, 2004 O.J. (L 390) 38 [hereinafter Transparency 
Directive]. 
 279. Directive 2003/6, 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16 (EC) [hereinafter Market Abuse 
Directive]. 
 280. See Directive 2004/39, 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1 (EC) (amending Directive 85/611, 
Directive 93/6, and Directive 2000/12).  The content of this directive clearly falls 
outside of what is usefully considered as “company law” and will not be discussed in 
this Article. 
 281. At the time of this writing, the EU framework for the regulation of 
undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) is undergoing 
substantial modification.  See UCITS White Paper,  available at http://ec.europa.eu/in 
ternal_market/investment/legal_texts/index_en.htm#whitepaper. 
 282. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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s mutual recognition of specified disclosure 
frameworks.  One important element of securities regulation that has not 
been harmonized a r civil liability in 
cases of securities fraud.  
under the direction of Baron Alexandre Lamfalussy in its 
“Final p
European Securities Markets.”284  This Report set forth “four levels,” 
which are: 
• 
 Committee 
work programs and agreements provide for cooperative efforts in certain 
regulatory activity, as well a
t the EU level is the standard fo
283
3.  EU Implementing Regulations 
The detailed EU rules implementing general directives are adopted 
in accordance with a four-level approach devised in 2001 by an expert 
committee 
Re ort of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of 
Level 1: general principles, directives that member states 
implement; 
• Level 2: detailed implementing legislation adopted by the 
European Commission, in consultation with the
of European Securities Regulators (CESR); 
• Level 3: interpretive regulations developed by CESR; and 
• Level 4: Commission polices for compliance.285 
Pursuant to this procedure, the Insider Dealing and Market 
Manipulation Directive, for example, has been fleshed out both by de-
tailed implementing legislation286 and CESR implementing measures.287  
Similarly, the Prospectus Directive has been supplemented with a very 
detailed Prospectus Regulation,288 which operates something like the 
instructions in the United States’ Regulation S-K on the information to 
 
 283. See Luca Enriques & Tobias H. Tröger, Issuer Choice in Europe, 12 (ECGI 
detailed analysis of this four-level procedure, see 
 O.J. (L 336) 33 (EC); Commission Directive 2003/125, 
Level 2 
003). 
9/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 149) 1 (EC). 
Law Working Paper No.90, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1032281. 
 284. Report of Committee on the Regulation of European Securities Markets, 
available at http://europa.eu.  For a 
FERRAN, supra note 249, at 61-126. 
 285. FERRAN, supra note 249, at 61-126. 
 286. Commission Directive 2004/72, 2004 O.J. (L 162) 70 (EC); Commission 
Regulation 2273/2003, 2003
2003 O.J. (L 339) 73 (EC). 
 287. Committee of European Securities Regulators, Additional 
Implementing Measures for Market Abuse Directive, CESR/03-213b (2
 288. Commission Regulation 80
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could have a significant 
impact on national securities markets by allowing the home member 
state of an issue of a company, 
even if it is listed in another m 291
n further detail in Part V, the ECJ also guides national law 
that 
national law regarding this business form – the Aktiengesetz and the 
Companies Act 2006 contain a very large number of substantially 
be provided in disclosure documents289 and obviates detailed national 
legislation on the content of prospectuses. In fact, the German Securities 
Prospectus Act defines the required minimum content of a prospectus 
under German law with a brief reference to the EU Prospectus 
Regulation.290  The FSA’s disclosure and transparency rules referred to 
in the previous section are, to a great extent, taken without change from 
this EU legislation.  As discussed in Part V, the Transparency Directive 
includes provisions on applicable law that 
r to regulate the disclosure requirements 
ember state.  
4. The Europeanization of National Law 
The growth of EU activity in the area of securities regulation is 
passing much of the legislative volume of rules in this area from the 
member states to the supranational entity.  The hierarchical relationship 
between the European Union and its member states, as well as the den-
sity of the EU measures in the areas of company law and capital mar-
kets, also mean that member state law has been shaped by EU law to a 
very significant extent.  For a U.S. observer, the “marbling” of national 
law with supranational elements will appear quite different than the two-
tiered state/federal structure that prevails in the United States. As will be 
discussed i
has not already been harmonized or supplanted pursuant to its read-
ing of the EC Treaty, thus creating an additional supranational impact on 
local law. 
An awareness of the pervasive presence of EU law in both the 
German and the UK legal systems should warn those who would argue a 
strong form of legal origin influence.  The respective bodies of company 
law have both been “Europeanized” and exist alongside a large body of 
EU securities law.  Although EU law has not yet focused on private 
limited companies – and thus ECJ decisions have addressed conflicts in 
 
 289. See 17 C.F.R. 229 (2007). 
 290. See Wertpapierprospektgesetz [WpPG, Securities Prospectus Act], July 1, 
2005, last amended Dec. 28, 2007, § 7 (F.R.G.). 
 291. See Transparency Directive, supra note 278, art. 3. 
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est 
practices, which has led to significant uniformity in this area as well. 
C. Within Germany and the United Kingdom
identical provisions that implement EU law.292  In public companies, the 
appointment of directors and their management of the company in areas 
other than those regulated by directives have been left to national law.  
Thus in this important area of the law divergences do exist and continue 
to arise despite pressure by institutional investors for international b
 
 state (Land) of Hesse, 
where the city of Frankfurt am Main is located. 
1. Germany 
Although company law is national law in both Germany and the 
United Kingdom, each of these countries contains sub-jurisdictions and 
regulatory bodies to which power must be delegated or with which 
jurisdiction must be shared.  The Companies Act 2006 makes special 
allowances for divergence in the case of the law of Scotland and 
Northern Ireland, and the adoption of rules for the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange occurs partly in cooperation with the
Germany is a federation, but the Länder do not adopt company or 
securities laws of their own.  Consequently, there is no competition for 
charters within Germany.  The Aktiengesetz is also quite inflexible, leav-
ing little room for individualized company structures.  Section 23(5) of 
the AktG provides that the company charter may deviate from the 
provisions of the law only where expressly provided for in the law; such 
express grants are not generously provided.293  As Professor Karsten 
Schmidt notes, according to German corporate law, “the constitution-
like, prescribed structure of the stock corporation may be altered only 
slightly by the articles of incorporation, given that – contrary to limited 
liability companies and partnerships – the stock corporation is governed 
by the principle that the form of constitutional documents is strictly 
 
 292. These are especially visible in the area of capital maintenance, such as the 
minimum capital requirements for public companies (see § 6 AktG and § 763(1) 
Companies Act 2006), the required procedure to assessing in-kind contributions to 
ktG and § 593 Companies Act 2006) and the prohibition capital (see §§ 32 et seq. A
against a company lending money to a third party to purchase its shares (see § 71a 
AktG and § 677 et seq. Companies Act 2006), all of which stem from the Second 
Company Law Directive (see §§ 6, 10 and 23). 
 293. See AktG § 23(5). 
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re, originated in the 
capi
 
prescribed.”294  Indeed, Professor Hans-Joachim Mertens quipped in an 
essay written shortly after German reunification that a future economic 
historian would have great difficulty in discerning whether the 
Aktiengesetz, with its strictly prescribed structu
talist or in the communist half of Germany.295 
Securities exchanges exist in many German Länder; their rules are 
adopted in a semi-public manner in connection with the Land.  As 
mentioned above, Germany’s largest securities exchange, the Frankfurt 
Stock Exchange, is in the Land of Hesse.  Pursuant to § 32 of the 
German Exchange Act,296 the federal government has issued an ex-
change admission regulation providing guidelines on the procedure to be 
used and requirements to be met when admitting securities to listing on a 
German exchange.297  The “exchange council” (Börsenrat), a governing 
body of the exchange on which representatives of listed companies and 
market participants are seated, is responsible for drafting the exchange 
 294. SCHMIDT, supra note 178, at 771 (Author’s translation, italics in original); see 
Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law Between the United States and 
e ORP. L. 697 (2005) (discussing 
ma
 29 d 
Ko
 29
 
man Law Digest § 
007, BGB1 I S. 3089 [hereinafter Exchange Admission Regulation]. 
Contin ntal Europe: Distribution of Powers, 30 DEL. J. C
ndatory corporate law in Continental Europe). 
5. Hans-Joachim Mertens, Satzungs- und Organisationsautonomie im Aktien- un
nzernrecht, 3 ZGR 426 (1994). 
6. This section requires that the regulation contain 
provisions necessary to protect the public and for orderly exchange trading, regarding:  
(1.) admission requirements, and in particular: (a) requirements for the issuer 
regarding its legal form, its size and the duration of its existence; (b) requirements for 
the securities to be admitted regarding their legal basis, negotiability, face value, and 
printed format; (c) the minimum amount of the issue; and (d) the requirement that the 
application for admission include all shares of the same class or all debt securities of 
the same issue; (2.) the language and the content of the prospectus, in particular the 
securities to be admitted and the issuer, its capital, business activity, assets and 
liabilities, financial position, management and supervisory bodies, its recent 
development and prospects, any lockup agreements between the issuer and its 
shareholders, including any understandings and measures designed to secure 
performance on the agreement, as well as the persons or companies that take 
responsibility for the contents of the prospectus; (3.) the date on which the prospectus 
is to be published; and (4.) the admissions procedure. 
Börsengesetz (BörsG), June 2, 1896, BGB1. I, 2010, last amended by Gesetz, Dec. 21, 
2007, BGB1. I S. 3089 [hereinafter German Exchange Act]; see Martindale-Hubbell
Law Digest – European Law Digests, 1-1 Federal Republic of Ger
3.17 (2008) (describing the requirements of the German Exchange Act). 
 297. See Börsenzulassungs-Verordnung  (BörsZulv), Apr. 15, 1987, last amended by 
Gesetz, Dec. 21, 2
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disputed 
exch
rules.298  These rules must be approved by the supervisory authority of 
the Land which, in Hesse, is the Commerce Ministry.299  The Exchange 
Rules are issued in accordance with the German Exchange Act and 
under the supervision of the local state authority; they take on the char-
acter of a public law charter (öffentlich-rechtliche Satzung).300 This 
gives listed companies additional options to challenge 
ange actions, such as the delisting of a company under 
circumstances not expressly provided for in the exchange admission 
regulation.301 
Although German exchange rules are drafted by private parties, 
who expect the sympathetic cooperation of the commerce ministry in 
their local Land, they coexist with an extensive body of EU securities 
regulation as well as the national laws implementing those regulations.  
They must therefore conform to the national regulation on admission to 
an exchange.  As a result, the listing requirements of the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange, for example, have little room to exercise their local freedom 
even though they are considerably lighter than both their UK and U.S. 
counterparts.  It is difficult to say whether the open-ended nature of the 
Frankfurt rules expresses a business-friendly accommodation for listed 
companies or if it is simply the result of the heavy blanket of national 
and EU law resting on German companies, although the latter is more 
likely.  The Frankfurt rules go to disclosures and accounting, with stan-
dards for certain exchange segments being somewhat stricter than 
required by law.  For example, a company with shares admitted to the 
premium market segment referred to as “prime standard” must publish 
reports, including financial statements, on a quarterly rather than merely 
a semiannual basis, as required by the federal Exchange Admission 
Regulation (Börsenzulassungs-Verordnung).302  Such requirements are 
very light compared to their UK and U.S. counterparts and in no way 
 
 298. German Exchange Act, supra note 296, §§ 9, 13. 
 299. See generally id. § 13; Peter Foelsch, in BANKRECHT UND BANKPRAXIS, margin 
nos. 7/171, 7/183 (Thorwald Hellner & Stephan Steuer eds., 2007) (discussing the ap-
g the 
ww.deutsche-boerse.com; Exchange Admission Regulation, supra note 297, §§ 
proval process). 
 300. Foelsch, supra note 299, margin no. 7/182. 
 301. See Manfred Wolf, Der Ausschluß vom Neuen Markt und die Aufnahme von 
Ausschlußgründen in das Regelwerk Neuer Markt, 38 WM 1785 (2001) (analyzin
contract law problems arising in the unilateral amendment of this type of contact). 
 302. See Börsenordnung für die Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse [Rules of the Frankfurt 
Stock Exchange], Oct. 13, 1975, last amended Aug. 15, 2008, §§ 62-63, available at 
http://w
53-62. 
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c-
tice 
ailed 
EU legislation, however, the national substance of the BaFin regulations 
has become less signific very little jurisdictional 
interaction within Germ
regulate the composition of the company’s board or its actions.  Rather, 
the latter topics are addressed by the Corporate Governance Code re-
ferred to above, and compliance with the Governance Code must be 
declared (or non-compliance disclosed and explained) in the notes of a 
listed company’s financial statements.303 The Governance Code contains 
requirements comparable to the corporate governance standards found in 
the NYSE Listed Company Manual, such as the creation of an audit 
committee on the supervisory board with a chair who is an accounting 
expert and not a former manager,304 the disapproval of the general pra
of managing directors migrating into the supervisory board,305 the 
recommendation that supervising directors of public corporations sit on 
the boards no more than five, separate companies (the Aktiengesetz sets 
the limit at 10),306 a general policy of one share/one vote,307 and a 
shareholder-friendly calling and holding of the annual meeting.308 
Particularly with regard to takeovers and securities trading, German 
law also delegates authority to the German Financial Services Supervi-
sory Agency (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht – BaFin) 
to adopt regulations.  As CESR has increasingly issued more det
ant.  As a result, there is 
any, especially given that the Frankfurt listing 
rules are comparatively light and the Kodex largely repeats the require-
ments of the Aktiengesetz.  Nearly all company law is national law. 
2. The United Kingdom 
Although the United Kingdom is composed of England, Wales, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland – each having a certain degree of 
autonomy and slight differences in laws that affect companies – there is 
no regulatory competition between its component states. The Companies 
Act 2006 applies equally to each state, but makes numerous references 
 
 303. See Aktg § 161 (2008). 
 304. Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex [German Corporate Governance 
, last amended June 14, 2007, § 5.3.2, available at www.corporate-
4.5; AktG § 100(2)(1). 
ra note 304, § 2.1.2. 
Code], Feb. 26, 2002
governance-code.de. 
 305. Id. § 5.4.4. 
 306. See id. § 5.
 307. German Corporate Governance Code, sup
 308. Id.  § 2.3. 
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orities, which highlight the divergences in the various UK 
com
the Takeover Panel as a body composed of representatives of the 
r rules 
London) are quite different 
ongress in Washington to shape 
to the slight differences between the laws of the various states, including 
variations in the requirements for registering charges against the 
company (which is closely linked to principles of local property law),309 
or the requirements for entering into contracts that bind the company 
(which is closely linked to principles of local contract law).310  The 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) makes similar, but 
fewer, adjustments for differences in such areas as criminal law and 
related auth
ponent states.311  Most significant “jurisdictional” interaction in the 
area of company law occurs between the UK Parliament and the bodies 
to which it delegates specific powers, primarily the Secretary of State, 
the FSA and the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers (the “Takeover 
Panel”).312 
The Secretary has significant delegated authority under the Act, 
particularly in connection with the constitution of companies, including 
prescribing model articles of association.313 The Secretary receives 
power to issue other statutory instruments affecting a number of 
different rights.314  The Companies Act 2006 authorizes the Takeover 
Panel to issue rules for the regulation of takeovers in accordance with 
the EU Takeover Directive,315 to enjoin persons from acting in violation 
of the rules,316 to order the production of documents,317 and to conduct 
hearings on the alleged violation of its rules.318 The historical position of 
industry suggests that those who are able to shape the UK takeove
(e.g., institutional investors in the City of 
from those who may lobby the U.S. C
the U.S. takeover rules (e.g., corporate management).319  Because each 
 
 309. See Companies Act 2006, ch. 46, pt. 25. 
 310. See id. §§ 43-48. 
cial Services and Markets Act 2000, ch. 8, § 176 (U.K).  311. See, e.g., Finan
 312. See supra note 234 and accompanying text. 
 313. See Companies Act 2006, ch. 46, § 19. 
 314. See, e.g., id. § 71(4) (giving the Secretary the power to issue rules regulating 
challenges to company names). 
 315. See id. § 943. 
 316. See id. § 946. 
 317. See id. § 947. 
 318. See id. § 951. 
 319. See John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile 
Takeovers, and Why? – The Peculiar Divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation, 
95 GEO. L.J. 1727 (2007).  Armour and Skeel provide an excellent analysis showing 
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rule-giving body represents different constituencies and has its own 
unique procedures for drafting and issuing its rules, the types of 
constituencies that can exercise influence on each of those bodies are 
also different.  Understanding relevant jurisdictions and their powers is 
therefore a prerequisite to understanding the types of forces that move 
historical development, which is outlined in the following Part V.  Since 
the Takeover Panel has recently been brought formally under the law 
through the Companies Act 2006, it will be interesting to see whether its 
rules and decisions move at all in the direction of the more industry-
friendly U.S. counterparts. 
The FSMA both created the FSA and delegated power to it, inclu-
ding the power to grant authorization to pursue a regulated financial 
activity.320  Its rules address matters ranging from the disclosure of in-
side information and of shareholdings,321 to the listing standards for UK 
securities exchanges,322 i.e. the London Stock Exchange (LSE).  The 
LSE’s own rules primarily regulate its members rather than listed 
companies.323  Unlike Germany, local government is not involved in the 
FSA’s rule-making process.  The FSA Listing Rules provide an exten-
sive set of initial and continuing obligations for listed companies that not 
only specify financial criteria and regulate disclosure, but also provide 
 
how the nature of a rule-giving body can channel certain types of constituency influence 
into its rules.  It builds on ideas found in Romano, supra note 102, which focuses on the 
rule-giver’s state of mind in accepting or rejecting solutions offered by various 
constituencies.  A more recent paper looks at the motives and available funds that con-
ssion Paper, Paper No. 603), available at 
is (Armour & 
unity for 
ancial Services and Markets Act 2000, ch. 8, § 20 (U.K.). 
NGE, RULES OF THE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE 6-
-
stituencies such as corporate management can use to influence rule-giving bodies.  See 
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Zvika Neeman, Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics 
(Harvard Law and Economics Discu
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1030355.  A combination of jurisdictional analys
Skeel), situational analysis (Romano), and analysis of motive and opport
influence (Bebchuk & Neeman) should be able to offer a legal history that explicates 
the complete dynamics of legal change. 
 320. See Fin
 321. See FSA Disclosure and Transparency Rules, supra note 231, R. 2, 5. 
 322. The FSA is the “competent authority” under EU law for supervising and 
regulating the securities exchanges.  See Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, ch. 
8, § 72 (U.K.). 
 323. See LONDON STOCK EXCHA
13 (2008), available at www.londonstockexchange.com/en-gb/products/membership 
trading/rulesreg/ruleslse/rulesoflse.htm (differentiating between securities of non
member issuers, which may be traded on the Exchange, and member firms, which are 
subject to rules of the Exchange). 
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tion between the 
shares of issuers from different home member states on the same 
exchange, altering the traditional rule that allowed the marketplace to 
control the regulation of securities sold on the market. 
guidelines on how specific types of transactions are to be approved324 
and the manner in which company directors may buy and sell the 
company’s stock.325  Thus, like the regulatory composition in the United 
States, the shift from a non-listed to a public listed UK company brings 
with it a substantial increase in regulation.  Unlike the United States, 
however, it would be next to impossible for another UK exchange to 
compete for listing applicants by offering less regulation because the 
bulk of the listing rules come from the FSA rather than the exchange – 
although a “race-to-the-top” strategy based on stricter standards should 
be possible.  Moreover, as discussed in Part V, the EU Transparency 
Directive’s applicable law provisions allow competi
D. The United States and Its States 
The bodies with power to issue rules governing public companies in 
the United States are the states (e.g., the State of Delaware), the federal 
government (which enacted, e.g., the Exchange Act and the Securities 
Act) and the securities exchange on which a given company’s shares are 
listed (e.g., the New York Stock Exchange and the Nasdaq Stock Market 
both  of 
these bodies tend to overlap and supplement each other. 
 
 issue their own listing standards).326  The rules issued by each
1.  The Constitutional Position of the U.S. Federal Government 
Federal law focuses on disclosure in the contexts of securities 
offerings,327 takeovers,328 annual and quarterly reporting,329 and the soli-
 324. Transactions requiring shareholder approval include stock and stock option 
c., Listed Company Manual, available at http://www. 
 
bsites of both organiza-
.S.C. § 77e(a) (2006)). 
plans for management.  See FIN. SERVS. AUTH. (U.K.), LISTING RULES, R. 9.4 (2008). 
 325. Transactions requiring shareholder approval include stock and stock option 
plans for management.  See id. R. 9.2.7. 
 326. See generally NYSE, In
nyse.com/Frameset.html?nyseref=&displayPage=/lcm/lcm_section.html; NASDAQ,
Inc., Marketplace Rules, available at www.nasdaq.com.  The we
tions are continuously updated. 
 327. See The Securities Act of 1933, § 5(a) (codified at 15 U
 328. See id. § 14(d) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (2006)). 
 329. See id. § 13 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2006)). 
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citat
discussed above on the Commerce Clause;336 there is little doubt that 
Congress could replace the state corporate laws with a federal statute.337  
ion of proxies330 for the annual meetings of shareholders, as well as 
combating fraud in connection with such activities.331  In the area of 
company law proper, the federal government could constitutionally 
supplant state law, but has traditionally chosen not to do so. 
Pursuant to Article VI, clause 2, of the U.S. Constitution, known as 
the Supremacy Clause, the laws of the federal government preempt the 
laws of a state.332  Preemption is not uniformly present in all cases.  The 
federal preemption power runs on a sliding scale, beginning with those 
cases where exclusive powers of the federal government are specified in 
the Constitution and gradually decreasing through cases in which the 
Supreme Court has found that (1) there is a presumption in favor of pre-
emption, (2) the legal position is neutral, and (3) there is a presumption 
against preemption, and finishing with those cases in which the states 
have a constitutional immunity from preemption.333  Because the Com-
merce Clause334 of the Constitution vests the federal Congress with the 
power to regulate commerce among the states, interstate commercial 
activity is a field where the argument for preemption is at its 
strongest.335  Congress based its enactment of the various securities laws 
 
 330. See id. § 14(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2006)). 
borrowed from Professor Mark V. Tushnet, who 
the present purposes,” which of course indicates that finer distinc-
n a Post-Printz World, 36 TULSA L.J. 11, 19 (2000). 
-empt or exist concurrently with state law. The federal 
 331. See The Securities Act of 1933, § 77, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2006); The Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006)). 
 332. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  For an informative historical analysis of the U.S. 
federalist structure, see generally Michael W. McConnell, Federalism:  Evaluating the 
Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484 (1987). 
 333. This sliding scale analysis is 
uses it in a discussion of the foreign policy area, with the caveat that the five-point scale 
is “sufficient” for “
tions might be appropriate in different circumstances. See Mark V. Tushnet, 
Globalization and Federalism i
 334. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 335. See Tushnet, supra note 333, at 19 (discussing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 
Wheat.) 1 (1824)). 
 336. See LOUIS LOSS ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 98 (5th ed. 
2004, supplemented to 2007). 
 337. See, e.g., Joel Seligman, A Modest Revolution in Corporate Governance, 80 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1159, 1169 (2005) (stating “there was no real question given the 
United States Constitution’s Supremacy Clause that the SEC could seek legislation that 
would supplant the states in corporate law for a specified category of corporations and 
that the federal law would pre
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ation and governance of a 
corporation and the rights and duties of its owners and managers.344  For 
For example, although most U.S. states have some form of law 
providing for disclosures in connection with the sale of securities (often 
referred to as “blue sky laws”), Congress in 1996 provided that these 
laws shall not apply to any securities listed on a national exchange.338  
The preempted state law was simply displaced.  The same result could 
be achieved through the adoption of a federal company law – although 
this has not been seriously considered since the beginning of the 
1920’s.339  In the mean time a “tradition” has developed according to 
which corporations are understood as “creatures of the state”340 and 
corporate law is understood as an area in which there is a “longstanding 
prevalence of state regulation.”341  Thus, “except where federal law 
expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to 
stock holders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the 
corporation.”342  States are understood to have “broad latitude” in 
regulating such “internal affairs”343 as the form
these reasons, the federal government avoids encroaching on this area. 
 
securities laws did exactly this with respect to state disclosure and fraud remedies 
during the New Deal.”); see also Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 588, 596 (2003) (stating that “Congress’s authority over interstate commerce 
means that the internal affairs ‘doctrine’ is just an informal arrangement, not a hard 
limit on federal lawmaking”). 
 338. See National Securities Markets Improvements Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
290, § 112 Stat. 3416 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).  The 
“blue sky” laws have become progressively less important as federal law has either 
expressly or tacitly pre-empted their application. Along these lines, the Securities 
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, § 112 Stat. 3227 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), also removed
amount of activity from the state jurisdictions by pre-empting state c
 a significant 
lass actions for 
 3
 3
Ap . 
19
 3 .  
RE ” 
ref
specified types of securities fraud.  See LOSS ET AL., supra note 336, at 28, 1189. 
 339. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of 
Corporate Federalism, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619, 653 (2006). 
 340. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (refusing to apply the 
federal securities laws to matters of internal corporate management (citing Cort v. Ash, 
422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975))). 
 341. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 70 (1987). 
42. Cort, 422 U.S. at 84. 
43. CTS, 481 U.S. at 78 (citing the decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of 
peals below, Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 264 (7th Cir
86)). 
44. The concept of “internal affairs” comes from the area of conflicts of law
STATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICTS OF LAW § 302 cmt. a (1971).  “Internal affairs
ers to 
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2.  Federal Laws 
Federal laws, and the extensive body of rules issued pursuant to 
them, mostly require registration of companies, disclosure of financial 
and other information about the company and management, and make 
only minimal incursions into the internal affairs of the companies 
regulated.345  Controversies arise in connection with border areas, where 
there is uncertainty as to whether the field has been preempted by 
federal law346 or where a federal remedy could be applied to an action 
taken under the state corporate law.  For example, when a shareholder 
raised a federal challenge against a “short-form” merger that under 
Delaware law did not require shareholder approval, the Supreme Court 
rejected the claim because the matter was “internal” and did not exhibit 
 
the relations inter se of the corporation, its shareholders, directors, officers or agents. . 
. . involv[ing] primarily a corporation’s relationship to its shareholders [and] 
 charter and by-law amendments, 
disgorgement of profits that such insiders 
 state statute that 
d
includ[ing] steps taken in the course of the original incorporation, the election or 
appointment of directors and officers, the adoption of by-laws, the issuance of 
corporate shares, preemptive rights, the holding of directors’ and shareholders’ 
meetings, methods of voting including any requirement for cumulative voting, 
shareholders’ rights to examine corporate records,
mergers, consolidations and reorganizations and the reclassification of shares. Matters 
which may also affect the interests of the corporation’s creditors include the issuance 
of bonds, the declaration and payment of dividends, loans by the corporation to 
directors, officers and shareholders, and the purchase and redemption by the 
corporation of outstanding shares of its own stock. 
Id. 
 345. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(a)-(b) (1934) (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 78p(a)-(b) (2006)) (requiring directors, officers, and principal stockholders of 
public corporations to disclose any buying or selling of the stock of such public 
company).  In the original Exchange Act, incursions into the management of the 
corporation were limited to such requirements as disclosure of the shareholdings of 
managers and 10% stockholders, and the 
made through short term dealings (within a period of six months) in the company’s 
shares.  An exception to the limitation to disclosure rules was found in the Investment 
Company Act, which included a requirement that a specified percentage of independent 
or unaffiliated directors be seated on the board.  Investment Company Act § 10(a) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (2006)). 
 346. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (invalidating a
impose  a waiting period of the consummation of takeover offers that was deemed to 
frustrate the balance achieved in section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).  
On the question of “field preemption” as applied to corporate and securities law, see 
Roberta S. Karmel, Reconciling Federal and State Interests in Securities Regulation in 
the United States and Europe, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 495, 500 (2003). 
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ternal procedures by prohibiting most loans to 
direc
because an EU directive,352 which had to be carried into national law, 
353 German law354 
characteristics, such as misrepresentation or fraud, that the federal law 
was enacted to combat.347  Federal/state conflicts also arise when the 
SEC oversteps its authority under the Exchange Act in regulating an 
“internal” matter (such as the type of voting rights embodied in shares), 
which is usually provided for in state corporate laws.348  No legal 
controversy arises, however, when the federal government expressly 
enters internal corporate affairs, as it did with Sections 301 and 402 of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOA),349 which regulated the 
composition of corporate boards by requiring independent audit 
committees and their in
tors.  It is by tradition, but not by law, that the states control most of 
the internal affairs of corporations. 
An important distinction between U.S. and EU company law arises 
in that the U.S. Congress may not command the states to implement 
specified policies,350 where the European Union will.  As a result, state 
laws like the DGCL are essentially different from their counterparts in 
Germany and the United Kingdom because they are not marbled with 
elements of federal law; rather, state law and federal law occupy 
separate realms.  For example, Section 441 of the Companies Act 2006 
requires companies to deliver their annual accounts for each financial 
year to the companies’ registrar.351  This obligation is found in UK law 
required it.   The same EU law requirement is found in 
 
 347. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (The court found that, 
absent an allegation of misrepresentation or fraud – which are the key elements of Rule 
 a 
90) (holding that 
d stock carried proportional voting rights 
e
 78m (2006)). 
21 U.S. 898, 932 (1997) (reaffirming that “[t]he 
10b-5 under the Exchange Act – the federal rule could not be used to invalidate
merger effected properly under state law).  For an excellent discussion of this case, see 
Donald C. Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fe’s Shadow: The SEC’s Pursuit of 
Managerial Accountability, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 449 (2001). 
 348. See The Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 19
the SEC’s attempt to guarantee that all liste
exceed d the agency’s authority under § 14 of the Exchange Act.). 
 349. Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 301, 402 (codified at15 U.S.C. §§ 78f,
 350. See Printz v. United States, 5
Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address 
particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of their political 
subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program”). 
 351. Companies Act 2006 ch. 46, § 441. 
 352. First Company Law Directive, Council Directive 68/151 of 9 March 1968 
Coordinating Safeguards Required of Companies, 1968 O.J. (L 65) 1. 
 353. See id. arts. 2(1)(f), 3(1)-(2). 
 354. Germany implemented the First Company Law Directive in 1969 with The 
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and will be found in a substantially similar form in the various company 
laws of all EU member states because national legislatures are obligated 
to implement the supranational directive.  Conversely, U.S. federal laws, 
such as the Exchange Act, operate on a plane separate from that 
occupied by the state company law statutes.  These two parallel systems 
manoeuvre around each other, and at times leave holes or overlap.  In 
the U.S., the closest thing to European-style compulsory implementation 
is found in legislative orders via the SEC to the national securities ex-
changes to issue specific listing rules, as discussed below. Such orders 
explain why listing rules serve a harmonizing function that is not found 
in state company law with the exception, perhaps, of the Model Business 
Corporation Act (the “Model Act”).355 
The Model Act may be considered a voluntary form of European-
style harmonization. The American Bar Association’s Section of Busi-
ness Law (the “ABA”) continuously updates and improves the Model 
Act and publishes drafts for discussion in the ABA publication, The 
Business Lawyer.356  State legislatures are free to adopt the provisions 
with or without change.  By 2000, thirty-five states had substantially 
adopted the Model Act357 – although most large public companies are 
governed by the laws of Delaware and Delaware has not adopted the 
Model Act.  As a result, corporate law in the United States is essentially 
divided into three camps: (1) the majority of the states follow the Model 
Act, (2) a few states, such as Oklahoma, follow the DGCL, and (3) some 
large states like California and New York, which can afford their own 
 
Law Implementing the First 
Comp
Directive of the European Council on the Coordination of 
Europ
1969, BGBl vol. I, p. 1146.  The required filing was previously specified in AktG §§ 
or housekeeping purposes into §§ 325-329 
 and adopting the Model Act will be discussed in 
Chronology of the Evolution of the 
Booth, supra note 355, at 66. 
any Law (Gesetz zur Durchführung der Ersten Richtlinie des Rates der 
äischen Gemeinschaften zur Koordinierung des Gesellschaftsrechts) of Aug. 15, 
177, 178 (2008), but has since been moved f
of the HGB, which apply to all stock corporations.  The Commercial Code also 
provides for the creation of the register in which the filing must be made.  See UWE 
HÜFFER, AKTIENGESETZ 881 (7th ed. 2006). 
 355. The Model Act is drafted by the Section of Business Law of the American Bar 
Association.  The process of updating
more detail in Part III.A.2.  The Model Act has been adopted in substance in thirty-five 
of the fifty U.S. states.  See Richard A. Booth, A 
MBCA, 56 BUS. LAW. 63, 66 (2000). 
 356. See generally Am. Bar Ass’n, The Business Lawyer, http://www.abanet.org/ 
buslaw/tbl/home.shtml (last visited Sept. 9, 2008). 
 357. See 
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ct by 
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law 
(NCCUSL)361 which, like the Model Business Corporation Act, has been 
offered to the states for their voluntary adoption.  This process has signi-
fican
they violated either state or federal law.364  Pursuant to the Exchange 
drafting committees, follow neither Delaware nor the Model Act.358  
Federal law has not been directly implemented into any of these 
corporate statutes. 
Because U.S. corporate law statutes offer creditors few safeguards 
against shareholders paying out the corporate capital to themselves, U.S. 
company law reaches out in various directions to cobble together 
creditor rights.  Some protections are found in federal law and others in 
harmonized model laws.  In addition, federal law bankruptcy provisions 
governing both fraudulent conveyances and equitable subordination are 
used to address cases in which shareholders unfairly vote themselves 
preferential treatment.359  Rules on fraudulent conveyances are also used 
to limit such payouts.360  Such rules have been drafted in a model a
tly harmonized the shape of such rules in the United States.362 
3.  Exchange Rules 
The initial and continued listing requirements of national securities 
exchanges are merely contractual in nature,363 and would be invalid if 
 
 358. See JONATHAN R. MACEY, MACEY ON CORPORATION LAW (2002), for a 
iform Fraudulent Transfer Act, which was drafted by NCCUSL in 1984, 
iform Fraudulent Conveyance Act that had existed since 1918.  The 
sioners on Uniform State Laws Homepage, http://www.nccusl.org (last visited 
 a self-regulatory organization which has taken effect . . . may be enforced by 
discussion of the states that have followed a specific provision of the DGCL or the 
Model Act. 
 359. See David A. Skeel & Georg Krause-Wilmar, Recharacterization and the 
Nonhindrance of Creditors, 7 EBOR 259 (2006). 
 360. See, e.g., Moody v. Sec. Pac. Credit Bus., Inc., 971 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir. 1992); 
see also United States v. Tabor Court Realty, 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 361. The Un
revised The Un
1984 version has been adopted by 42 states. See generally National Conference of 
Commis
Oct. 7, 2008). 
 362. See id. 
 363. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127-28 
(1973). 
 364. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (2005); see also JOHN D. 
CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 495 (4th ed. 1998).  Aside 
from the invalidity under contract law, federal securities law provides that a “rule 
change of
such organization to the extent it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this title, the 
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 The expansion of the Exchange Act into “internal” matters 
 
Act, national securities exchanges are “self regulatory organizations” 
(SROs) and their rules, including the listing standards, are subject to the 
approval of the SEC,365 which supervises their adoption according to a 
procedure provided for in Section 19 of the Exchange Act.366  In accor-
dance with this procedure, the SEC supervises all significant rule 
changes of national exchanges and may instruct the exchanges to adopt 
specific rules.  Because the SEC operates under power delegated to it 
through the Exchange Act, it may not instruct a securities exchange to 
adopt a rule in an area not covered by such delegated power.  Therefore, 
the D.C. Circuit court found in 1990 that an SEC rule that would have 
required exchanges to maintain a one share/one vote policy was beyond 
the agency’s statutory authority because, in the court’s opinion, voting 
rights were part of internal corporate governance and beyond the disclo-
sure focus of the Exchange Act.367  However, this decision, although 
certainly binding, is generally not considered to demarcate the limits of 
the SEC’s delegated power with great authority.  As Professor Joel 
Seligman has observed, the court’s decision not only ignores the SEC’s 
plenary power under the Exchange Act to change or abrogate exchange 
rules,368 but also fails to explain how, if exchanges can adopt rules that 
go well beyond disclosure and if the SEC has unlimited power over this 
process, the SEC’s own affirmative capacity can be limited to disclosure 
rules.369 
rules 
Exch
(2006)). 
 365. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 19(b) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)); 
and regulations thereunder, and applicable Federal and State law.”  The Securities 
ange Act of 1934 § 19(b)(3)(C) (1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(3)(C) 
LOSS ET AL., supra note 336, at 776. 
 366. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 19(b) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)). 
According to this provision an exchange must file copies of any proposed rule change 
with the SEC, stating the proposed rule’s basis and purpose.  The SEC then provides 
notice of the proposal and gives interested persons an opportunity to comment.  Usually 
within 35 days, the SEC will then order the rule change or institute proceedings to 
determine whether the proposal should be disapproved.  Under certain circumstances 
rules may enter into effect immediately without the waiting period. No rule proposal 
can become effective without SEC approval.  See LOSS ET AL., supra note 336, at 776. 
 367. Bus. Roundtable v. S.E.C., 905 F. 2d 406, 411-13 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 368. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 19(b)(3)(C) (1934) (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 78s(b)(3)(C) (2006)). (granting the SEC the authority to review and order 
changes to the rules of an registered stock exchange). 
 369. LOSS ET AL., supra note 336, at 778. 
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(fiduciary).373  The elaboration of this last category, fiduciary duties, has 
tion of the Delaware courts, 
through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act may lead future courts to reach 
different conclusions regarding the scope of the SEC’s power in such 
matters. 
4. Within Delaware 
If a company is listed, the composition and behavior of its board 
will be governed to a certain extent by federal rules.  Further, if the 
company must register with the SEC, even if it is not publicly listed, the 
conduct of its general meetings and the disclosure required from 
directors and major shareholders will be governed by the same body of 
rules.  Because the DGCL offers a flexible set of default terms, what 
remains mandatory within Delaware law are the constitution of the 
company370 and matters falling under the rubric of “internal affairs,” 
particularly the duties of care and loyalty owed by directors and control-
ling shareholders to the company and the minority shareholders.371  
Professor Jeffrey Gordon has aptly described laws like the DGCL as 
containing four types of mandatory rules: “procedural, power allocating, 
economic transformative, and fiduciary standards setting.”372  These 
categories would include such matters as establishing a mandatory 
procedure for calling shareholder meetings (procedural), giving share-
holders the right to elect and remove directors (allocating), requiring a 
shareholder vote on transactions that would change the nature of the 
corporation (transformative), and duties of care and loyalty 
been the most important contribu
particularly through decisions handed down during the second half of 
the twentieth century.374 Allocation of power and the opportunity to vote 
 
 370. See DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW §§ 101-06. 
ey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. 
 in 1974, when he accused the state of leading a “race for the bottom”.  
 371. See, e.g., In re Disney Litigation, 907 A.2d 693, 749-53 (Del. Ch. 2005); Singer 
v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 977 (Del. 1977) (interpreting the duties of care and 
loyalty owed by directors to shareholders under the DGCL). 
 372. Jeffr
REV. 1549, 1591 (1989). 
 373. Id. at 1593 (Fiduciary duties are applied by courts “to restrain insiders in 
exercising their discretionary power over the corporation and its shareholders in 
contingencies not specifically foreseeable and thus over which the parties could not 
contract.”). 
 374. In the case of Delaware, it is thought that the courts’ introduction of stricter 
fiduciary duties was a reaction to the critical stance taken by former SEC Chairman 
William Cary
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if the company is registered with the 
SEC
en from the law of 
the State of Delaware (or another state, depending on the law applicable 
to the transaction), or from federal Bankruptcy La
V. H AW 
on major decisions that would affect the nature of the company are 
provided for in the DGCL, but the DGCL forms a default rule in this 
regard and may be shaped significantly in the certificate of 
incorporation.375  The way in which a matter is put up for a vote will be 
governed by federal proxy rules 
, or by a combination of minimalist rules and fiduciary standards 
under Delaware law if it is not.376 
There is no interaction between Delaware and a lower, local body 
or a securities exchange.  As explained above, national securities ex-
changes adopt their rules in coordination with the SEC.  Although the 
DGCL does refer to a “Secretary of State,” this office has neither the 
authority to issue statutory instruments nor any significant role in 
checking the adequacy of a company’s request for incorporation.377  
Fraudulent conveyance rules, if applied, would be tak
w. 
ISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT IN U.S. AND EU COMPANY L
A. Internal and External Influences within the System 
Part IV examined the jurisdictional relationships that define legal 
functions.  The analysis was static in that it looked at the rule-giving 
bodies in each jurisdiction, the areas their respective powers cover, and 
the relative supremacy of each body.  This Part V will examine how the 
interaction of these jurisdictional components has contributed to the 
evolution of company law in the U.S. and EU legal systems over time.  
Actions in one jurisdiction cause reactions in other jurisdictions within 
the system.  For example, if the upper level in a legal system orders a 
 
See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections on Delaware, 83 
YALE L. J. 663, 705 (1974)).  In the landmark decision Singer, supra note 371, the 
Delaware Supreme Court imposed strict fiduciary duties on the management of a parent 
company in a cash-out merger with a subsidiary.  See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 
339, at 680. 
 375. See Gordon, supra note 372, at 1586 (explaining that the “present system of 
mandatory rules . . . establish the governance structure [of a corporation] and set the 
standards of conduct to which insiders will be held”). 
 376. Id. 
 377. See DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 103; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, §8704 (2008). 
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ch component.  
The 
 
fligh
ns – regulatory competition, planned harmoni-
 
sub-unit to desist from regulating an entity based in another sub-unit, 
this opens the field to competition between the entity forms of the 
various sub-units.  In the alternative, if the upper level imposes its own 
rules on such entities, the uniformity of rules within the overall system 
excludes sub-unit competition.  In this way, the development of the sys-
tem as a whole depends on the forces exercised on ea
legal nature of the jurisdictions and their sub-units as described in 
Part IV demarcates the legally permissible boundaries for this inter-
action (e.g., the U.S. federal government will never command a state to 
implement a federal directive).  Here, the interaction itself will be 
examined with reference to – but not detailed study of – the exogenous 
influences that set this system development into motion. 
The problematic comparisons discussed in Part II.C neglected the 
importance of some historical influences while over-emphasizing others.  
In the example from the Origin Theorists, the presence of strong capital 
markets in the United States and the United Kingdom at the close of the 
20th Century was attributed to the common law, whereas the presence of 
weak capital markets in Continental Europe was attributed to the civil 
law.  As shown in that Part, this theory ignored: (i) the strong capital 
markets in Continental Europe before 1914, (ii) the destructive effects of 
two world wars on Continental Europe, (iii) the political effects of the 
Cold War on Continental Europe, (iv) the stimulating effect of capital
t on U.S. markets, and (v) the fact that differences between 
(rationalist) French culture and (empiricist) British culture run much 
deeper and wider than differences in the legal systems.  The historical 
dimension of legal development can be more fully understood by 
evaluating a well-researched assessment of relevant historical events in 
the context of legally permissible jurisdictional actions and reactions.378 
This Part will discuss the main pressures to form the development 
of company law in the United States and Europe by examining juris-
dictional interaction on the historical axis.  Major political events earlier 
in the century, including World War I and II and the Cold War (and as 
discussed in detail by Roe in his critique of the Origin Theorists379), will 
be referred to only parenthetically.  Emphasis will be placed on 
jurisdictional interactio
 378. The importance of the legal framework of course depends on the nature of the 
historical event.  Reactions to economic boom or bust will likely be kept within the 
constitutionally permissible framework whist reactions to war and revolution might 
very well sweep such framework aside. 
 379. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text. 
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zatio flu-
ence during recent decades.  This Article attempts to offer a framework 
for comparing the c ited Kingdom and 
Delaware.  Therefore, it will try to isolate similarities and differences in 
the 
n, and market-led convergence – which have exercised great in
ompany laws of Germany, the Un
systematic interaction of jurisdictions within the European Union 
and the United States. 
B. U.S. Corporate Law: the Forces of Regulatory Competition 
1. A History of Gradual Growth 
As corporate law in the United States developed in an essentially 
British society (which excluded the native North Americans) after the 
close of the colonial period, it did not suffer anything like transplant 
effects.  The distance from Europe also kept the United States mostly 
free of foreign invasion, the imposition of foreign law, and the destruc-
tion of property through warfare.   Corporate law developed side-by-
side with the U.S. economy, at first gradually and then rapidly towards 
the turn of the century.  Early corporations were specially chartered by 
state governments and often provided services on a monopoly basis that 
a government itself might have traditionally provided.   The first 
enabling statute for business corporations, entitled a law “relative to 
incorporatio
380
381
ns for Manufacturing purposes,” was enacted by the State of 
New
the law.  
n
 York in 1811.382 Similar enabling statutes gradually replaced spe-
cial chartering as a basis for incorporation.  From a comparative point of 
view, it is particularly meaningful that, at the very outset of corporate 
activity, the U.S. Supreme Court held corporate charters to be constitu-
tionally protected contracts vested with protection from arbitrary state 
interference, thus ensuring private corporations a strong position under 
383
I creasing flexibility and liberalization, as well as a growing lati-
 
 380. The major exception to this peaceful growth was the U.S. Civil War between 
1861 and 1865, which left the U.S. South largely destroyed and under the 
administration of an occupation army. The great industrialization and growth in 
, supra note 139, at 18. 
 M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 130 (3d ed. 
See Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
financial markets at the eve of the 20th Century mostly bypassed this area. See 
KENNEDY
 381. See LAWRENCE
2005). 
 382. See id. at 134. 
 383. 
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Delaware, thus propelling Delaware to the top of the corporate law mar-
ket.388  Thi has been a 
primary engine of development for corporate law until today. The debate 
over
thus leads to a decrease in competition among laws at the state level.  As 
tude for management decisions marked the development of corporation 
law during the latter half of the 19th Century.384  The gradual change in 
outlook towards business and corporations was accompanied by positive 
attitudes towards securities dealing, which gradually overcame the view 
that speculation in securities was an unproductive activity that enabled 
deceit and should therefore be restricted.385  It will be remembered that a 
U.S. corporation’s “internal affairs” are governed by the laws of the 
state of its incorporation regardless of where it bases its center of ad-
ministration.  In the late 1890’s a number of states began to compete for 
tax revenue by fashioning their corporate laws to attract promoters plan-
ning to incorporate new companies and managers who might decide to 
reincorporate an existing company in a different state.386  The State of 
Delaware joined this race after Woodrow Wilson, who was then 
governor of New Jersey, the leading corporate charter state, amended the 
New Jersey corporate statute to make it less business friendly.387  
Consequently, many New Jersey corporations reincorporated in 
s “regulatory competition” for corporate charters 
 whether such competition creates the best law for society – namely, 
whether it is a race to the “bottom”389 or to the “top”390 – is still 
ongoing. 
2.  A Systemic Balance of State and Federal Law 
Regardless of which direction regulatory competition leads, it is a 
fact of system dynamics that the more corporate law an authority with 
jurisdiction over the entire territory enacts (in the U.S., the federal 
government), the territorial sub-units (in the U.S., the states) will have 
fewer matters in which they can distinguish themselves and compete.  
An increase in the amount of corporate law found at the federal level 
 
 384. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 381, at 395; Bratton & McCahery, supra note 339, 
 
, supra note 243, at 198. 
381, at 399. 
at 627.
 385. See BANNER
 386. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 
 387. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 339, at 629. 
 388. Id. at 626. 
 389. See Cary, supra note 374. 
 390. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993). 
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 national population that state law had failed to 
prev
discussed above, the federal government has largely avoided regulating 
corporate “internal affairs.”391 Congress has historically entered the field 
of company law only after economic and political shocks convinced a 
significant portion of the
ent insiders from deceiving outside investors.392  Intervention of the 
federal government has not eliminated the “equilibrium” of regulatory 
competition between the states, because it has restrained itself from 
straying too far from mere disclosure rules, reacting only when its hand 
was forced by events.393 
During the period of the great “trusts” (such as Standard Oil) and 
the abuses that marked the end of the 19th century, the federal govern-
ment seriously considered replacing the state corporate statutes with 
federal law; however, the project eventually lost momentum in light of 
more active antitrust prosecution.394  After the stock market crash of 
1929 and the severe economic depression that followed, the federal 
government entered the securities field in force with the Securities Act, 
the Exchange Act (which created the SEC), the Public Utility Holding 
Company Act of 1935,395 the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, the Invest-
ment Company Act and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.396  In 
2002, following the revelation of serious accounting misrepresentations 
by major corporations such as Enron and WorldCom and the collapse of 
the stock markets, the federal government enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act.  This Act sought to reinforce the existing system of disclosure by 
decreasing conflicts of interest, increasing accountability, and adding 
new types of disclosures.397  Conflicts of interest were reduced by strict-
ly controlling the services that auditors could provide to the companies 
they audit.398 Such control was achieved by inserting an audit committee 
 
 391. See supra notes 340-44 and accompanying text. 
hery, supra note 339, at 651 (stating that Congress has 
e pt for instances where action has 
e Creation of American Corporate Capitalism 
ssrn.com/abstract=586184. 
 
. 
.A. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2000). 
d at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78p (2006)). 
8j-1). 
 392. See Bratton & McCa
remain d silent on issues of corporate governance exce
been demanded nationwide). 
 393. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 339, at 619. 
 394. Lawrence E. Mitchell, Th
(George Washington Univ. L. School Pub. L. Research Paper No. 105, 2004), available 
at http://
 395. The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 79 to 79z-6
(2000)
 396. The Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C
 397. Sarbanes Oxley Act §§ 401-403 (codifie
 398. Id. §§ 201-202 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7
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overall disclosure 
syste
 and 
fraud
the securities laws and federal rules.404  Listing requirements cover a 
broad range of matters, from the “internal” composition of a company’s 
eholders for appro-
composed of independent directors into the boards of listed 
companies399 and by flatly outlawing company loans to directors.400  
These were clear incursions into the internal affairs of the regulated 
companies, but they were incursions related to the 
m.  Disclosures were improved by imposing internal checks on the 
creation of disclosure documents (i.e., accounts), as well as on the 
individuals who were responsible for their preparation.  Accountability 
was increased by requiring chief operating officers and chief financial 
officers to personally sign required disclosures and attest to the accuracy 
and completeness of their contents subject to civil and criminal 
liability.401 
With regard to the federal element in the regulatory competition 
system, one must remember that bankruptcy law – certain provisions of 
which serve capital maintenance functions – is federal law,402
ulent conveyances are regulated by a state law usually modeled on 
the NCCUSL’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.403  Nevertheless, even 
when one takes into account the federal elements discussed above, the 
degree of freedom left to the state corporate statute is still significantly 
higher than what is left to EU member states.  For listed companies, 
however, the detailed, mandatory listing requirements may bring the 
respective amounts of breathing room more or less into alignment. 
The initial and continued listing requirements of U.S. securities 
exchanges are indeed quite extensive and, before the 1930’s, they 
attempted to serve the investor protection function later performed by 
board405 and transactions that must be put to the shar
 
 399. Id. § 301 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 10f). 
 400. Id. § 402 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m). 
 401. Id. §§ 302, 807 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o(d)). 
 402. See generally Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (2000). 
 403. See Prefatory Note to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 7 A.U.L.A. §§ 
301-02 (1999). 
 404. See Coffee, supra note 114, at 34-36 (giving a comparative analysis of the 
rovided by the securities exchanges and describing their 
hareholder protection); Robert B. Thompson, Collaborative 
nual, supra note 326, ¶ 303A.01. 
shareholder protection p
function in the history of s
Corporate Governance: Listing Standards, State Law and Federal Regulation, 38 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 961, 972 (2003) (noting that NYSE rules against watered stock 
had been in force for members since 1869). 
 405. See NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Ma
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e; a serious 
violation of these conditions can lead to a company being expelled from 
the market t nts tend to 
be pervasive and mandatory, and thus further reduce the range of 
poss
val,406 to the “external” provision of information to the public,407 
minimum requirements for total assets and the required public disper-
sion of the company’s shares.408  These requirements are contractual 
conditions to a company’s listing on a given exchang
hrough involuntary de-listing.409  These requireme
ible competition between the laws of individual states. 
3.  Outreach Statutes and Foreign Corporations 
The relationships among the U.S. states in the area of company law 
offer interesting opportunities for comparison with parallel relationships 
in the European Union.  Because U.S. state law in this area exists in the 
shadow of the federal government’s power to regulate interstate com-
merce, the states in their dealings with each other may not enter into an 
area preempted by federal law or unduly impede interstate activity.410  
Courts have sought a balance between a state’s reserved traditional 
powers to police business within its borders on the one hand, and its 
obligations under the Constitution on the other; tension arises in the 
context of “foreign” and “pseudo-foreign” corporations.  The term 
“foreign corporation” denotes a company established and existing under 
the laws of a particular jurisdiction, whether that of a foreign country or 
another state of the United States, other than the state in which it is 
doing business.411  Although the term “pseudo-foreign” corporation is 
not found in statutes, legal literature uses it to designate a corporation 
that, although incorporated elsewhere, has most of its shareholders and 
business activities in the host state.412  Most states require only that a 
 
 406. See id. ¶ 312.03. 
 407. See id.  ¶ 202.00. 
 408. See id. ¶ 101.01.  For an analysis of the NYSE listing process and 
requirements, see Michael Gruson et al., Issuance and Listing of Securities by Foreign 
KS (Michael 
Company Manual, supra note 326, at ¶ 8. 
, 142 (1970). 
Banks and the U.S. Securities Laws, in REGULATION OF FOREIGN BAN
Gruson & Ralph Reisner eds., 4th ed. 2005). 
 409. See NYSE, Inc., Listed 
 410. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 640 (1982); Pike v. Bruce Church, 
Inc., 397 U.S. 137
 411. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 371(a) (2008); Model Bus. Corp. Act § 
1.40(10) (1984). 
 412. See Note, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations and the ‘Internal Affairs’ Rule, 1960 
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reholders in the company, to any 
corp
(thus foreign corporations retain the right to do business through state 
territory).418  There is no authoritative federal court decision determining 
affairs of a corporation in the 
foreign corporation register with the state and provide an in-state agent 
who can be served with process papers if a judicial action is filed against 
that entity.413  Some states, however, apply significant parts of their own 
corporate statutes to pseudo-foreign corporations.  For example, 
California applies its own rules regarding the election of directors, their 
duties, and the participation of sha
oration that is not listed on a national stock exchange if over half of 
its shareholders of record have California addresses and the company’s 
payroll is mainly paid in the state.414  New York requires the same type 
of foreign corporations (i.e., unlisted companies with significant oper-
ations in the state) to provide information to shareholders and applies 
New York law to actions against company directors and to the 
determination of director liability.415 
The state power to impose such requirements on corporations 
formed under laws not its own, but rather of another state, has not been 
clearly defined;416 nevertheless, the power is considered to be extensive.  
A state may completely ban foreign corporations from operating within 
state territory,417 so long as such action does not deprive those corpora-
tions of their constitutional rights or interfere with interstate commerce 
whether a state may regulate the internal 
m w York, but there has 
 
anner done by the laws of California and Ne
DUKE L.J. 477 (1960). 
 413. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 371(b); Model Bus. Corp. Act § 15.03(a). 
 414. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (Deering 2008). 
 415. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 1315-20 (McKinney 2008). 
 416. See John C. Coffee, Jr. et al., Symposium Remarks, The Direction of Corporate 
ECHT (2004). 
L., supra note 417, § 8388 (2005); 36 AM. JUR. 2D Foreign 
Law: The Scholar’s Perspective, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79, 103 (1999).  One of the most 
detailed analyses of this state-to-state relationship has been written in German.  See 
STEFAN KLEIN, DIE RECHTSSTELLUNG AUSWÄRTIGER GESELLSCHAFTEN IM DEUTSCHEN 
UND US-AMERIKANISCHEN R
 417. See WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF 
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS  § 8386 (2005); 36 AM. JUR. 2D Foreign Corporations § 182 
(2001); see also Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 282 U.S. 440, 444 (1931); Eli 
Lilly & Co. v. Sav-On-Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S. 276, 279 (1961). 
 418. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Jenkins, 297 U.S. 629, 636 (1936); Furst v. 
Brewster, 282 U.S. 493, 498 (1931); Cudahy Packing Co. v. Hinkle, 278 U.S. 460, 466 
(1929); FLETCHER ET A
Corporations § 192 (2001). 
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 ultimate authority in 
matt
been considerable speculation on the matter.419  In addition, aside from a 
finding that such statutes interfere with interstate commerce or are 
preempted by an expanding federal regulation of corporations,420 there is 
little constitutional basis for challenging the statutes.  First, the 
“Privileges and Immunities Clause” of the United States Constitution421 
– a principal constitutional tool for guaranteeing the citizens of one state 
certain freedoms and rights in another state – has been held not to apply 
to corporations.422  Second, no federal court has authoritatively applied 
the “Full Faith and Credit Clause”423 to guarantee that the structure of 
internal affairs governance of a corporation created in one state will be 
respected in such form in another state.424  It is important for this ques-
tion to note that pseudo-foreign corporation laws (of the type used in 
California) have already existed without significant challenge for 
approximately 50 years; it is therefore unlikely that they would be struck 
down on any ground other than federal preemption – if federal rules on 
internal affairs continue to expand as they have in the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, and in the very unlikely event that they would apply to unlisted 
companies.  Given that state courts do not have
ers of federal constitutional law, the predictable assertions of 
authority that have been made by the Delaware and California courts 
should not be given undue weight on this issue.425 
 
 419. See Richard M. Buxbaum, The Threatened Constitutionalization of the Internal 
ce of Law and the 
f America, 101 HARV. L. REV. 96 (1987); KLEIN, 
.S. 519 (1839), discussed in GEVURTZ, 
, 625 A.2d 859, 665-66 (Del. 
Affairs Doctrine in Corporation Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 29 (1987); Willis L. M. Reese & 
Edmund M. Kaufman, The Law Governing Corporate Affairs: Choi
Impact of Full Faith and Credit, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 1118 (1958); Donald C. 
Langevoort, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Corporate Takeovers: A Comment 
on CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. o
supra note 416, at 360. 
 420. On this question, see Langevoort, supra note 419, at 110. 
 421. U.S. Const., art. IV, § 2 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all 
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”). 
 422. See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U
supra note 150, at 37-38, and Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. 
Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181(1888). 
 423. U.S. Const., art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to 
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”). 
 424. For a thorough, recent discussion (in German), see KLEIN, supra note 416, at 
383.  For older treatment by U.S. scholars, see Buxbaum, supra note 419, at 43-44; see 
generally Reese & Kaufman, supra note 419. 
 425. See Draper v. Paul N. Gardner Defined Plan Trust
1993) (holding that Delaware law governs a shareholder derivative suit brought on 
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.428  Nevertheless, given the de-
gree to which company law has been (and is still being) harmonized 
throughout at foreign 
companies pose to host member states is probably smaller than what 
migh
Cases addressing possible conflicts between federal and state law 
have stressed that, because corporations are “creatures of the states,” 
state law should be given considerable deference in questions of internal 
affairs.426  This does not necessarily imply, however, that equal defer-
ence must be given if there is a conflict between two states with regard 
to “foreign” corporations that base their operations in the host state.  
This has led states to adopt provisions on “foreign” corporations that 
vary in the requirements they impose on such companies.427  As will be-
come clear in Part V.B, states have a considerably freer hand than their 
EU member state counterparts in regulating the presence of “foreign” 
corporations doing business on their soil
the European Union, the threat (if any) th
t be imagined in the United States. 
4.  A Foreseeable Future of Stable Development 
In the United States, the comparatist can look back on a 200-year 
history of company law that has not been significantly interrupted by 
war or tumultuous ideological turnarounds.  The long-term trend has 
been for authority to gradually pass from the states to the federal 
government.  Though initially held back by various cultural, economic 
and political forces, states entered the fray to compete for franchise 
revenues by loosening their grip on companies until abuses and market 
breakdowns provoked federal action, such as the “trust busting” at the 
turn of the 20th Century429, the enactment of the securities laws in the 
1930’s, the various amendments and rules added to the latter over the 
decades, and most recently the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.  It is safe to 
 
behalf of a Delaware corporation in California except in “the rarest situations”).  The 
courts of California, on the other hand, have approved imposing their cumulative voting 
provisions on pseudo-foreign corporations.  See, e.g., Wilson v. Louisiana-Pacific Res., 
Inc., 138 Cal. App. 3d 216, 187 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); Valtz v. Penta Inv. Corp., 139 
Cal. App. 3d 803, 808 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (applying conflicting California rules to 
shareholder information rights to Delaware corporations). 
rica, 481 U.S. 69, 86 (1987); Santa 
00 et seq. (Deering 2008) with N.Y. BUS. 
ney 2008). 
d 717, 722 (Del. 1971). 
 426. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Ame
Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977). 
 427. Compare CAL. CORP. CODE § 21
CORP. LAW §§ 1301-20 (McKin
 428. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 429. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2
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ause Delaware’s customers to 
question the efficacy of their rent payments.”431  Along these lines, the 
future s ombi-
nation o ght of 
the resp
ments m sors of 
Profess oberta 
Roman market 
forces l
ority of states eventually settling upon one format. . . .  The 
dynamic production of corporation laws exemplifies how federal-
Be y the 
interest by the 
general
shareholders. . . . states seeking to attract incorporations have an 
incentive to focus on the interests of shareholders and managers, 
assume that the government’s economic intervention to abet the 
financial crisis of 2008 will be followed by a further tightening of the 
federal reigns.  However, Professors William W. Bratton and Joseph A. 
McCahery rightly see “no political incentives that might encourage 
federal micromanagement of the charter market.”430  They observe: 
“Failing that, corporate federalism remains robust, so long as the federal 
government and stock exchanges continue to refrain from allocating to 
themselves so much subject matter as to c
hape of U.S. company law will likely be decided by a c
f the stability of the securities markets and the popular wei
ective arguments for and against state chartering.  Those argu-
ay well be led in person or by the intellectual succes
or Lucien A. Bebchuk in one corner, and Professor R
o in the other.  Romano has convincingly argued that 
ead the way to higher quality law: 
[T]he diffusion of corporate law reform initiatives across the states 
[leads to] . . . experimental variation regarding the statutory form 
thought to be best suited for handling a particular problem, followed 
by a maj
ism’s delegation of a body of law to the states can create an effective 
laboratory for experimentation and innovation. . . .  Innovation en-
hances revenues from charter fees and the local corporate bar’s 
income from servicing local clients.432 
bchuk has countered that such market forces are driven b
s of the constituencies in control of corporations, and not 
 good: 
[There is a] divergence between the interests of managers and con-
trolling shareholders and the interests of public shareholders. . . . 
managers may well seek, and states in turn may well provide, rules 
that . . . serve the private interests of managers and controlling 
 
 430. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 339, at 696. 
 431. Id. 
 432. Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State 
Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 246-47 (2006). 
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e 
comparative  in 
which ersity 
in co
they will tend to ignore the interests of other parties.  As a result, 
state competition may well produce undesirable rules whenever 
significant externalities are present.433 
This argument is unlikely to be settled in the near future.  Th
view from Europe, however, is relatively clear:  the way
U.S. states and the federal government have approached div
mpany law and the need to develop uniform rules has been – and 
will continue to be – markedly different from the process in Europe. 
C. Company Law in Europe: Integration by Chance and by Choice 
1.  Historical Influences Preceding EU Market Integration 
In 1811, as New York was adopting the first U.S. corporate law 
statute, the Duke of Wellington was in Portugal fighting armies allied 
with Napoleon Bonaparte, who controlled most of Continental 
Europe.   As would be the case for many wars to come, the financing 
for the military campaigns waged from Brittany to Moscow was ar-
ranged in London; it was at this time that the Rothschild brothers began 
their banking career by channeling currency to the Duke of Wellington 
and transferring subsidy payments from London to Britain’s various 
European allies.   Thus, although Britain was deeply involved in a 
number of major conflicts that had a much lesser effect on the United 
States, these conflicts tended to strengthen its centrality as a corporate 
and financial center.  Indeed, in the first of many transactions, the 
Rothschild brothers arranged a Sterling denominated bond issue for war 
torn Prussia in 1818, creating what Professor Niall Ferguson calls a 
“watershed in the history of the European capital market . . . . [a] 
deliberate Anglicisation of a foreign loan . .  a
434
435
.  new departure for the 
international capital market.”436  Such developments solidified and 
further developed corporate and financial structures that had been ori-
ginally devised in the British overseas trading companies, such as the 
 
 433. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits 
olmes, “Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, Duke of,” in THE OXFORD 
ITARY HISTORY, (Richard Holmes ed., Oxford 2001). 
on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1509 (1992). 
 434. Richard H
COMPANION TO MIL
 435. NIALL FERGUSON, THE HOUSE OF ROTHSCHILD: MONEY’S PROPHETS, 1798-
1848, -85 (1998). 
 436. Id. at 124. 
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Massachusetts Bay Company and the East India Company.437  Thus 
neither British markets nor British company law was affected by the 
kind of devastating shocks that Roe describes.438 
Germany had a very different experience.  After the French occupa-
tion, the gradual unification of the German states (which was greatly 
accelerated and completed by Otto von Bismarck in 1871439) roughly 
coincided with the adoption of the first German Stock Corporation Act 
in 1870,440 which was an enabling statute, rather than a system of 
concessions.441  Professor Alfred Chandler has compared this period to a 
similar phenomenon, taking place in the United States, of industrial 
expansion and search for corporate vehicles that could amass large quan-
tities of capital.442  Thereafter, however, any comparison of Germany 
with either the United States or the United Kingdom is impossible.  No 
country experienced greater swings of events, legislation and ideology in 
the 20th Century than Germany.  In 1914, German stock markets boasted 
more listed companies than the United States.443  Yet during a mere 
thirty years from 1919 to 1949, Germany abruptly jolted through five 
forms of government: from a monarchy to a democracy to a Nazi dicta-
torship,444 and then split into two separate governments, one democratic 
and the other communist.445  As Nazi ideology came to dominate 
Germany, legal scholars advocated the idea of having a strong leader (a 
 437. Margaret Wilkinson, “companies, trading,” in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO 
H
R DIE 
CALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL 
INANCIAL SYSTEM 425, 426 (Jan Pieter Krahnen & 
eds., 2003). 
BRITIS  HISTORY (John Cannon ed., Oxford 1997). 
 438. See supra Part II.C. 
 439. See LOTHAR GALL, BISMARCK, DER WEIßE REVOLUTIONÄR 449 (2001). 
 440. This was the first German corporate statute mainly because Germany as a state 
was just coming into existence.  The first corporate statute in Germany was the Prussian 
statute, which existed since 1848.  See GESETZ ÜBER DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT FÜ
KÖNIGLICH PREUßISCHEN STAATEN VOM 9. NOVEMBER 1843 (Theodor Baums ed.,1981). 
 441. See Johannes Semler, MÜNCHNER KOMMENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESETZ 
Introduction, margin no. 21 (Bruno Kropff & Johannes Semler eds., 2d ed. 2000). 
 442. ALFRED CHANDLER, S
CAPITALISM 428 (1990). See generally Brian R. Cheffins, Mergers and Corporate 
Ownership Structure: The United States and Germany at the Turn of the 20th Century, 
51 AM. J. COMP. L. 473 (2003). 
 443. See Erik Nowack, Investor Protection and Capital Market Regulation in 
Germany, in THE GERMAN F
Reinhard H. Schmidt 
 444. See, e.g., MICHAEL STOLLEIS, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAW IN GERMANY 1914-45 
(Thomas Dunlap trans., 2004). 
 445. See, e.g., id. 
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450 (which was often quite similar to U.S. practice).  Extreme 
currents of history no longer buffet Germany; it is reasonable to assume 
that in y law 
will be influenced primarily by the integration of the European and 
worl
Union.  Around the same time this drive to harmonization was beginning 
e country rule and subsidiarity came 
Führer) on company boards; the position of a Chairman/CEO who could 
override the will of his board was introduced into the Aktiengesetz in 
1937.446  Following World War II, U.S. and British occupation forces 
also advocated changes to German company law in the image of their 
own laws, such as by introducing registered shares.447  When the occu-
pation was over, Germany set out to create one of the most labor-
friendly company laws in history.448  Following the Cold War, Germany 
essentially adopted an entire framework of securities and takeover 
legislation449 and amended its corporate law significantly, as recom-
mended by a panel of experts, to bring it in line with international best 
practice
 the foreseeable future the development of German compan
d markets and actions taken through or together with the European 
Union. 
2. Market Integration From Harmonization To Competition 
Part IV.A explained in some detail how European directives shaped 
the company laws of member states beginning in 1968.  This program 
has substantially harmonized the laws governing public companies and 
has created a system of securities laws that is nearly identical across the 
to wane, a new preference for hom
 
 446. Johannes Semler, MÜNCHNER KOMMENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESETZ Introduction, 
margin no. 26 (Bruno Kropff & Johannes Semler eds., 2d ed. 2000). 
rmination of Employees in the Supervisory Boards and 
 1951;  was a
rt III.A for a brief 
 447. See Hanno Merkt, Die Geschichte der Namensaktie, in DIE NAMENSAKTIE 83 
(R. von Rosen & W. Seifert eds., 2000). 
 448. The Law on Co-Dete
Management Boards of Enterprises Engaged in the Mining Iron and Steel Industries 
was adopted in the Works Constitution Act dopted in 1952; and the Co-
Determination Act of 1976 was adopted in that year.  See supra Pa
discussion of co-determination. 
 449. The Securities Trading Act was adopted in 1994; the Securities Prospectus Act 
was adopted in 1998; the Takeover Act was adopted in 2001; and the Exchange Act was 
thoroughly reformed in 2002. 
 450. See generally BERICHT DER REGIERUNGSKOMMISSION CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: UNTERNEHMENSFÜHRUNG, UNTERNEHMENSKONTROLLE, 
MODERNISIERUNG DES AKTIENRECHTS (Theodore Baums ed., 2001). 
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 the member states, including Germany.  
As t
 
upon Europe,451 partly from the judicial initiative of the ECJ,452 and 
partly in connection with the politics of introducing majority rule 
through the Single European Act.453  Subsequently, the harmonization 
process stopped.  However, a series of ECJ decisions beginning in 1999 
and decided on the basis of the right of establishment guaranteed 
companies in Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty454 made deep cuts into 
the national company laws of
he substance of public companies has been harmonized, particularly 
the creation and maintenance of their capital, relevant cases arose in 
respect of private companies. 
First, in Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen,455 the ECJ 
found that Denmark must allow a UK private limited company to freely 
establish itself in its territory, even if Danish citizens used the company 
for the sole purpose of evading Denmark’s stricter laws on capital ade-
quacy, and even if the company conducted none of its business in the 
United Kingdom.456  Then, in Überseering BV v Nordic Construction 
Company Baumanagement GmbH,457 the ECJ found that Germany’s 
conflict of laws rules, as they had been applied to a Dutch company, 
impeded freedom of establishment.458  Unlike the United States, which 
applies the “incorporation theory”459 so that the internal affairs of a 
corporation are governed by the laws of its state of incorporation, 
Germany has traditionally applied the “real seat” (or siège réel) theory, 
 451. See Timmermans, supra note 262, at 626. 
 452. A major breakthrough in the philosophy of home country rule came in the 
famous Cassis de Dijon movement of goods case, Rewe-Zentrale AG v. 
Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, Case 120/78, [1979] ECR 649. 
commitment signed in 1986 to 
, persons, services and capital is ensured”) by 1992.  
, it introduced voting by qualified majority on a number of matters 
etary union, and gave more power to the European Parliament.  
supra note 6, at 12. 
3.2 (3d ed. 2000). 
 453. The “Single European Act” was a political 
create a single, integrated European market (“an area without internal frontiers in which 
the free movement of goods
Among other things
that had required unanimity and were consequently deadlocked, addressed increased 
cooperation as a mon
See CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, 
 454. See EC Treaty, supra note 250, at arts. 43, 48. 
 455. Centros Uberseering Ltd. v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, Case No. C-
212/97, [1999] ECR I-01459. 
 456. Id. at ¶ 39. 
 457. BV v. Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH, Case C-208/00, 
[2002] ECR I-09919. 
 458. Id. at ¶¶ 93-94. 
 459. EUGENE F. SCOLES et al., CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 2
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an court’s argument, that its application of 
Germ
under which the internal affairs of a corporation are governed by the 
laws of the state where it has its center of administration.460  Through the 
application of the real seat theory to a Dutch company – whose shares 
came to be owned by German investors, and which was operated in 
Germany – the German court applied German law and found that the 
company was not properly constituted and registered as a German 
corporation, thus denying it legal standing to sue in a court of law.461  
Overruling the German court, the ECJ followed its decision in Centros 
and found that denying a company that was duly formed in another 
member state the legal capacity to be party to legal proceedings was 
“tantamount to an outright negation of the freedom of establishment 
conferred on companies by Articles 43 and 48” of the EC Treaty.462  The 
Court rejected the Germ
an company law to pseudo-foreign corporations was justified 
because it enhanced legal certainty and the protection of creditors and 
minority shareholders.463 
It is unclear whether the Überseering decision has changed 
Germany’s conflict of laws rules for corporations, the substantive law 
that results from their application, or both.464  The seat theory will re-
main for companies incorporated outside of the European Union unless a 
friendship treaty applies465 or legislation currently being discussed in 
 
 460. See id. § 23.1; Wulf-Henning Roth, From Centros to Ueberseering:  Free 
Movement of Companies, Private International Law, and Community Law, 52 ICLQ 
175, 180-81 (2003).  According to Prof. Roth, the “center of administration” as under-
stood in Germany is “the location where the internal management decisions are 
transformed into the day-to-day activities of a company.”  Roth at 181, citing the 
decision of the German High Federal Court reported in the German Federal Law 
. 
, [2002] ECR I-09919, at ¶¶ 6-12. 
commerce treaty between the United States 
and
 for the recognition of companies and their right to enter 
, Commerce and Navigation, U.S. – Germany, July 14, 1956, art. 
Reporter on Civil Cases (BGHZ), vol. 97, p. 269, at 272
 461. Uberseering
 462. Id. at ¶ 93. 
 463. Id. at ¶¶ 83-94. 
 464. Roth, supra note 460, at 207-08. 
 465. For example, the friendship and 
 Germany provides in Article VII that 
[n]ationals and companies of either Party shall be accorded, within the territories of 
the other Party, national treatment with respect to engaging in all types of commercial, 
industrial, financial and other activity for gain, whether in a dependent or an 
independent capacity, and whether directly or by agent or through the medium of any 
form of lawful juridical entity
and trade in the jurisdiction. 
Treaty of Friendship
VII, 7 U.S.T. 1839. 
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ctive, and imposed 
unlim
 expressly 
preempt d l preemption action 
to invali at
Un er 
Inspire Art
freedom of
another member state, unless the laws  
crite
a member state may use in 
assessing the permissibility of the affect its company law and related 
legislation may have on companies formed under the law of another 
member state.  One clear rule that emerges from the decisions is that, al-
 
Germany to adopt the incorporation theory also applies to non-EU 
companies.  In a subsequent major decision in this area, Kamer van 
Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam and Inspire Art Ltd,466 the 
ECJ held that a Dutch outreach statute against pseudo-foreign corpora-
tions was inconsistent with the EC Treaty.  The statute required the 
branches of companies incorporated abroad to make disclosures beyond 
those provided for in the Eleventh Company Law dire
ited liability as a penalty for failure to comply with these and other 
requirements, such as a minimum capital requirement.467  From the 
perspective of comparative analysis with U.S. federalism, the Inspire Art 
decision is interesting in that it is based both on freedom of establish-
ment (which is not guaranteed for companies by the U.S. Constitu-
tion),468 and on the theory that member state action has been
e by an EU directive,469 not unlike a federa
d e a state law under the U.S. Constitution. 
d the ECJ decisions in cases such as Centros, Überseering, and 
, member state laws will be unlawful if they burden the 
  establishment of a company formed under the laws of 
of the host state remain within the
ria set forth in Gebhard v Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e 
Procuratori di Milano.  These criteria require that the law be: 
• applied in a non-discriminatory manner, 
• justified by imperative requirements in the public interest, 
• suitable for securing  the attainment of the objective which 
they pursue, and 
• not beyond what is necessary in order to attain it.470 
The vertical impact of these decisions is to apply a clear principle 
of supremacy of EU law over member state national company law; the 
horizontal impact is to create standards that 
 466. [2003] ECR I-10155. 
 467. Id. at ¶ 143. 
 468. See supra Part V.A. 
 469. [2003] ECR I-10155, ¶¶  66-72. 
 470. Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano 
[1995] ECR I-4165, ¶ 37. 
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though membe dulent actions 
by foreign companies, the deliberate use of a system of company law 
that 
ate of incorporation and 
travel w  to the 
sale of teres-
ting tw e EU 
Transpa , at least 
with respect to disclosure rules.  Under the title “Integration of securities 
markets,” Article 3 of that Directive provides: 
 
r states may protect themselves from frau
relies on disclosure (especially one found in the First and Eleventh 
Company Law Directives), rather than legal capital to protect creditors 
does not constitute such fraudulent action.471 
3. A Curious Twist For EU Securities Law 
EU securities law currently offers an interesting chance for 
observation, especially from a comparative point of view.  A securities 
exchange is essentially an organized market with specific rules for entry; 
these rules apply only to individuals participating in or listed on the 
market.  This “market oriented” logic is the foundation for the theory on 
the “bonding” function of dual listing472 and has traditionally governed 
rules for applying securities law.473  The applicability of a nation’s 
securities laws is usually determined by a trader or vendor’s entrance 
into that nation’s territory or market.  The U.S. Regulation S474, for 
example, takes the rational step to remove sales of securities from U.S. 
supervision if no offers or sales are made to persons in the United States 
and if the U.S. market is not conditioned for sales of the securities 
through “directed selling efforts” in the country.475  Thus, unlike the 
rules governing a corporation’s “internal affairs” – which, under the 
incorporation theory, are derived from the st
ith the corporation wherever it goes – the rules applicable
securities had been derived from the place of sale.  In an in
ist that locks securities law and company law together, th
rency Directive has turned this traditional rule around
 471. See Timmermans, supra note 262, at 633. 
 472. For a classic discussion of the bonding function, see Coffee, supra note 62, at 
691; for a more recent discussion, see Laurent Frésard & Carolina Salva, Does Cross-
listing in the U.S. Really Improve Corporate Governance? Evidence from the Value of 
Corporate Liquidity (EFA 2007 Ljubljana Meetings Paper), available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=958506. 
 473. See e.g., Council Directive 2003/6, 2003 O.J. (L 96) 23 (EC). 
 474. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.901 (2008). 
 475. See Meritt B. Fox, The Political Economy of Statutory Reach: U.S. Disclosure 
Rules in a Globalizing Market for Securities, 97 MICH. L. REV. 696, 708 (1998). 
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 in this Directive. 
law, Professors Luca Enriques and Tobias H. Tröger conclude that 
considerable latitude for regulatory arbitrage exists in Europe “with 
The home Member State may make an issuer subject to requirements 
more stringent than those laid down in this Directive. The home 
Member State may also make a holder of shares . . . subject to 
requirements more stringent than those laid down
A host Member State may not . . . as regards the admission of 
securities to a regulated market in its territory, impose disclosure 
requirements more stringent than those laid down in this Directive or 
in Article 6 of [the Market Abuse Directive].476 
For EU issuers of equity securities, the “home member state” is the 
state of its registered office,477 which would be the state of 
incorporation.  As a result, EU issuers will carry any disclosure 
obligations exceeding the EU floor with them regardless of the market 
on which their securities are traded.  This reverses the traditional choice 
of law rule for securities regulation, advances the need to consider a 
venue for listing to the time of incorporating the company, and adds an 
element that will be taken into consideration in regulatory competition 
between member states. 
As Professor Eilís Ferran has observed, on one hand this regime 
removes competition with respect to home state issuers because they 
will not be locked into any higher standard of disclosure; on the other 
hand, the regime could for precisely this reason create a flight to re-
incorporate in states where securities regulators have the strongest 
reputations.478  Depending on whether private remedies seeking civil lia-
bility in connection with securities fraud are codified within securities 
laws themselves or in general remedies for misrepresentation or fraud, 
differences in such remedies (potential plaintiffs or defendants, stan-
dards of culpability, or matters of proof and causation) could reinforce 
or counteract this migratory pressure.  Following a detailed survey of 
EU securities legislation in connection with provisions on applicable 
 
 476. Council Directive 2004/109, 2004 O.J. (L 390) 44.  The law applicable under 
the Market Abuse Directive retains the traditional market orientation approach and is 
that of the member state in which the securities are listed on a regulated market.  
Council Directive 2003/6, 2003 O.J. (L 96) 23; see also Luca Enriques & Tobias H. 
, o. 90, 2007), 
281. 
RAN, supra note 249, at 154. 
Tröger  Issuer Choice in Europe, 13-14 (ECGI Law Working Paper N
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1032
 477. Council Directive 2004/109, 2004 O.J. (L 390) 44. 
 478. FER
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nsely harmonized takeover law.”479  Regulatory 
com
ry competition as in the United States – actually increase it.  
This would offer new possibilities for states to compete in the charter 
m  
exchanges. 
 
regard to the regime of private liability for false statements in disclosure 
documents, the public administration and enforcement of securities laws 
in general, and less de
petition in European securities law could thus contribute more to 
future competition for company charters than the differences in 
corporate law statutes. 
This type of competition may also add diversity to markets.  Under 
the Transparency Directive480 a company incorporated in Germany and 
listed on the London Stock Exchange will, under UK law, be subjected 
to rules no stricter than those provided for by the European Community; 
but if Germany were to impose stricter rules on its own companies, the 
stock of the German company could compete for superior governance 
and disclosure against that of UK companies on the UK market.  This 
could potentially have an effect similar to market segments, such as the 
LSE’s “Main Market” and AIM (Alternative Investment Market),481 or 
Frankfurt’s “prime standard.”482  By allowing securities to fly different 
national flags that can legally signal stricter governance, securities 
regulation and stock exchange rules in Europe could – rather than level-
ling regulato
arket while all but eliminating competition between national
4. A Future For Regulatory Competition of Corporate Law In Europe? 
By rolling back the member state regulation of foreign corporations 
affecting freedom of establishment, the ECJ opened the gates to signifi-
cant regulatory competition of company law.  Indeed, as discussed 
above, scholarly speculation in recent years has focused only on whether 
the motivational and legal conditions for regulatory competition exist in 
Europe,483 and not on the legality of the competition itself.  Disclosure 
and securities fraud regimes could provide such a motive.  However, 
even though the European Commission’s Advisory Group of Non-
Governmental Experts on Corporate Governance and Company Law is 
 479. Enriques & Tröger, supra note 476, at 58, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
te 476. 
=1032281. 
 480. See id. at 12-13. 
 481. LONDON STOCK EXCH., ANNUAL REPORT 12 (2007). 
 482. FRANKFURT STOCK EXCH., Rules § 63. 
 483. See, e.g., Armour, supra note 161; Enriques & Tröger, supra no
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ork done by market segments with different listing 
standards – is a very interesting development.  None of these possibili-
ties should be excluded by xamining company law in 
the European Union. 
moving away from harmonized regulation, Professor Theodor Baums484 
has observed that the proposed creation of a European Private Company 
“could well take the form of a regulation so as to create a true organiza-
tional form that can be used in all member state[s].” 485  The existence of 
such an entity under EU law would greatly reduce incentives for state 
competition among private companies.  For public companies, a Euro-
pean task force set out in 2007 to create a “European Model Company 
Law Act” comparable to the U.S. Model Business Corporation Act.486  
Such a model act would offer member states a chance to voluntarily 
harmonize that part of company law which has not already been shaped 
by directives and the decisions of the ECJ.  Especially for the newer and 
smaller member states, this type of pre-packaged legal expertise could 
prove extremely attractive.487  Given the currently foreseeable range of 
technical possibilities in company law, the pressure of internationally 
active investors to seek ever-increasing uniformity in securities regula-
tion, the possible introduction of an EPC, and the creation of a European 
Model Company Act, the space for competitive signaling will likely 
become even smaller than it is now.  As it has in the past, however, com-
petition can always still arise in connection with unforeseen innovations. 
The possibility of flagged securities competing on a single exchange – 
thus replicating the w
 the comparatist e
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article has attempted to provide guidance in approaching 
comparative company law.  It identified some common errors that occur 
in comparative law, offers some guidelines to help avoid such errors, 
and provides a framework for entering into studies of the company laws 
of three major jurisdictions.  Part I discussed some of the problems that 
 
 484. Professor Baums is a member of the European Commission’s advisory group of 
non-governmental experts on corporate governance and company law. 
 485. Theodor Baums, European Company Law Beyond the Action Plan 9 (ECGI 
Working Paper No. 81, 2007). 
 486. See Theodor Baums, The European Model Company Law Act Project (ILF 
Working Paper No. 75, 2008) (available only in German). 
 487. Id. at 5-6. 
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com
can arise in comparative law and offers a few points of caution.  These 
approach coordinates aspire to be useful for practical, theoretical and 
applied (legislative) comparative law.  Part II presented some relatively 
famous, concrete examples of comparative analysis gone astray, and the 
debate they generated, in order to demonstrate the utility of heeding the 
approach coordinates.  Part II further explained how “anecdotal” com-
parisons, simplified or deductive comparisons, and comparisons with 
strong prejudices yield little knowledge about the legal systems they 
analyze.  Part III provided an example of using functional definition to 
demarcate the area to be compared – here, “company law” – offering an 
“effects test” to determine whether a given provision of law should be 
considered as functionally part of the rules that govern the core 
characteristics of companies.  Part III did this by presenting the relevant 
company law statutes and related topical laws of Germany, the United 
Kingdom and the United States, using Delaware as a proxy for the 50 
states.  Part IV analyzed the field of functions that comprises “company 
law” in the United States and the European Union.  That Part selected as 
the predominant factor for consideration the jurisdictions, sub-juris-
dictions and rule-making entities that have legislative or rule-making 
competence in the relevant territorial unit, analyzed the extent of their 
power, presented the type of law (rules) they enact (issue), and discussed 
the concrete manner in which the laws and rules of the jurisdictions and 
sub-jurisdictions can legally interact.  Part V looked at the way these 
jurisdictions do interact on the temporal axis of history (that is, their 
actual influence on each other) which, in the relevant jurisdictions, 
currently takes the form of regulatory competition and legislative 
harmonization.  An understanding of the type of historical development 
a particular jurisdiction has experienced and is currently exhibiting 
clarifies not only possible causal connections between legislative chan-
ges and changes in legal systems, but gives a better insight into how the 
respective countries and jurisdictions can be usefully compared.  Finally, 
this Part VI concludes with the finding that a mild form of regulatory
petition can be expected to characterize the development of com-
pany law in the United States and that in Europe a judicially led opening 
of competition may be tempered by an increasing uniformity in 
company vehicles, although the future competition of various national 
securities on a single securities market presents interesting possibilities. 
This Article has provided an explanatory framework that can and 
should be filled in with more detailed analysis.  The potential influence 
of certain constituencies on the bodies responsible for certain types of 
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in its analysis of 
U.S., German and UK law.  Finally, this Article has offered an 
“approach” to comparative company law that can also serve as an 
introduction to comparing the company laws of the United Kingdom, the 
United States and Germany.  As is the task of scholarship generally, it 
hopes to clear the way for future progress in the field. 
 
rules in each jurisdiction and the effects of linking an ever-greater 
number of sub-jurisdictions within inter- or supranational frameworks 
are examples of such detailed analysis.  Economic, historical and politi-
cal studies, in particular, would have to accompany any conclusions 
formulated under the framework presented. As information on foreign 
law is sometimes rather difficult to find, this Article has also attempted 
to provide as much detailed information as possible 
